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(For Frank ‘Austin’ England III) 


The system must always provide a remedy i.e. choice for the offered party to refuse any commercial presentment from a defacto government proceeding as a private party/agency for cause and out of personal choice not to elect to accept or embrace any offer to convert a secured right to be diminished to such point that the said right becomes a subject to be regulated in commerce. Whereas, you can’t be forced to accept any agency offer (but the agency through its agents can and do intentionally mislead with extreme prejudice as regards their never ending “non-substantive” administrative offers for your many secured rights to be ultimately diminished to the point that the “State” presumes you have elected to have all of your once secured rights to be regulated in commerce.) Anyone that has no knowledge of the copyright law that protects the statute and thereby, causes you to accept the agencies offers from its agent or agent(s) i.e. “Transferors”, and thereby, cause you to become an unknowing “Transferee” of the said offer to be regulated in commerce, will suffer extreme prejudice regarding your once secured rights. By not timely returning the original offer to the “Transferor” for cause (In essence the short version, “I’m not interested in your damn offer to be summarily regulated in commerce.”) you will have failed to establish the right to exclusive enforcement of the offered instrument that was transferred to you as the original offer made by the agent/presenter.

The secret re the lack of enforceability regarding the regulatory process (the appearance of mandated or compelled licenses and such) falls short in the power to enforce a prohibitory statute due to the nature of the legislative process offering such statute as an elective doing business offer with the state making the conditions attaching thereto.

These statutes are simply non-substantive administrative offers and have no force or effect in law unless you ignorantly accept the presentment of the “Statute Merchant” who offers the regulatory terms of the statute.  (You must return any offers (tentative contract) for cause stating the offer does not rise to the level of a substantive regulation and has no force and effect of law as said offer is in fact a mere commercial presentment that comes within the nature of an operation of law going to mere “Malum Prohibitum.”

The Substantive Statute is however enforceable as that particular statute addresses issues that go to substantive crimes i.e. damage to others and their property this law is termed “Malum in Se.”

As regards the afore-reference regulatory law, the statutes that stand behind the promulgation of rules and regulations by the administrative agency have no force or effect in law to mandate specific performance absent your voluntary acceptance to be regulated in commerce.

Any agent of an agency that approaches you as a “Transeror” with a “statute merchant” offer, must be able to support that offer by a substantive statute authorizing the offer to be made.  Here’s how you determine the statutes that are merely administrative offers to be regulated in commerce and wholly optional on your part for cause.

See UNITED STATES PRINTING OFFICE STYLE MANUAL 2008 Publication , at Chapter 8, 8.19 — 8.20 In Bills, contracts, laws, ect., to indicate matters that is to be omitted.

When there is an omission of the date of enactment in the last line of the promulgated rule or regulation as seen in brackets, this means that rule or regulation has no effective or authorized date to permit enforcement. (and thereby is a nullity) This is because the enforcement date has been omitted (by bracketing) and the rule or regulation is not enforceable in law because the said rule or regulation has no effective date that can be cited to cause the statute to become a “substantive” commercial offer and thereby, lacks authority for enforcement purposes . . . however,  the rule or regulation can be offered for acceptance and JOINDER by and agent acting as a transferor for the purpose to mislead and the uninformed. Should the acceptor go into controversy and try to argue the statute . . . which is unnecessary under the circumstances as there would be no controversy if you returned the flawed process for cause and cited your reason for the return . . . 

Whereas, at the very bottom of any statute on the last line you will notice that particular line (noting the date enacted and other info) will either be in brackets [  ] or parenthesis (  ) . . . “Parenthesis” denotes a substantive statute (addressing common law crimes or damage to property, such as “Hit and Run”.)  and thereby, the nature of that particular statute will have the force and effect of law to be imposed on the guilty.  “Brackets” encompassing the date of enactment of the statute however, denotes (the date is to be omitted) and thereby, the administrative rule or regulation that has no force and effect in law to be imposed or compelled, but must be voluntarily accepted by you to be “regulated in commerce” to enforce the offered instrument and is made in a deceptive manner to cause the served party to become a “Transferee” giving the agency the right to enforce the non-substantive instrument because of joinder.

The latter process gives way to intimidation and misleading language by the agency and its agent moving in commerce as “Transferor” and thereby, causing you to accept the offered choice to be regulated in commerce and thereby, enter into an implied and knowing contract.



Keep in mind, how the Substantive vs Non-substantive statute dovetails with OUR COMMERCIAL REMEDY. . . the non-substantive statute can only be presented as a commercial transaction and offer by an agent (who must possess an agent ID) issued by the defacto DBA the private side of government for acceptance or return for cause by you. Or . . . you can accept the offer, making it very clear that by acceptance, you as the holder of the presented instrument and a certificated security (birth registration as evidence of your standing as the creditor in this particular transaction) and thereby, you “Hold” and control both instruments and if the offeror either won’t or doesn’t understand the nature of the transaction if accepted, as requiring the presentor/transferor/agent to cut you a check as dollar for dollar “instant consideration” for standing as the creditor and accepting the said offer in the presented transaction. By the offer’s” apparent misleading offer, said offer will out of necessity, return said offer for cause due to their commercial dishonor for refusing to process your tentative acceptance as the sponsor of the credit in said transaction and thereby out of further necessity proceed in a quid pro quo manner meeting your consideration in a timely manner dollar for dollar. 


This issue was dismissed for cause and summarily abandoned in a court here in Oregon about 12 years ago.  This particular issue dealt with the Board of Cosmotology which was attempting to force a man to accept the license to be regulated in commerce as regards cutting and doing hair . . . he prevailed and never heard another word from them, continuing to do hair for the next ten years until he died.

Also See Clearfield Doctrine that make it very clear, when the state is operating in a doing business mode, the said state has no superior position to compel specific performance unless a contract is entered into and thereby, you can refuse to accept and return their administrative offer for cause.


What the use ofbracketsi.e. [ ] and the use ofPARENTHESIS” mean when reading the last line of the statutes.

To Wit: Oregon Revised Statutes

“ORS 86.725 Time within which foreclosure must be commenced.The foreclosure of a trust deed by advertisement and sale or the foreclosure of a trust deed by judicial procedureshall be commenced within the time, including extensions, provided by ORS 88.110 and 88.120 for the foreclosure of a mortgage on real property. [1959 c.625 §20]

Note the bracketed date above, which by law, causes the date re the enactment of the statute to be omitted and thereby, fails to provide and effective date for enforcement of this particular statute . . . unless the agent/transferor, can coerce the served party to accept and join said statute for commercial purposes and thereby do business in commerce with “this state” for fun and profit . . . at your expense . . .

Another Example:
Neither ORS Chapter 676 nor 690 that are cited in support of FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS and the STATUTES AND RULES are qualified as substantive statutes. That being the case, no Administrative Rule alleging to draw its authority from either Chapter 676 or 690 of the ORS can by their nature, be substantive and therefore, fail to possess the force and effect of law to be compelled. The allegations are for all intent and purpose, moot on their face and therefore a mere nullity if returned for cause.

The Rules on administrative law indicate that there are three basic types of regulations:

1. Administrative
2. Interpretative
3. Substantive

So what does all of the above mean:

1. Administrative rules or regs. can have the force and effect of law if consistent with substantive regulations. But note, the administrative rule still requires a substantive regulation! If there is no substantive regulation, the administrative regulation is of no use as to force and effect of law.

2. Interpretative regulations do not have the force and effect of law.

3. Only Substantive regulations have the force and effect of law and you will be able to see the source statute at large at the bottom of the regulation in “parenthesis,”( ) not in brackets [ ]..

For an explanation of the substantive and administrative regulations, see Chrysler Corp. v. Brown , 441 U.S. 281

So the next obvious question is how do I find the substantive regulation in the CFR’s, as they are all mixed up and not labeled.

Actually it is quite simple when you see it.

This is an Administrative type (could also be an interpretative type as well), but ATF-6 included delineates the type.

[32 FR 15241, Nov. 3, 1967, as amended by T.D. 7188, 37 FR 12796, June 29, 1972; T.D. 7297, 38 FR 34803, Dec. 19, 1973; T.D. 8091, 51 FR 23053, June 25, 1986; T.D. 9015, 67 FR 57331, Sept. 10, 2002]

The giveaway is that all of the federal register and other information is all in brackets “[ ]”. The use of brackets in the government style manual is only to provide information and the text contained within the brackets is to be omitted.

This is a substantive regulation in title 27 CFR §70.22.

NOTE: At the bottom of is the same information on the federal register, etc. in brackets, but above this is the AUTHORITY IN PARENTHESIS “( )”. There is the item that MUST be present to demonstrate a substantive regulation and the item will be in parenthesis, the item will not be in brackets!

(Authority: Aug. 16, 1954, Chapter 736, 68A Stat. 901; (26 U.S.C. 7602) Note parenthisis in red.

[T.D. ATF-6, 38 FR 32445, Nov. 26, 1973, as amended by T.D. ATF-42, 42 FR 8367, Feb. 10, 1977; 55 FR 47608, Nov. 14, 1990; 57 FR 40328, Sept. 3, 1992; T.D. ATF-450, 66 FR 29023, May 29, 2001] Note brackets in red.

What is indicated above, is the agency has the “substantive” authority to make the offer . . . the agency does not have the “substantive” regulator authority to enforce the offer to be accepted by the “transferee,” (being the general public) thereby, affording the transferee the right/remedy to return the offer for cause . . . or accept the offer for value and return the offer for value for discharge, settlement and closure of the accounting . . . your choice

So . . . the DOJ only provides an administrative regulation. I will include it as it appears in West. I will also include in this posting the moving of the ATF substantive regulations under 26 CFR 301.xxx into title 27 in 1973 and you can see this slight of hand at the bottom of all summons, etc., the authority in said regulation is in parenthesis indicating the authority as non-substantive having no force or effect of law. Of course this is the problem that has been known under 26 USC Sec. 7602 when using the parallel table of authorities, you only find 27 CFR type regulations, i.e. substantive regulations and now you know why, this is the slight of hand employing 26 CFR and attempting to give 26 CFR the substantive power of 27 CFR which 26 CFR is wholly lacking.

See Commissioner Internal Revenue v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614, 633 (1976) that the Government shall provide at a minimum an affidavit of basic facts, to wit:

“The Government may defeat a claim by the (party to be “treated” as) a taxpayer that its assessment has no basis in fact and therefore render applicable the Anti-Injunction Act without resort to oral testimony and cross-examination. Affidavits are sufficient so long as they disclose basic facts from which it appears that the Government may prevail. The Constitution does not invariably require more, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), and we would not hold that it does where collection of the revenues is involved.”


ORS 690.015 Prohibited acts.This section establishes prohibitions relating to the practice of hair design, barbering, facial technology and nail technology. The prohibitions under this section are subject to the exemptions under ORS 690.025. A person who violates a prohibition under this section is subject to the penalties under ORS 690.992 in addition to any administrative action taken by the Board of Cosmetology under ORS 690.075 or any civil penalty imposed by the Health Licensing Office under ORS 676.612. A person violates a prohibition under this section if the person does any of the following:

(1) Performs or attempts to perform as a practitioner without a certificate, demonstration permit or certificate of identification.
(2) Operates a facility without a license or temporary facility permit.
(3) Operates a facility unless it is at all times under the direct supervision of a practitioner.
(4) Practices hair design, barbering, facial technology or nail technology as an independent contractor without a registration.
(5) Displays a sign or in any way advertises or purports to offer services in a field of practice without first obtaining a permit, certificate, independent contractor registration or facility license.
(6) Knowingly makes a false statement on an application to obtain or renew a certificate, registration, license or permit or to obtain a certificate of identification.
(7) Allows an individual in the employ or under the supervision or control of the person to perform in a field of practice without a certificate or permit.
(8) Sells, barters or offers to sell or barter a document evidencing a certificate, registration, license, permit or certificate of identification.
(9) Purchases or procures by barter a document evidencing a certificate with intent to use it as evidence of the person’s qualification as a practitioner.
(10) Materially alters with fraudulent intent a document evidencing a certificate, registration, license, permit or certificate of identification.
(11) Uses or attempts to use as valid a fraudulently obtained, counterfeited or materially altered document evidencing a certificate, registration, license, permit or certificate of identification. [1977 c.886 §3; 1981 c.141 §1; 1983 c.151 §2; 1987 c.31 §3; 1993 c.267 §2; 1995 c.343 §62; 1999 c.425 §2; 2003 c.547 §39] NOTE: the authority for the above referenced ORS 1 thru 11 is noted in “Brackets [ ]”. For a statute, rule or regulation to be “substantive”, but to be substantive the cite must be displayed within “parenthesis ( )” The above referenced statute does not have the force and effect of law as it’s enactment date is in [brackets] and therefore, omitted.

676.612 Disciplinary authority.(1) In the manner prescribed in ORS chapter 183 for contested cases and as specified in ORS 680.535, 687.445, 688.836, 690.167, 690.407, 690.515, 694.147 and 700.111 and section 11, chapter 547, Oregon Laws 2003, the Health Licensing Office may refuse to issue or renew, may suspend or revoke or may place on probation or otherwise sanction a holder of a certificate, permit, license or registration to practice issued by the agency for any of the following reasons:
 (a) Fraud, misrepresentation, concealment of material facts or deception in applying for or obtaining an authorization to practice in this state, or in any written or oral communication to the agency concerning the issuance or retention of the authorization.
(b) Using, causing or promoting the use of any advertising matter, promotional literature, testimonial, guarantee, warranty, label, insignia or any other representation, however disseminated or published, that is false, misleading or deceptive.
(c) Making a representation that the certificate, permit, license or registration holder knew or should have known is false or misleading regarding skill or the efficacy or value of treatment or remedy administered by the holder.
(d) Practicing under a false, misleading or deceptive name, or impersonating another certificate, permit, license or registration holder.
(e) Permitting a person other than the certificate, permit, license or registration holder to use the certificate, permit, license or registration.
(f) Practicing with a physical or mental condition that presents an unreasonable risk of harm to the practitioner or to the person or property of others in the course of performing the practitioner’s duties.
(g) Practicing while under the influence of alcohol, controlled substances or other skill-impairing substances, or engaging in the illegal use of controlled substances or other skill-impairing substances so as to create a risk of harm to the person or property of others in the course of performing the practitioner’s duties.
(h) Failing to properly and reasonably accept responsibility for the actions of employees.
(i) Employing, directly or indirectly, any suspended, uncertified, unlicensed or unregistered person to practice a regulated occupation or profession listed in ORS 676.992.
(j) Unprofessional conduct, negligence, incompetence, repeated violations or any departure from or failure to conform to standards of practice in performing services or practicing in a regulated occupation or profession listed under ORS 676.992.
(k) Conviction of any criminal offense, subject to ORS 670.280. A copy of the record of conviction, certified by the clerk of the court entering the conviction, is conclusive evidence of the conviction. A plea of no contest or an admission of guilt shall be considered a conviction for purposes of this paragraph.
(L) Failing to report any adverse action, as required by statute or rule, taken against the certificate, permit, license, or registration holder by another regulatory jurisdiction or any peer review body, health care institution, professional association, governmental agency, law enforcement agency or court for acts or conduct similar to acts or conduct that would constitute grounds for disciplinary action as described in this section.
(m) Violation of a statute regulating an occupation or profession listed in ORS 676.992.
(n) Violation of any rule regulating an occupation or profession listed in ORS 676.992.
(o) Failing to cooperate with the agency in any investigation, inspection or request for information.

(2) The agency may refuse to issue or renew, may suspend or revoke or may place on probation or otherwise sanction a holder of a certificate, permit, license or registration to practice issued by the agency for failure to pay an outstanding civil penalty that is due or for failure to meet the terms of any order issued by the agency that has become final.

(3) If the agency places a holder of a certificate, permit, license or registration on probation under subsection (1) of this section, the agency, in consultation with the appropriate board, council or program, may determine and at any time modify the conditions of the probation.

(4) If a certificate, permit, license or registration is suspended, the holder may not practice during the term of suspension. Upon the expiration of the term of suspension, the certificate, permit, license or registration may be reinstated by the agency if the conditions of suspension no longer exist and the holder has satisfied all requirements in the relevant statutes or administrative rules for issuance, renewal or reinstatement. [2003 c.547 §3]

Note: 676.992 was added to and made a part of 676.600 to 676.625 by legislative action but was not added to ORS chapters 676 to 681 or any chapter or series therein. See Preface to Oregon Revised Statutes for further explanation. There is no evidence of Chapter 676.600 to 676.625 being classified as a substantive statute as there is no parenthesis designating said statute as substantive.Thereby, all the above offered information is by it’s nature, wholly informative and has no force or effect in law to regulate the subject matter in commerce as offered nor to be charged as an offense.



It is clear that many patriots simply have not had success with the controversies raised by U.S. Inc.  It’s not for the lack of tools.  For instance, Tom Schaults has used BIC-type payment instruments and promissory notes and closed account payments SUCCESSFULLY hundreds of times.  HUNDREDS of time.  So have many others.  But most patriots fail time and again.  Why do you think this is?

With the extensive BIC tools I provided to thousands, we included criminal complaints, affidavits of probable cause, methods for conducting notary trials, and similar enforcement vehicles.  And yet, I cannot recall a single person who approached the FBI with a criminal complaint to formally say, “I charge John Smith with criminal misappropriation for failing to transfer the funds to Treasury.  Will you remove him?  I charge him with criminal malfeasance, insurrection and false impersonation by pretending to hear a case in which he has been named as a defendant (third party defendant).  I charge him with violating public policy (UCC 3-104 and 31 CFR 103.11).  I charge him with obstructing the tax laws of the United States.  What are you going to do about it?”


For THIS reason, I have come to the inevitable conclusion that most patriots are simply not closers.  They do NOT belong in that dangerous arena.  Period.  Most wind up biting off more than they can digest.  Doesn’t the evidence support that conclusion?


And that is to RETURN THEIR PROCESS TO ITS SOURCE – the same way they return yours when it is disagreeable to them, KNOWING that once they’ve returned it, they are out of your administrative process.  Shouldn’t that also be YOUR goal?

This week alone we used ROP on multiple occasions including returning a GRAND JURY INVITATION with not a peep thus far.  At worst, they may call a hearing to consider contempt, and guess what, the invite will be returned pony express.  For CRIMINAL CASES ESPECIALLY, return of process is the ONLY way to make the lack of jurisdiction abundantly clear.  There can be NO presumption of an appearance or consent, and NO opportunity for the typical trickery, deception and coercion.  All of their bluffs to do this or that go right out the window, because when we return their process we are basically saying, “YOU AND YOUR PROCESS ARE INCONSEQUENTIAL TO THIS LIVING MAN/WOMAN ON THE LAND.”



De Lovio v. Boit,2 Gall. 398, 7 Fed. Cas. No. 3.776 (1815) (A policy of insurance (virtually every statute is insured for the purpose to cause the offer to qualify as a maritime offer) and thereby, is a maritime contract, and therefore comes within the consideration of admiralty jurisdiction.);

(“The clause however of the constitution not only confers Admiralty jurisdiction, but the word “Maritime” is superadded, seemingly ex-industria to remove every latent doubt. “Cases of Maritime jurisdiction” must include all maritime contracts, torts and injuries, which are in the understanding of the Common Law, as well as of the Admiralty, . .”); American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828)(A case in admiralty does not, in fact, arise under the Constitution or laws of the United States. (and thereby is private));
Metropolitan Property and Casualty v. Harper, 168 Or App 358, 7 P3d 541 (2000) (A subrogated insurer becomes the owner of the claim and the real party in interest in any action to enforce it.); ORS 742.356 [Formerly 747.130 and then 743.741] (Surety insurer may take measures to reduce risk of loss);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.111, 131, 63 S.Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed.2d 122 (1942) (It is hardly lack of due process for the Government to regulate that which it subsidizes .);
MIller v. C.C. Meisel Co., Inc., 183 Or App 148, 51 P3d 650 (2002) ([T]he law does not protect parties who enter into unwise agreements that are otherwise enforceable.);

Damage suffered by consent is not a cause of action {Volenti non fit injuria};