Statutes (Never Argue The Second Amendment)

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2nd amendment, Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank, Clearfield Doctrine, Natural Right, Right to Keep and Bear Arms, Second Amendment, statutes

(For Frank ‘Austin’ England III) 

(Blog Master: The last post “Treaty Cannot Infinge The Constitution” was liked by http://GunRightsAttorneys.wordpress.com  from there link I found this article attached to there “Like”and was going to give it the”Thumbs Up or Like” until I realized that they didn’t consider the “Right to Keep and Bear Arms” as granted by our Creator, only  by government.  It is a good article and I wished I could give it the “Like” but unfortunately they don’t understand the Natural Right.  Here it is Don’t Cherish the 2nd Amendment

 

NEVER ARGUE THE 2ND AMENDMENT, THIS IS A TRAP . . . ALL SECURED RIGHTS STAND ON THEIR OWN, THEY NEED NO DEFENSE!

 

THERE CAN BE NO SUMMARY INFRINGMENT AGAINST THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN ANY MANNER . . . THE STATE OF OREGON WILL HOWEVER, AS DO OTHER STATES, CRAFT PRIVATE LEGISLATION AND STATUTES OFFERING THOSE STATUTES FOR ACCEPTANCE IN A MISLEADING MANNER TO DO BUSINESS WITH AND THEREBY CAUSE THE PEOPLE TO IGNORANTLY VOLUNTEER TO BE REGULATED IN COMMERCE TO THE DEROGATION OR EXCLUSION OF THEIR SECURED RIGHTS! THIS ALL GOES TO CONTRACT!

Follow me closely on this deception and how you can determine for yourself that all regulatory legislation addressed to the people that is “defined” to originate in “this state”, is for profit private copyright law and can only be offered for acceptance to participate in and under these statutes. You have the right NOT TO ELECT/ACCEPT to participate under the right and law of Contract which is in fact CHOICE! Contract originates as a natural event and first requires a meeting of the minds . . . to contract or not to contract premised on the nature and consideration of the offer. ORS Chapter 174 Section 174.030 provides for the natural right to prevail . . . see below.

Oregon Statutes – Chapter 174 – Construction of Statutes; General Definitions – Section 174.030 – Construction favoring natural right to prevail. Where a statute is equally susceptible of two interpretations, one in favor of natural right and the other against it, the former [natural right] is to prevail.

Every statute must have an implementing regulation date to have the force and effect of law. The three (3) gun regulation statutes cited below do in fact display those implementing regulation dates HOWEVER! I have highlighted these dates and you will note, that the dates of implementation are contained in “pairs” of [brackets]. In accordance with the rules of style as published within the “Government Printing Office Style Manual” ANY MATERIAL WITHIN “PAIRS” OF BRACKETS IS TO BE OMITTED!

Any rule or regulation not possessing an implementing date has no force or effect of law and cannot be enforced . . . but the statute can be offered for acceptance . . . if you in anyway bring the issue into “controversy”. This is where they mislead the public. At some point the statute is presented to you in some manner should a gun issue come up . . . this is the critical point . . . . YOU DON’T WANT TO “TRAVERSE” OR “JOIN” with that offered statute, either by arguing your 2nd Amendment rights or any issue regarding the offered opportunity to go into controversy. Knowledge of the omitted regulation dates is all you need to know and how these [brackets] apply. Read the Rules of Style below.

Rules of Style to wit: UNITED STATES PRINTING OFFICE STYLE MANUAL 2008 Publication , at Chapter 8, 8.19 — 8.20  Brackets in pairs In Bills, contracts, laws, ect., to indicate matters that is to be omitted.

PRETTY CLEAR . . . THE ENTIRE REGULATORY PROCESS CRAFTED BY THE PRIVATE FOR PROFIT CORPORATE ENTITY KNOWN AS THE DEFACTO “THIS STATE” AND CAN’T INFRINGE A SECURED RIGHT . . .BUT THEY CAN CONTRACT YOU OUT OF THAT RIGHT! SO WHO IS “THIS STATE?”AND JUST WHAT POWER DOES IT REALLY POSSESS?

 

The Power to Define “this　state” a defacto for profit corporation as in the airspace above the organic State “this state” (in the airspace above) or “the (organic) State” (on the land below) .Commercial, De facto, Territorial association, business　or state as opposed to an organic State of the Union; Cf. Alter ego; De facto officer doctrine; Joint ventures; Legislative Courts doctrine; Penal codes; Political jurisdictions; Ultra vires; ORS 131.205[1973 c.836 §13]

Note the Brackets in pairs, you don’t have to participate in “this state” either.

(Definition for ORS 131.205 to 131.235) (As used in ORS 131.205 to 131.235, “this” state” means the [fictitious] land and water and the air space above the [substantive] Land and Water with respect to which “the”State of Oregon [being the land] has legislative jurisdiction.) The above referenced nature of the “elective” choice to join or not join with “this state” for commercial purposes is addressed within the Clearfield Doctrine below;

“Governments descend to the level of a mere private corporation and take on the characteristics of a mere private citizen. This entity cannot compel performance upon its corporate statute or rules unless it, like any other corporation or person is the holder-in-due course of some contract or commercial agreement between it and the party upon whom the payment and performance are made and thereby, willing to produce said documents and place the same evidence before trying to enforce its demands called statutes.　

For purposes of suit, such corporations and individuals are regarded as entities entirely separate from government.” Governments descend to the level of a mere private corporation and takes on the character of a mere private citizen [where private corporate commercial paper (securities) are concerned]”. . . “For purposes of suit, such corporations and individuals are regarded as an entity ENTIRELY separate from government.” Bank of United States v. Planter’s Bank of Georgia, 9 Wheaton (22 US) 904, 6 L. Ed. 24

So the entire legislature works for a for profit foreign corporation as “Statute Merchants” doing business for their corporation under the guise of a legitimate law making body.

Review the three (3) gun regulation statutes below . . . note that none of the three have the force and effect of law to be enforced . . . . that is, unless you accept or elect to argue against the private sector definitions of their regulatory statute and thereby, agree to be regulated in commerce as regard to your causing a controversy and thereby to the derogation of your “Natural” 2nd amendment right to bear arms.

Administrative Notice is hereby given as to the recognized “Natural Right” below:

Oregon Statutes – Chapter 174 – Construction of Statutes; General Definitions – Section 174.030 – Construction favoring natural right to prevail. Where a statute is equally susceptible of two interpretations, one in favor of natural right and the other against it, the former [natural right] is to prevail.

Oregon Statutes – Chapter 166 – Offenses Against Public Order; Firearms and Other Weapons; Racketeering – Section 166.250 – Unlawful possession of firearms.

(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section or ORS 166.260, 166.270, 166.274, 166.291, 166.292 or 166.410 to 166.470, a person commits the crime of unlawful possession of a firearm if the person knowingly:
(a) Carries any firearm concealed upon the person;
(b) Possesses a handgun that is concealed and readily accessible to the person within any vehicle; or
(c) Possesses a firearm and:

(A) Is under 18 years of age;
(B)(i) While a minor, was found to be within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for having committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would constitute a felony or a misdemeanor involving violence, as defined in ORS 166.470; and
(ii) Was discharged from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court within four years prior to being charged under this section;
(C) Has been convicted of a felony or found guilty, except for insanity under ORS 161.295, of a felony;
(D) Was committed to the Department of Human Services under ORS 426.130; or
(E) Was found to be mentally ill and subject to an order under ORS 426.130 that the person be prohibited from purchasing or possessing a firearm as a result of that mental illness.
(2) This section does not prohibit:
(a) A minor, who is not otherwise prohibited under subsection (1)(c) of this section, from possessing a firearm:
(A) Other than a handgun, if the firearm was transferred to the minor by the minor’s parent or guardian or by another person with the consent of the minor’s parent or guardian; or
(B) Temporarily for hunting, target practice or any other lawful purpose; or
(b) Any citizen of the United States over the age of 18 years who resides in or is temporarily sojourning within this state, and who is not within the excepted classes prescribed by ORS 166.270 and subsection (1) of this section, from owning, possessing or keeping within the person’s place of residence or place of business any handgun, and no permit or license to purchase, own, possess or keep any such firearm at the person’s place of residence or place of business is required of any such citizen. As used in this subsection, “residence” includes a recreational vessel or recreational vehicle while used, for whatever period of time, as residential quarters.
(3) Firearms carried openly in belt holsters are not concealed within the meaning of this section.
(4) Unlawful possession of a firearm is a Class A misdemeanor. [Amended by 1979 c.779 §4; 1985 c.543 §3; 1989 c.839 §13; 1993 c.732 §1; 1993 c.735 §12; 1999 c.1040 §1; 2001 c.666 §§33,45; 2003 c.614 §8] DATES OMITTED, thereby rendering #(4) “Unlawful possession of a firearm is a Class A misdemeanor”, as unenforceable when any party presented with this #(4) provision simply gives or returns notice without recourse, of “No Sale!”

Section: 　Previous 　166.180 　166.190 　166.210 　166.220 　166.230 　166.240 　166.245 　166.250 　166.260 　166.262 　166.263 　166.270 　166.272 　166.274 　166.275 　Next Last modified: August 7, 2008

Oregon Statutes – Chapter 166 – Offenses Against Public Order; Firearms and Other Weapons; Racketeering – Section 166.470 – Limitations and conditions for sales of firearms.
(1) Unless relief has been granted under ORS 166.274, 18 U.S.C. 925(c) or the expunction laws of this state or an equivalent law of another jurisdiction, a person may not intentionally sell, deliver or otherwise transfer any firearm when the transferor knows or reasonably should know that the recipient:
(a) Is under 18 years of age;
(b) Has been convicted of a felony or found guilty, except for insanity under ORS 161.295, of a felony;
(c) Has any outstanding felony warrants for arrest;
(d) Is free on any form of pretrial release for a felony;
(e) Was committed to the Department of Human Services under ORS 426.130;
(f) After January 1, 1990, was found to be mentally ill and subject to an order under ORS 426.130 that the person be prohibited from purchasing or possessing a firearm as a result of that mental illness; or
(g) Has been convicted of a misdemeanor involving violence or found guilty, except for insanity under ORS 161.295, of a misdemeanor involving violence within the previous four years. As used in this paragraph, “misdemeanor involving violence” means a misdemeanor described in ORS 163.160, 163.187, 163.190, 163.195 or 166.155 (1)(b).
(2) A person may not sell, deliver or otherwise transfer any firearm that the person knows or reasonably should know is stolen.
(3) Subsection (1)(a) of this section does not prohibit:
(a) The parent or guardian, or another person with the consent of the parent or guardian, of a minor from transferring to the minor a firearm, other than a handgun; or
(b) The temporary transfer of any firearm to a minor for hunting, target practice or any other lawful purpose.
(4) Violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor. [Amended by 1989 c.839 §3; 1991 c.67 §40; 1993 c.735 §11; 2001 c.828 §2; 2003 c.577 §7] DATES OMITTED!

Section: 　Previous 　166.436 　166.438 　166.440 　166.441 　166.445 　166.450 　166.460 　166.470 　166.480 　166.490 　166.510 　166.515 　166.520 　166.560 　166.610 　Next Last modified: August 7, 2008

(For the rest of this post see two other posts by Frank ‘Austin’ England III Authority of Title 27/ Title 18 on Firearms  and Natural Rights

 

Court (Administrative Jurisdiction Must Be Proven UCC 1-308)

Tags

affidavit with seal, Bailey v. State of Alabama, Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank, Bennett v. Boggs, Boyd v. U.S., Butchers' Union v. Crescent City, Butler v. Collins, Byars v. U.S., Carmine v. Bower, Clearfield Doctrine, Clearfield Trust v. United States, Fuetes v. Shevin, Hodges v. U.S., Hurtado v. United States, Kent v. Dulles, Maine v. Thiboutot, Memphis BAnk and Trust v. Garner, Miranda v. Arizona, Mookini v. United States, Mugler v. Kansas, Murdock v. Pennsylvania, Norton v. Shelby County, Owens v. City of Independence, prize court must prove jurisdiction with UCC 1-308, Reid v. Covert, right are reserved, Shapiro v. Thomson, Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, Sovereign document, U.S. v. Morris, U.S. v. Tweel, United States v. Bishop, United States v. Minker

 

(For Austin)   

 

AFFIDAVIT OF UNDERSTANDING re THE ADMINISTRATIVE/

LEGISLATIVE “PRIZE” COURT MUST AFFIRMATIVLY PROVE JURISDICTION

WHEN RIGHTS ARE RESERVED at UCC 1-308, ARTICLE III STATE COURT MUST DETERMINE CAUSE PURSUANT TO DUE PROCESS TO ESTABLISH CAUSE / JURISDICTION

“It is well settled in administrative law that: “It is the accepted rule, not only in state courts, but, of the federal courts as well, that when a judge is enforcing administrative law they are described as mere ‘extensions of the administrative agency for superior reviewing purposes’ as a ministerial clerk for an agency…” 30 Cal.596; 167 Cal 762. And;

Apparent agency.

Kotera v. Daioh Int’l U.S.A. Corp,9509-06556; A100452 (Or. 01/30/2002) (In the absence of agency based on actual authority, plaintiff (FRANCHISE TAX BOARD) was required to produce evidence of apparent agency to support personal jurisdiction over (Defendant). Miller v. McDonald’s Corp., 150 Or App 274, 282, 945 P2d 1107 (1997). To establish apparent agency, plaintiff must have offered evidence that (1)　Defendants held out Plaintiff as an agent, and (2) plaintiff justifiably relied on that holding out. See id. at 282-83. Plaintiff alleged neither such “holding out” by Defendants nor reliance on plaintiff’s part. The only evidence of “holding out” came from the affidavit submitted by Defendants, which acknowledged that Plaintiff was a director of the corporation. However, no evidence before the trial court established that plaintiff relied on that information in agreeing to the transaction. Accordingly, there was insufficient evidence before the trial court to support an exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendant, and the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss on that ground;

14. Although courts sometimes have used “apparent authority” and “apparent agency” interchangeably, the distinction is important. “Apparent agency creates an agency relationship that does not otherwise exist, while apparent authority expands the authority of an actual agent.” Miller, 150 Or App at 282 n 4. Thus, apparent authority is relevant only if actual agency already has been established. Here, because plaintiff has offered no evidence to establish the existence of an actual agency, apparent authority is not implicated.);

ORCP 21(A) (Defenses and Objections, How presented) (Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim or third party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion to dismiss: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person,“A judge ceases to sit as a judicial officer because the governing principals of administrative law provides that courts are prohibited from substituting their evidence, testimony, record, arguments and rationale for that of the agency.

Additionally, courts are prohibited from their substituting their judgments for that of the agency.” American Iron and Steel v. United States, 568 F.2d 284. And; “. . . judges who become involved in enforcement of mere statutes (civil or criminal in nature and otherwise), act as mere “clerks” of the involved agency…” K.C. Davis., ADMIN. LAW, Ch. 1 (CTP. West’s 1965 Ed.) “…their supposed “courts” becoming thus a court of “limited jurisdiction”as a mere extension of the involved agency for mere superior reviewing purposes.” K.C. Davis, ADMIN. LAW., P. 95, (CTP, 6 Ed. West’s 1977)> FRC v. G.E., 281 U.S. 464; Keller v. P.E.P., 261 U.S. 428. And; A so-called Municipal or District court that is not a constitutional court is a legislative tribunal.

In speaking on this subject in relation to the Constitution for the united States of America, the supreme Court said: “The term ‘District Courts of the United States,’ . . . without an addition expressing a wider connotation, has its historic significance. It describes the constitutional courts created under Article III of the Constitution. Courts of the Territories are legislative courts, properly speaking, and are not District Courts of the United States.” Mookini v. United States, 303 US 201, 205, 58 Sct. 543, 82 Led. 748 ((1938).

The power of the Municipal or District Court is that of the old “justice of the peace” courts which were courts of “limited and special jurisdiction.” State v. Officer, 4 Or. 180 (1871).

Inferior tribunals are subject to the supervisory control (judicial powers), and must show affirmative proof on the face on the inferior tribunal record to sustain a conviction. “If the court is . . . of some special statutory jurisdiction it is as to such proceedings an inferior court, and not aided by presumption of jurisdiction.” Norman v. Zeiber, 3 Or 198.

Inferior tribunals have no presumption of jurisdiction in their favor and all that need to be done by Petitioner, to throw the burden of proving jurisdiction upon Respondent State, is to contest the applicability of the inferior tribunals jurisdiction to Petitioner. ” . . . if the record does not show upon its face the facts necessary to give jurisdiction, they will be presumed not to have existed.” Norman v. Zeiber, 3 Or. 198. And;

The constitutional rule for inferior tribunals was set down by the Oregon Supreme Court in Evans v. Marvin, 76 Or. 540, 148 P 1119 (1915), a case involving a justice court:” . . . the constitutional rule that justice courts are of limited jurisdiction. …their judgments must be sustained affirmatively by positive proof that they had jurisdiction of the cases they attempt to decide.” Evans v. Marvin, 76 Or. 540, 148 P 119 (1915). And;

Even the de facto Constitution and the State Statutes will clearly show that the EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY is vested Solely in the office of the Elected County Prosecutor, Deputy Prosecutor, Special Prosecutor and/or Attorney General’s Office.

All so called Judges are in fact and law EXECUTIVE OFFICERS and that is why the so called JUDGE/ADMINISTRATOR CAN PRESUME TO ISSUE A WARRANT FOR YOUR ARREST WHEN YOU FAIL TO APPEAR IN THE AIRSPACE OF “THIS STATE” BEING ABOVE THE LAND OF “THE STATE!”THAT HAS LEGISLATIVE JURISDICITON.

ALL so called State Court’s are creatures of Statute created by the LEGISLATURE and are merely ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES which only have the authority or jurisdiction conferred by a Statute.

If you search carefully the Senate and House Bills and the 1st Legislative Enactment or Session Law creating the Superior Court’s in your State, you will find that it says right in your own law books, that ALL your so called State Superior Court’s are really LOWER DISTRICT FEDERAL COURTS!

THE PEOPLE HAVE NO STATE JUDICIAL COURT’S AVALIABLE TODAY! “THIS STATE” is a de facto FEDERAL MUNICIPAL CORPORATION and by fraud in the inducement, presents itself as a de jure State, but in fact and law is NOT a State in Original Jurisdiction pursuant to the authority of the 1st Original Judiciary Act wherein the District of Columbia is a de facto for profit copyright private corporation.

“WHEREAS, THIS STATE” is a DE FACTO FEDERAL MUNICIPAL CORPORATION under the NEW JUDICIARY ACT wherein the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA presumes Equal Footing as a de jure STATE.

The issue re the use of the terms of art by the legislative branch within the several states identifying　their legislative acts as in “this state” goes only to “Definitions” re the statute . . . should the act(s) not rise to malum se within “the state” and thereby give notice of a substantive connection to the subject matter as applying to some form of physical damage or substantive contact going to an actual controversy and a real party in interest . . . the statute has no mechanism granting authority to reach the Sovereign.　 Capital crimes therefore are prosecuted by and through the substantive statute as being within “the state” when charged.

Generally in a court proceeding you may challenge the implied charging statute by noting: “The prosecution has apparently only defined the statute as appertaining in”THIS state”, however, it appears the prosecution has failed to charge (certified”) the statute as with in “THE state” of Oregon.”　 This is why the avoidance to certify charging documents going to malum prohibitum . . . as there can be no verifiable charging documents issued and no real party in interest can come forward . . . whereas, the statutory prohibition is only defined.

REGARDING THE ABSOLUTE LIBERTY OF MAN

TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE STATE

Murdock v. Pennsylvania  319 US 105 No state shall convert a liberty into a privilege, license it, and attach a fee to it. “A state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by Federal constitution. at 113, (1943).

Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 373 US 262 If a state converts a liberty into a privilege the citizen can engage in the right with impunity.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 “Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be NO rule making or legislation which would abrogate them.”

Norton v. Shelby County, 118 US 425 “Any unconstitutional act is not law, it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection, it creates no office, it is an illegal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.”

Byars v. U.S. , 273 US 28 Unlawful search and seizure. Rights must be interpreted in favor of the citizen.

Boyd v. U S, 116 US 616 5th Amendment rights. “…constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed… It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of Citizens, and against any stealthy encroachment thereon.”

United States v. Bishop, 412 US 346 Relying on prior decisions of the Supreme Court is a perfect defense against willfulness.

Owens v. City of Independence,445 US 622, 100 S. Ct. 1398 Maine v. Thiboutot,448 US 1, 100 S. Ct. 2502 Hafer v. Melo, 502 US 21 Officers of the Court have no immunity, when violating a constitutional right, from liability, for they are deemed to know the law.

Shapiro v. Thomson,394 US 618, 89 S. Ct. 1322 A Citizen must be free to travel throughout the [several] United States uninhibited by statutes, rules or regulation.

Bailey v. State of Alabama,219 US 219 You have a right to own and contract your labor as you see fit.

Clearfield Trust v. United States,318 US 363 Bank of United States v. Planters’ Bank of Georgia , 9 Wheaton (22 US) 904, 6 L. Ed. 24 (See citation below page 4)“Governments descend to the level of a mere private corporation and takes on the character of a mere private citizen [where private corporate commercial paper, Federal Reserve Notes and other negotiable debt instruments are concerned]…. For purposes of suit, such corporations and individuals are regarded as an entity entirely separate from government.”(Emphasis added)

Memphis Bank & Trust v. Garner, 459 US 392, 103 S. Ct. 692 Addresses the untaxability of obligations of the United States by or under State authority, (31 USC 3124, formerly 742) and provides that if any taxing requiring that either the obligation or the interest thereon, or both, be considered, directly or indirectly, in the computation of the tax it cannot be taxed by or under State authority.

U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F. 2d 297 (1977) “Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak or where an inquiry left unanswered is intentionally misleading”.

Carmine v. Bower, 64 A. 932 “Silence is a species of conduct, and constitutes an implied representation of the existence of facts in question, and the estoppel by misrepresentation. When silence is of such a character and under such circumstances that it would become a fraud on the other party to permit the silent party to deny what his silence has induced the other party to believe and act upon, it will operate as an estoppel.

United States v. Minker, 350 US 179, at page 187 “Because of what appears to be a lawful command on the surface, many citizens, because of their respect for what only appears to be a law, are cunningly coerced into waiving their rights, due to ignorance.” (Paraphrased)

The original 13th Amendment of our National Constitutional, which stated: “If any citizen of the United States shall accept, claim, receive or retain any title of nobility or honor, or shall, without the consent of Congress, accept and retain any present, pension office or emolument of any kind whatever, from any emperor, king, prince or foreign power, such person shall cease to be a citizen of the United States, and shall be incapable of holding any office of trust or profit under them, or either of them.” Laws for the Organization of the Territory of Michigan condensed, arraigned and passed by the fifth legislative council, (1833) Source – Michigan State Library. The above noted original 13th Amendment specifically addresses the condition now in existence in America today. Whereas, Bar members referencing the British Accreditation Registry, the Temple Bar, the four Inns of Court, and particularly the Middle Court presume to do business secretly and deceptively in re commerce and as regards the financial well being of the public generally. This state of affairs is clearly address regarding who has the burden to prove jurisdiction within the Clearfield Doctrine as regards the private nature of such practice.

Boyd v U.S., 116 US 635. “…constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed … It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of citizens, and against any stealthy encroachment thereon.”

Hodges v. U.S. , 203 US 1 (1942). “The right to the enjoyment of life and liberty and the right to acquire and possess property are fundamental rights of the citizens of the several states and are not dependent upon the Constitution of the United States or the federal government for their existence.”

Bennett v. Boggs, 1 Baldw. 60 (1830). “Statutes that violate the plain and obvious principles of common (Natural) right and common reason are null and void.”

Hurtado v. United States, 410 US 578 (1973) “It is not every act, legislative in form, that is law. Law is something more than mere will exerted as an act of power…Arbitrary power, enforcing its edicts to the injury of the party and property of its subjects is not law.”

Butchers’ Union Co. v. Crescent City Co.,111 US 746 (1884).” Our rights cannot, by acts of Congress, be bartered away, given away or taken away.”

U.S. v. Morris. 125 F 322, 325. “Every citizen and freeman is endowed with certain rights and privileges to enjoy which no written law or statute is required. These are the fundamental or natural rights, recognized among all free people.”

Butler v. Collins, 12 Calif., 157. 463.”Consent in law is more than mere formal act of the mind. It is an act unclouded by fraud, duress, or sometimes even mistake.”

Fuentes v. Shevin , 407 US 67 (1972). “A waiver of constitutional rights in any context must, at the very least, be clear; contractual language relied upon must on its face amount to a waiver.”

Regina v. Day, 9 Car. & P. 722. “Every consent involves a submission, but it by no means follows that a mere submission involves consent.”

Thompson v. Smith 154 SE 579. “The right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, either by a carriage or automobile, is not a mere privilege which a City may prohibit or permit at will, but a common right which he has under the right to Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of happiness.”

Kent v. Dulles , 357 U.S. 116, 125. “The right to travel is part of the Liberty of which the Citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment.”

Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 659-60. “Our system of government, based upon the individuality and intelligence of the Citizen, the state does not claim to control him, except as his conduct to others, leaving him the sole judge as to all that only affects himself.”

(see also Christy v. Elliot, 216 Ill. 31, 74 NE 1035; Cal v. Farley, 98 Cal. 09, 20 CA 3d 1032; Michigan Public Utilities Com. v. Duke,
266 US 576, 69, 449.) State police power extends only to immediate threats to public safety, health, and welfare.

California Bank v. San Francisco, 142 Cal. 276, 75 Pac. 832, 100 A.S.R. 130, 64 L.R.A. 918. “A state may impose an excise upon the franchise of corporations engaging in a business which every private Citizen has a right to engage in freely. The privilege taxed is the right to engage in such business with the special advantages which are incident to corporate existence.

“No agreement with a foreign nation and no treaty is free from the restraints of the Constitution. “ Reid v. Covert ,
 354 U.S. 1 (1957)

84 C.J. S. º355, Mass. – Hough v. North Adams 82 N.E. 46, 196 Mass. 290 “A failure substantially to comply with the statutory requirements as to the mode and manner or making the levy invalidates the tax: and there must be strict compliance with mandatory procedures… No tax can be sustained as valid unless it is levied in accordance to the letter of the statute. ”

With Reservation of All Rights, Remedies and Applicable Treaties without prejudice UCC 1-308 and particularly, ORSChapter 174 – Construction of Statutes; General Definitions – Section 174.030 favoring the Natural Right to prevail over the statute, UCC 1-308 reserves the right under Article III due process and thereby proceedings.

“I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed: July 12, 2010. (Signature_____________________SEAL(name)Beneficiary to the Trust

STATE OF                   )
                                 ) S.S.
COUNTY  OF                )

On this Day of July 12, 2010, before me, a Notary Public, personally appeared  (name), personally known to me as the living soul whose name is subscribed to this instrument and acknowledged that he executed same.

___________________________________ My appointment expires: _______________ Notary SEAL

(Blog Master’s Note: This posting too quite a bit of time to format, as I added the case links.  Some cases phasing can be verified   here,  including Carnmine v. Bower, 64 A. 932; Bennett v. Boggs, 1 Baldw. 60; U.S. v. Morris, 125 F. 322; and Butler v. Collins, 12 Calif., 157.  The other cases I filled in as I could. Remember the Seal is your right thumb print with red ink on it. )

 

 

(Blog Master’s Note:  UP DATE:  The trouble I had in finding this case  Butchers’ Union Co. v. Crescent City Co.,  is beyond belief.  I found it attached to another case and not by searching by volume and page.   Both Find Law and Justia hid the decision.  What were they hidding?  Be sure and read through the case.)