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(For Austin)

The Legislature cannot enact laws that violate Natural Law.

NOTE:Keep in mind . . . neither Man nor Woman can be denied the right to remedy by the common law, but the legislature can foreclose all of that bodies creations (contemplations of the legislative process) from access to the common law. This is of course, because the common law is exclusive to and serves the genus Man. The foreclosure of certain holdings of the courts made prior to 1938 is simply an admission by the legislature and judiciary that the implementation of HJR-192 created a forum wholly commercial and reduced to mere equitable consideration in its dealings. The genus Man i.e. a substantive and thereby biological property responsible wholly unto Him or Herself and particularly His or Her Creator. (Where the confusion manifests itself, lies with the legislature to craft the necessary fictitious instruments to traverse that no mans land that exists between substance and fiction. Man at all times moves in his natural person, He cannot be compelled to cross that chasm of legislative fiat, nor can he be compelled to enter that realm of the manipulation of Gods creations for the purpose to avoid the substantive common law, while at all times causing Man to erroneously believe that He must rely on mere fictitious instruments to move in the legislatively created ether of make believe and contemplations of law to the exclusion of the common and thereby, Natural law.


Fiction yields to truth {Fictio cedit veritati};

Laws are made to prevent the stronger from having the power to do everything {Inde datæ leges ne fortior omnia posset; Dav. 36};

Favor ought not to be able to bend justice, power to break it, nor money to corrupt it; for not only if it be overborne, but if it be abandoned or negligently observed,no one can think that he holds anything securely, or that he will inherit any thing from his father, or be able to leave any thing to his children {Jus nec inflecti gratia, nec frangi potentia, nec adulterari pecunia potest; quod si non modo oppressum, sed desertum aut negligentia asservatum fuerit, nihil est quod quisquam se habere certum, aut a patre accepturum, aut liberis esse relicturum, arbitretur};

The law of God and the law of the land are all one; and both preserve and favor the common and public good of the land{Le ley de dieu et ley de terre sont tout un; et l’un et l’autre preferre et favour le common et publique bien del terre;Keilw. 191};

We can do nothing against truth {Nihil possumus contra veritatem; St. Albans, Doct. & Stu. Dial. 2, c. 6};

It is a miserable slavery where the law is vague or uncertain{Misera est servitus, ubi jus est vagum aut incertum};

All men are freemen or slaves {Omnes homines aut liberi sunt aut servi};

The thing speaks for itself {Res ipsa loquitur};

If you depart from the law, you will go astray, and all things will be uncertain to everybody {Si a jure discedas, vagus eris, et erunt omnia omnibus incerta; Coke, Litt. 227};

That is the highest law which favors religion{Summa est lex quæ pro religione facit;10 Mod. 117, 119; 2 Chanc. Cas. 18};

The torture or wresting of laws is the worst (kind of torture) {Tortura legum pessima};

One absurdity being allowed, an infinity follows {Uno absurdo dato, infinita sequuntur; 1 Coke, 102};

and that class of authority, infra:

Silvera v Lockyer No. 01-15098 (9th Cir. 05/06/2003) (The majority falls prey to the delusion—popular in some circles—that ordinary people are too careless and stupid to own guns, and we would be far better off leaving all weapons in the hands of professionals on the government payroll. But the simple truth—born of experience—is that tyranny thrives best where government need not fear the wrath of an armed people. Our own sorry history bears this out: Disarmament was the tool of choice for subjugating both slaves and free blacks in the South. In Florida, patrols searched blacks’ homes for weapons, confiscated those found and punished their owners without judicial process.

See Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 Geo. L.J. 309, 338 (1991). What the Second Amendment prohibits is not reasonable regulation consistent with its purposes, but disarmament of the people.);

United States v. Seeger 380 U.S. 163, 172, 85 S.Ct. 850, 13 L.Ed.2d 733 (1965) (There is a higher loyalty than loyalty to this country, loyalty to God.)

Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States143 U.S. 457, 12 Sup. Ct. 511(1892) (There is no dissonance in these declarations. There is a universal language pervading them all, having one meaning; they affirm and reaffirm that this is a religious nation. These are not individual sayings, declarations of private persons; they are organic utterances; they speak the voice of the entire people. While because of a general recognition of this truth the question has seldom been presented to the courts, yet we find that in Updegraph v. Com. 11 Serg. and R. 394, 400, it was decided that, “Christianity, general Christianity, is, and always has been, a part of the common law of Pennsylvania; … Not Christianity with an established church, and titles, and spiritual courts; but Christianity with liberty of conscience to all men” And in People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns 290, 294, 295, Chancellor Kent, the great commentator on American law, speaking as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New York, said “The people of this State, in common with the people of this country, profess the general doctrines of Christianity, as a rule of their faith and practice; and to scandalize the author of these doctrines is not only, in a religious point of view, extremely impious, but even in respect to the obligations due to society, is a gross violation of decency and good order;…”);

 Robin v. Hardaway, 1 Jefferson109, 114, 1 Va. Reports Ann. 58, 61 (1772) aff’d. Gregory v. Baugh, 29 Va. 681, 29 Va. Rep. Ann. 466, 2 Leigh 665 (1831) (Now all acts of legislature apparently contrary to natural right and justice, are, in our laws, and must be in the nature of things, considered as void. The laws of nature are the laws of God; whose authority can be superseded by no power on earth. A legislature must not obstruct our obedience to him from whose punishments they cannot protect us. All human constitutions which contradict his laws, we are in conscience bound to disobey. Such have been the adjudications of our courts of justice. And cited 8 Co. 118. a. Bonham’s case. Hob. 87; 7. Co. 14. a. Calvin’s case.);

Dr. Bonham’s Case, 8 Coke’s Reports 107, at 118 (1610) ([I]n many cases, the common law will control acts of parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an act of parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will control it, and adjudge such to be void.); aff’d. Robin v. Hardaway, 1 Jefferson 109, 114, 1 Va. Reports Ann. 58, 61 (1772);

McFaul v. Ramsey 61 U.S. (20 How.) 523, 525, 15 L.Ed. 1010, 1011 (1858) (This system, matured by the wisdom of ages, founded on principles of truth and sound reason, has been ruthlessly abolished in many of our states, who have rashly substituted in its place the suggestions of scholiasts, who invent new codes and systems of pleadings to order. But this attempt to abolish all species, and establish a single genus, is found to be beyond the power of legislative omnipotence.They cannot compel the human mind not to distinguish between things that differ.);
Accord: VanHorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance 2 U.S. 304, 316 (F.Cas.) 2 Dall. 304(1795)(A statute shall never have an equitable construction in order to overthrow or divest an estate. Every statute, derogatory to the rights of property, or that takes away the estate of a citizen, ought to be construed strictly.);
Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission (1926) 271 U.S. 583, 593-594 aff’d. U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 71-72 (1936) (It is not necessary to challenge the proposition that, as a general rule, the state, having power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit to impose. But the power of the state in that respect is not [271 U.S. 583, 594] unlimited, and one of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require the relinquishment of constitutionally secured rights. If the state may compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all.It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of existence.);  Cf. Public Licenses and Private Rights (Barnett, 1953); 33 OLR 10, n. 32 (State’s power to grant privilege on its own conditions is limited, so that it may not thereby require relinquishment of constitutional rights.);
United States F. & G. Co. v. Bramwell, 217 Pac. 332 (Or. 07/10/1923) aff’d Shasta View Irrigation v. Amoco Chemicals Corporation 329 Or 151, 986 P2d 536 (1999)(The common law of England … as it existed at the time of the American Revolution as far as it was general and not incompatible with the nature of our political institutions, or in conflict with the Constitution and laws of the United States or of Oregon has been adopted as part of the law of the state, in view of Article 1 Section 2, of the Organic Law of the Civil Government of Oregon, Adopted July 26, 1845, and of Constitution of 1857, Article 18, Section 7.);

Redfield v. Fisher,135 Ore. 180, 292 P. 813, 819 (1930) (The individual, unlike the corporation, cannot be taxed for the mere privilege of existing. The corporation is an artificial entity which owes its existence and charter powers to the state; but the individuals’ rights to live and own property are natural rights for the enjoyment of which an excise cannot be imposed. 26 R.C.L. Taxation § 209, p. 236; Cooley, Taxation (4th Ed.) § 1676; In re Opinion of the Justices, 195 Mass. 607, 84 N.E. 499.);

Swanson v. Fuline Corporation,248 F.Supp. 364, 369, 31 A.L.R. 246 (Or. 1965) (I might suggest that it would likewise be inequitable to hold one bound to a contract that was not mutually agreed upon by the parties thereto. The law merchant is harsh, but still it only enforces mutual agreements. A transferee’s participation in a fraud practiced upon the maker of note would constitute a lack of “good faith” on part of transferee of note.);

Smothers v. Gresham Transfer Inc. 332 Or 83, 23 P3d 333 (2001) (As we have explained, the history of the remedy clause indicates that its purpose is to protect absolute common-law rights respecting person, property, and reputation, as those rights existed when the Oregon Constitution was drafted in 1857.This court has stated that the guarantee of remedy by due course of law for injury to person, property, or reputation “is one of the most sacred and essential of all the constitutional guaranties” and that “without it a free government cannot be maintained or individual liberty be preserved.” Gearin v. Marion County, 110 Or 390, 396, 223 P 929 (1924).  This court also has stated that the purpose of the remedy clause is to make the common-law maxim that there is no wrong without a remedy “a fixed and permanent rule of law in this state. Platt v. Newberg et al., 104 Or 148, 153, 205 P 296 (1922). Those statements reflect this court’s understanding that certain common-law rights are absolute rights that must be protected from infringement.);
Barke v. Maeyens Jr. M.D. 176 Or App 471, 31 P3d 1133 (2001) (“[T]he history of the remedy clause indicates that its purpose is to protect absolute common-law rights respecting person, property, and reputation,as those rights existed when the Oregon Constitution was drafted in 1857. The means for protecting those rights is the mandate that remedy by due course of law be available in the event of injury. Until 1935, this court’s case law was consistent with that historical purpose. In Perozzi, this court erroneously relied on the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in Silver to hold that Article I, section 10, does not forbid the legislature from abolishing absolute rights respecting person, property, or reputation that existed when the Oregon Constitution was adopted.” Id. at 118-19. The court disavowed its line of cases based on the Perozzi rationale and concluded that“[t]he legislature lacks authority to deny a remedy for injury to absolute rights that existed when the Oregon Constitution was adopted in 1857.” Id. at 119, citing Mattson v. Astoria, 39 Or 577, 580, 65 P 1066 (1901).

ORS 174.030

(Construction favoring natural right to prevail) (Where a statute is equally susceptible of two interpretations, one in favor of natural right and the other against it, the former is to prevail.);http://landru.leg.state.or.us/ors/174.html

Cf. Constitution of Oregon, Article 18, Section 7 (Former laws continued in force) (All laws in force in the Territory of Oregon when this Constitution takes effect, and consistent therewith, shall continue in force until altered, or repealed.);  http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/constitution/orig/const.htm

Constitution of Oregon, Article I, Section 1 (1857) (Natural rights inherent in people) (We declare that all men, when they form a social compact are equal in right: that all power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace, safety, and happiness; and they have at all times a right to alter, reform, or abolish the government in such manner as they may think proper.); http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/constitution/orig/const.htmNam:

Equity never counteracts the laws {Æquitas nunguam contravenit legis};Equity follows the law {Æquitas sequitur legem};

Consent makes the law{Consensus facit legem};

Fiction yields to truth{Fictio cedit veritati}; We can do nothing against truth {Nihil possumus contra veritatem;St. Albans, Doct. & Stu. Dial. 2, c. 6};The law of God and the law of the land are all one; and both preserve and favor the common and public good of the land {Le ley de dieu et ley de terre sont tout un; et l’un et l’autre preferre et favour le common et publique bien del terre; Keilw. 191};

Fundamental principles require no proof {Principia probant; non probantur; 3 Coke, 40};

The thing speaks for itself {Res ipsa loquitur};

He who does not speak the truth freely is a traitor to the truth {Veritatem qui non liberè pronunciat, proditor veritatis; Coke, 4th Inst. Epil.};

Damage suffered by (knowing) consent is not a cause of action

{Volenti non fit injuria}; and the following concomitants ad infinitum:

(Blog Master’s Note: I tried very hard to include all case law in the post, but some of them are unavailable online.  In Comments, an individual mentioned ‘Birth Certificate’ and the next post will examine the Birth Certificate.  Like Roman Law, on the birth certificate is a foot print of the child, signifying a ‘slave’.)