, , , , , , , , , ,

(For Frank ‘Austin’ England III) 


It’s called “conquest” … where were you when the Moors conquered Spain and parts of France by infiltration, AD 700’s?

Where was the great concern when the plague of Smallpox was used to destroy the Nations; when Washington betrayed 3 of the 5 Seneca Tribes; when the Trail of Tears took the Cherokee and shipped their children off to Oklahoma, eventually driving the indigenous man across the continent, and into the seas?

Where was your great concern when your Masters took YHWY the Father of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob out of the schools, and out of the courts?

GO POUND SAND WHITE EYES … the private international law is clearly established by customs, history and recognized by your own Supremes (and you couldn’t get a million “Americans” out there to agree on anything of reason) !



Oetjen v. Central Leather Co. , 246 U.S. 297, 302-303, 38 S.Ct. 309, 62 L.Ed. 726 (1918) (It is also the result of the interpretation by this court of the principles of international law that when a government which originates in revolution or revolt is recognized by the political department of our government as the de [246 U.S. 297, 303] jure government of the country in which it is established, such recognition is retroactive in effect and validates all the actions and conduct of the government so recognized from the commencement of its existence. Williams v. Buffy 96 U.S.179, 186 Underhill v.Hernandez 168 U.S. 250, 253, 18 S. Sup. Ct. 83. See s. c., 65 Fed. 577, 13 C. C. A. 51, 38 L. R. A. 405. To these principles we must add that: ‘Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be available of by sovereign powers as between themselves.’ Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252, 18 S. Sup. Ct. 83, 84 (42 L. Ed. 456); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 29 Sup. Ct. 511, 16 Ann. Cas. 1047.);

Jones v. U.S. 137 U.S. 202, 212-213, 11 S. Ct. 80, 83, 34 L.Ed. 691 (1890) (By the law of nations, recognized by all civiliezed states, dominion of new territory may be acquired by discovery and occupation as well as by cession or conquest; and when citizens or subjects of one nation, in its name, and by its authority, or with its assent, take and hold actual, continuous, and useful possession (although only for the purpose of carrying on a particular business, such as catching and curing fish, or working mines,) of territory unoccupied by any other government or its citizens, the nation to which they belong may exercise such jurisdiction and for such period as it sees fit over territory so acquired. This principle affords ample warrant for the legislation of congress concerning guano islands. Vatt. Law Nat. lib. bk. 1, c. 18; Wheat. Int. Law, (8th Ed.) 161, 165, 176, note 104; Halleck, Int. Law, c. 6, 7, 15; 1 Phillim. Int. Law. (3d Ed.) 227, 229, 230, 232, 242; 1 Calvo Droit Int. (4th Ed.) 266, 277, 300; Whiton v. Insurance Co., 109 Mass. 24, 31. Who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory, is not a judicial, but a political, question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens, and subjects of that government. This principle has always been upheld by this court, and has been affirmed under a great variety of circumstances. Gelston v. Hoyt,  16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246, 324; U. S. v. Palmer, Id. 610; The Divina Pastora 17 U.S.(4 Wheat.) 52; Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 307, 309; Keene v. McDonough, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 308; Garcia v. Lee, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 511, 520; Williams v. Suffolk Insurance Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415; U. S. v. Yorba, 1 Wall. 412, 423; U. S. v. Lynde, 11 Wall. 632, 638. It is equally well settled in England. The Pelican, Edw. Adm. App. D; Taylor v. Bar- [137 U.S. 202, 213] clay, 2 Sim. 213; Emperor of Austria v. Day, 3 De Gex, F. &. J. 217, 221, 233; Republic of Peru v. Peruvian Guano Co., 36 Ch. Div. 489, 497; Republic of Peru v. Dreyfus, 38 Ch. Div. 348, 356, 359.);

Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603, 607 (1850) (The jurisdiction of the conqueror is complete. He may change the form of government and the laws at his pleasure, and may exercise every attribute of sovereignty. The conquered territory becomes a part of the domain of the conqueror, subject to the right of the nation to which it belonged to recapture it if they can. By reason of this right to recapture, the title of the conqueror is not perfect until confirmed by treaty of peace. But this imperfection in his title is, practically speaking, important only in case of alienation made by the conqueror before treaty. If he sells, he sells subject to the right of recapture. But although, for purposes of sale, the title of the conqueror is imperfect before cession, for purposes of government and jurisdiction his title is perfect before cession. As long as he retains possession he is sovereign; and not the less sovereign because his sovereignty may not endure for ever.);

Although alienation be prohibited, yet by the consent of all in whose favor it is prohibited, it may take place, for it is in the power of any man to renounce a right introduced for his own benefit {Alienatio licet prohibeatur, consensu tamen omnium, in quorum prohibita est, potest fieri, et quilibet potest renunciare juri pro se introducto};

Consent makes the law {Consensus facit legem};

Long sufferance is construed as consent {Longa patientia trahitur ad consensum}; He does not appear to have retained his consent, who has changed any thing at the command of a party threatening {Non videtur consensum retinuisse si quis ex præscripto minantis aliquid immutavit};

Damage suffered by consent is not a cause of action {Volenti non fit injuria};