Non Negotiable Private Bond For Set Off (Birth Certificate Bond)


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(Blog Masters Note: According to Frank Austin England III this should be printed on the back side of your birth certificate. I have had several people ask for this. This Bond assumes you have already filed your UCC-1 Financial Statement, so please do.
As always, click on an article link, scroll down below comments to search previous articles.)

(For Frank ‘Austin’ England III)



Issued by: «ManFullName», Principal
c/o temporary mailing location:
U. S. P. O. Postmaster
non domestic without the United States
Beneficiary: Timothy F. Geithner, U.S. Trustee d/b/a   REGISTERED MAIL
Secretary of the Treasury       RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
Department of the Treasury       REGISTERED NO. «BCBondRegMailNo»
c/o 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.
Washington, D.C.  20220   


In accordance with H.J.R. 192, 05 June 1933, Chapter 48, 48 Stat. 112

In the matter of: Certificate of Live Birth No.«BCNumber», Accepted for Value and Exempt from Levy

      For deposit to the Department of the Treasury
      For further credit to: «StrawmanAlt2», «SocSec» 
            The undersigned «ManFullName» (“Principal”), a living Christian man in rerum natura, herewith accepts for value the enclosed bond, Certificate of Live Birth No. «BCNumber» and all endorsements front and back in accord with Public Law found at Chapter 48, 48 Stat. 112, Public Policy found at House Joint Resolution 192 of June 5, 1933, and the Uniform Commercial Code, the Principal being the sole authorized acceptor of the said bond, contributor of value thereto, and contributing beneficiary thereof. 


      Please deposit this bond to an account bearing the Registered Mail No. «BCBondRegMailNo» for future identification purposes, to be used for setoff of any and all bills, taxes, liabilities and claims (i) against «ManFirstName» «ManMiddleName» «ManLastName» as listed on Certificate of Live Birth, No. «BCNumber» a/k/a «StrawmanAlt1», (ii) against the Principal’s debtor: «StrawmanFullName» a/k/a «StrawmanAlt1» a/k/a «StrawmanAlt2» a/k/a any and all similar alphanumeric derivatives («SocSec»; File No. «UCCFileNoPresentState»; «DateofUCCPresentState», annexed hereto), or (iii) against any of the Principal’s various debtors or beneficiaries, the said claims to be identified by the Principal’s acceptance for value and endorsement noted thereon..
      Please transfer all assets from the Principal’s previous such accounts bearing the Registered Mail Numbers RR ___________ US (Date) and RR ___________ US (________) to the said account No. «BCBondRegMailNo»..
      Please (i) adjust any and all such bills, taxes, claims and liabilities to a zero (-0-) ending balance or ending balance favorable to the Principal; (ii) charge, settle and close any such account, and (iii) return all interest to the Principal via «StrawmanFullName»  («SocSec») in care of the above location.
      Respondent shall have thirty (30) days from the date of verified receipt of this Bond to perform or dishonor this Bond by returning it with all attachments to the Principal at the above-noted location by non domestic post.  Failure to so return shall constitute Respondent’s acceptance of and performance on all terms and provisions herein..
      This Bond shall be posted as an asset to the benefit of the United States Department of the Treasury and shall expire upon expiration of the Principal.. 
We, the undersigned witnesses, do hereby solemnly attest to the authenticity of the foregoing signatures and seals on this the ______________ day of _____________________ in the Year of Our Lord Two Thousand and ____________.

________________________ ________________________  _______________________________________
Signature Print       Location 
________________________ ________________________  _______________________________________
Signature Print       Location 


Accepted for value by drawee 
________________________   «PNDate»
«ManFullName»   Date
Exemption ID. No. «EIN» 
This is an issue of currency for cause.
Deposit to the U.S. Treasury and credit to the Account of and benefit of
«StrawmanFullName» ID No. «SocSec»

The IRS Title 15 Is Their Achilles Heel (Debt Validation) Part 3


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(Blog Masters Note:
I apologize to my readers for the delay in posting. I was a necessary delay for reasons of the heart, and I still require more time. I hope you all had a Happy New Year.
All past posts are now in a drop down below comments. )

(For Frank ‘Austin’ England III)


TITLE 15 > CHAPTER 41 > SUBCHAPTER V > § 1692 is an act of Congress designed to protect natural persons ,1692a  The term “consumer” means any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt, from abusive collection agency practices, see exhibit 1 of 9 pages;

THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE is incorporated in Delaware as a collection agency for a Puerto Rico company; INTERNAL REVENUE TAX AND AUDIT SERVICE (IRS) /// For Profit General Delaware Corporation /// Incorporation Date 7/12/33 /// File No. 0325720, see exhibit 2 of 3 pages;

THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE is not a part of the United States government, see: Diversified Metal Products v. T-Bow Co. Trust 158 F.R.D. 660/ IRS 93-405-E-EJL, see exhibit 3 of 3 pages;

Several Corporations involved with the INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE are also unlawfully acting under color of law as government agencies, see exhibit 4 of 1 page.


Notice for the agent is notice for the principal applies under this notice.

Notification of legal responsibility is “the first essential of due process of law.”  Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).

Your silence stands a consent, and tacit approval, for the declarations of facts and conclusions here being established as fact, as a law matter and this affidavit absent timely rebuttle, will stand as final judgment in this matter.

Failure to reply with-in thirty days, establishes you are in agreement with the foregoing and are thusly legally estopped pursuant to: Carmine v. Bowen, 64 A. 932, 1906, silence activates estoppel. 

I, Your Name Here, hereby reserve the right to amend this document, and am the only party authorized to assert the right to make amendments to this document as necessary, and in order that the truth may be ascertained and these proceedings justly determined.

Should any party possess information that will controvert and overcome this Declaration with specificity, please advise Me in writing by DECLARATION in AFFIDAVIT FORM within 30, days from receipt hereof and thereby, provide Me with your timely rebuttle, proving with particularity by stating all requisite actual evidentiary fact and all requisite actual law, and at no time in reliance on mere presumptive facts and personal conclusions law, that this Affidavit by Verified Declaration is substantially and materially false sufficiently for changing materially my declaration.

The Undersigned, I, Your Name Here, do herewith declare, state and say that I, Your Name Here, issue this with sincere intent in truth, that I, the undersigned am competent by stating the matters set forth herein, that the contents are true, correct, complete, and certain, admissible as evidence, reasonable, not misleading, and by My best knowledge, by Me, the undersigned. 

This document and all others pertaining to this issue may be recorded and thusly may be used at the discretion of its issuer for any and all matters as so allowed under Rule 902 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and others, including, without limitations, the jurisdiction of the State of Arizona and the United States of America.

By my hand, this sixth day of November, 2007, Your Name Here.

 Signed: _____________________________________,                

 All Rights Reserved

Your Name Here
c/o 1234 W. Freedom Way
Phoenix, Arizona republic
near [85000]


Arizona state Republic                        )

                                                            ) ss.                           JURAT

Maricopa County                                 )

On the ___ day of ________, 200__, Your Name Here personally appeared before me and proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person whose name is subscribed hereto and acknowledged to me that he executed the same under asseveration, and accepts the facts thereof.  Subscribed and affirmed before me this day.  Witness my hand and seal this ____ day of __________, 200__.

Notary Signature

My Commission expires on the ____ day of ____________, 20____.

Affidavit is 2 pages                    Exhibit is 16 pages                             Document number 2

                           certified mail number 7007 0710 0003 8330 1234


For Profit General Delaware Corporation
Incorporation Date 7/12/33
File No. 0325720

Non-profit Delaware Corporation
Incorporation Date 9/13/14
File No. 0042817

For Profit General Delaware Corporation
Incorporation Date 3/9/83
File No. 2004409

Non-profit Delaware Corporation
Incorporation Date 4/19/89
File No. 2193946

For-profit General Delaware Corporation
Incorporation Date 8/22/80
File No. 0897960

For-profit Delaware Statutory Trust
Incorporation Date 10/24/95
File No. 2554768

For-Profit General Delaware Corporation
Incorporation Date: 11/13/89
File No. 2213135



 A new concept that might be worth studying:

 Following are 4 concepts that when studied together may be an important part of the puzzle that have been recently discovered.

1) Nihil dicit judgement: This court order is actually higher than a default judgement and leaves no room for an appeal.

2) There is no accusation in civil court, therefore the word charge is synonymous with the word bill in civil court.

3) The IRS is a debt collection service.

4) Debt collection is covered under Title 15 chapter 4 sub-chapter V section 1692, not Title 26.

 Combining all of these facts into one concept creates a heretofore unused defense that appears to be valid.

When the IRS charges someone with willful failure to file under civil law they are really billing the victim. The victim then tries to fight using the Constitution and/or Title 26 without ever really requesting a verified assessment of the debt under Title 15,which gives the IRS the ability to be granted a nihil dicit judgement against the victim in UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, making the bill lawful. Once the bill is deemed lawful the IRS gets to claim the victim is fraudulently refusing to pay a legal debt and therefore converts the refusal to pay into some kind of criminal act.

  In reality, since the IRS is nothing more than a debt collection service the victim can demand the IRS to verify the assessment, which the IIRS can’t, and if the IRS could, the victim can make the IRS take the action to the jurisdictional district the alleged debtor is in.

These are all recent discoveries and have been used minimally, yet separately. I am attempting to combine all 4 into one complete concept in a way the average man can use as a defense against the terrorist.

 I am getting a lot of calls and e-mails on Title 15 so I will try to explain our concept again. Use this with the previous explanation and people interested should understand the concept with very little research.

The first rule of winning in court is to win before court. The second rule is to make the other party argue about something other than the case at hand. IRS attorneys know this, so should we.

Going to court and arguing about taxes using Title 26 is ineffective for the following reasons.

1) Title 26 is used by the government to determine the tax. see Title 26

2) The IRS is a debt collection service, not a government agency. see Diversified Metal v. T-Bow trust/IRS

3) The bill issued by the U.S. TREASURY (under Title 26) becomes a debt collected by the IRS (which has to follow Title 15).

4) If you fight the IRS under Title 26, you are fighting something they have nothing to do with. It is like contesting the electric bill to the mail man, he will just think you are a nag and he can’t do anything about it anyhow.

5) The bill has already been adjudicated under nihil dicit judgement and stands if not contested under Title 15. You can not contest the bill under Title 26 since that is the government code on how to figure the bill, not the bill itself.

6) Demanding the IRS verify the assessment (read as bill) requires them to cease and desist (under Title 15) until the supply the docs.

7) The IRS can not supply the requisite docs and therefore you have beat them before court. see rule 1

8) If you go to court you can argue the correct issue, the bill, not how they determined the bill, thusly you can win by arguing the right argument. see rule 2

9) You can force the IRS to do the action in the judicial district, ie the court nearest the debtor, which they will not do, and therefore you won’t go to court. see YHWH’s scriptures.

a) See; TITLE 26 > Subtitle F > CHAPTER 76 > Subchapter A > § 7408

§ 7408. Actions to enjoin specified conduct related to tax shelters and reportable transactions

(d) Citizens and residents outside the United States

If any citizen or resident of the United States does not reside in, and does not have his principal place of business in, any United States judicial district, such citizen or resident shall be treated for purposes of this section as residing in the District of Columbia.

I know this seems over simplified, but a cursory study of unsuccessful IRS litigation against their victims will lead one to determine that one of the common denominators of acquittals is that somewhere or somehow the victim did some type of assessment request that was never affirmed. This is diametrically opposed to all the victims that lost using Title 26 and the absence of applicability to the code.

In summary, just like a charge in a traffic ticket, don’t fight the law and their reasoning, deny the bill and require them to prove it exists as a matter of record, before they make it a matter of record under nihil dicit judgement because you didn’t deny it.



A contractOR (government under Title 26) issues you (contractEE) a bill through their third party collection service (IRS), you do not respond. Third party collector service, whose actions and remedies are defined in Title 15, goes to court ex-parte and receives a nihil dicit judgement. You get dragged into a foreign court (USDC) and attempt to fight the contractOR and their rules for issuing the bill under the Constitution and/or Title 26, neither of which applies, since it is the bill being discussed not the entity that issued the bill or how said entity determined the amount. Any attorney would tell you this is a waste of time. You (contractEE) must first void the bill under the appropriate code (Title 15) and demand the case be kept in the proper jurisdiction (nearest judicial district).

In essence, Title 26 applies to the government entity that determined the bill and Title 15 applies to the collection agency attacking you for payment. Its almost incomprehensible to believe that legally Title 26, THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE has little to do with the INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE. This appears to be a well orchestrated word trick.



Here is the silver bullet, check it out.

Title 26 has nothing to do with the INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE; it only applies to THE INTERNAL REVENUE.

The give away is in Title 26 section 7802 (b)(1)(c)

(b)(1)(c) one member shall be the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue.

Hence, The Internal Revue Code not The Internal Revenue Service Code.

The Internal Revenue and the Internal Revenue Service are two separate and distinct entities.

The Internal Revenue is a government agency and is under the scope of Title 26.

Internal Revenue Service is a private for Profit Corporation and is under the scope of Title 15.

If you look up Internal Revenue Service in the Index of Title 26 you will discover it is only mentioned in a few sections. None of which have anything to do with determining the tax, they only deal with governance, collection and the like.



The following contains a complete reference from Title 26 detailing the distinctions between INTERNAL REVENUE and INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE. INTERNAL REVENUE deals with taxes on liquor, tobacco and firearms. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE deals with the collection of assessed taxes for the TREASURY and the INTERNAL REVENUE.

This concludes my cursory study of the distinctions. After reading the following listed sections I believe you all will agree with my conclusion that Title 26 does not apply to controversies dealing with the ability of the INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE to collect taxes.

7802 especially (b)(1)(c)
7803 especially (1)(A)
7806 especially (b)

Nowhere in Title 26 is it stated that the INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE has anything to do with assessing taxes,  that is done by either the TREASURY or INTERNAL REVENUE.  The distinctions between the two are far too numerous to accept as a scribners error. The intent becomes obvious while reading the aforementioned sections.



After all the studying I have done on this recent discovery about the THE INTERNAL REVENUE V. THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, something just dawned on me that seems to be missing from Title 26. So here I am at 3 am going through the book from cover to cover and it is nowhere to be found. I get a lot of letters and docs from various agents of the IRS and their assorted cohorts and it is always there, but it is not on any of my copies of Title 26.

I have always hated seeing that satanic looking symbol and it usually makes me cringe more than the stupid wording underneath it. Its their logo, some kind of Nazi looking dead eagle. Its everywhere on INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE crap, but it is nowhere to be found in or on the Title 26 book.

Understanding the laws concerning copyrights and trademarks makes me consider this as prima facie evidence my theory is correct. If Title 26 was part of  THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE that logo would be all over the place. The reason it is not is because that would invalidate the logo since it would be used to commit an act of fraud.

This may not seem like a big deal but it would be like McDonalds not putting its GOLDEN ARCHES on its packaging.

Study points:
nihil dicit judgement

       Title 26
IRS logo not on Title 26 book
section 7802 (b)(1)(c)
IRS incorporated in 1933 long after INTERNAL REVENUE already operating
Diversified Metal v. T-Bow Trust / IRS
IR assesses and IRS collects

Title 15 Chapter 41 Sub V section 1692
verified assessment
judicial district



50 Titles and not one is about private corporations

·         Title 1 General Provisions
·         Title 2 The Congress
·         Title 3 The President
·         Title 4 Flag and Seal, Seat Of Government,and the States
·         Title 5 Government Organization and Employees
·         Appendix to Title 5
·         Title 6 Domestic Security
·         Title 7 Agriculture
·         Title 8 Aliens and Nationality
·         Title 9 Arbitration Title 10 Armed Forces
·         Appendix to Title 10 (Rules of Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces)
·         Title 11 Bankruptcy
·         Appendix to Title 11
·         Title 12 Banks and Banking
·         Title 13 Census
·         Title 14 Coast Guard
·         Title 15 Commerce and Trade
·         Title 16 Conservation
·         Title 17 Copyrights
·         Title 18 Crimes and Criminal Procedure 
·         Appendix to Title 18
·         Title 19 Customs Duties 
·         Title 20 Education 
·         Title 21 Food and Drugs 
·         Title 22 Foreign Relations and Intercourse 
·         Title 23 Highways 
·         Title 24 Hospitals and Asylums 
·         Title 25 Indians 
·         Title 26 Internal Revenue Code 
·         Appendix to Title 26
·         Title 27 Intoxicating Liquors 
·         Title 28 Judiciary and Judicial Procedure 
·         Appendix to Title 28
·         Title 29 Labor 
·         Title 30 Mineral Lands and Mining 
·         Title 31 Money and Finance 
·         Title 32 National Guard 
·         Title 33 Navigation and Navigable Waters 
·         Title 34 Navy (repealed) 
·         Title 35 Patents 
·         Title 36 Patriotic Societies and Observances 
·         Title 37 Pay and Allowances Of the Uniformed Services 
·         Title 38 Veterans’ Benefits 
·         Appendix to Title 38 (Rules of Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims()
·         Title 39 Postal Service 
·         Title 40 Public Buildings, Property, and Works 
·         Title 41 Public Contracts 
·         Title 42 The Public Health and Welfare 
·         Title 43 Public Lands 
·         Title 44 Public Printing and Documents 
·         Title 45 Railroads 
·         Title 46 Shipping 
·         Appendix to Title 46
·         Title 47 Telegraphs, Telephones, and Radiotelegraphs 
·         Title 48 Territories and Insular Possessions 
·         Title 49 Transportation 
·         Title 50 War and National Defense



 How it works.

THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE gives you their docs that you fill out, or they fill out. They then give the docs to THE INTERNAL REVENUE which says, “oh look this guy owes us this money”. THE INTERNAL REVENUE  then gets a nihil dicit judgement making the debt valid and turns the bill over to the INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, a private for profit collection agency, for collection. You then fight THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE on the validity, which was already covertly adjudicated, under Title 26. The judge considers you insane since he knows Title 26 has nothing to do with THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE and ONLY concerns itself with THE INTERNAL REVENUE. Which would be like taking something you bought at WALMART back to KMART.

This is also exactly what ALL other debt collection companies due for their vendors.


Lectlaw: JUDGMENT BY NIL DICIT, is one rendered against a defendant for want of a plea. The plaintiff obtains a rule on the defendant to plead within a time specified, of which he serves a notice on the defendant or his attorney; if the defendant neglect to enter a plea within the time specified, the plaintiff may sign judgment against him. NIHIL DICIT. He says nothing. It is the failing of the defendant to put in a plea or answer to the plaintiff’s declaration by the day assigned; and in plea or answer to the plaintiff’s declaration by the day assigned; and in this case judgment is given against the defendant of course, as he says this case judgment is given against the defendant of course, as he says nothing why it should not. Vide 15 Vin. Ab. 556; Dane’s Ab. Index, h.t. nothing why it should not. Vide 15 Vin. Ab. 556; Dane’s Ab. Index, h.t. Nihil-dicit judgement: a judgment entered against a defendant who has failed to make an effective answer (as because the answer is withdrawn or does not respond to the merits of the plaintiff’s case)

Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, page 1045                                                              Nihil Dicit.  He says nothing.  The name of the judgment which may be taken as of course against a defendant who omits to plead or answer the plaintiff’s declaration or complaint within the time limited.  In some jurisdictions it is otherwise known as judgment “for want of a plea”.  

Judgment taken against party who withdraws his answer is judgment nihil dicit, which amounts to confession of cause of action stated, and carries with it, more strongly than judgment by default, admission of justice of plaintiff’s case.  See also Nil dicit judgment



Just for information:

November 5 , 2007 was the day that some guy, through a serious of rather bizarre discoveries and epiphanies made a great discovery, really YHWH slapped some sense into this guy. That discovery being nothing more than a simple word game; THE INTERNAL REVENUE  and THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE are two distinct and separate entities.

When all the lawyers decide to quit defending their education and their own opinions and open their eyes to the simple fact that Title 26 has nothing at all to do with THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE and from its very beginning the confusion was purposeful and done with malice aforethought.

I have received so many reports from all other the country from people who now know why the IRS is leaving them alone. These people, some by accident and some on purpose required the IRS to verify the assessment, some with and some without mentioning Title 15. Regardless, once these people demanded the verification the IRS went away.

My advice to everyone is to treat the IRS like it is what it is, a private debt collector. None of us would use Title 26 to argue against a credit card company’s collector service and in all reality that is all the IRS is. Their incorporation documents confirm this.

Don’t forget, there is no accusation in civil court, charge in civil law means bill, nothing else. Treat a bill as a bill.



This might clear things up, but if you have no background in law it might be more confusing. Read it until you understand it. When you do understand it you will be able to follow their road map to destruction, or get off the path. It might help to go down and read the summary first if you have no background in law.

THE INTERNAL REVENUE (IR) deals with the THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (IRS) under Administrative law (E).  This allows the 2 separate entities to communicate privately and off the record. They can also do financial dealings without reporting to the court or the other parties. It also keeps those pesky human and Constitutional rights out of the case since Administrative law (E) is under the executive branch and not the legislative branch.

The IRS deals with a person’s strawman under Administrative law (E). We want them to deal with us under Private law (B), which will cause them to name and hold accountable the actual human being that is attacking you, but they created the strawman so they would not have to. As long as you use Title 26 which is under Administrative law (E) you are treated as a corporation (corporation don’t have human or Constitutional rights). When you invoke Title 15, which deals with natural persons (which do have human and Constitutional rights) the IRS loses authority because they will now be treated by the court as what they are, a private for Profit Corporation. Under Private law you can deal directly with the human, and his real name, that is attacking you rather than the whole corporation. By dealing with the IRS under Administrative law (E), you can not invoke the natural person concept since it is not included in its definitions. Also, since Administrative law (E) is part of Public law (A), any conviction can be moved to another section of Public law (A) called Criminal law (F). But, when dealing with the IRS under Title 15 you are considered a natural person and can invoke Constitutional law (D) if they try to violate your rights. Remember, the IRS agents use pseudonyms to keep us from going into Private law (B). A good rule to follow is if the IRS is trying to stop it, you should try and start it. Private law (B) can not be moved to Criminal law (F) since they are under different legal concepts.

                                                     Summary                                                                          This is very, very important:                                                                                                     If you invoke Title 26 you stay under Administrative law (E) and you can not use Constitutional and/or human rights as your defense since they do not exist in Administrative law (E), which is for corporations.  The RS has the authority under Administrative law (E) to move the proceedings to Criminal law (F) since both laws are relegated under Public law (A). If you invoke Title 15 you have moved over to private law (B) and are to be considered a natural person, human being, and have Constitutional rights. Plus the IRS can not move a case form Private law which is its own entity to Criminal law (F) since that is under Public law (A).

Definitions of laws:

In general terms, public law involves interrelations between the state and the general population, whereas private law involves interactions between private citizens. Generally speaking, private law is the area of law in a society that affects the relationships between individuals or groups without the intervention of the state or government. In many cases the public/private law distinction is confounded by laws that regulate private relations while having been passed by legislative enactment. In some cases these public statutes are known as laws of public order, as private individuals do not have the right to break them and any attempt to circumvent such laws is void as against public policy.

A) Public law is the law governing the relationship between individuals (citizens, companies) and the state. Constitutional law, administrative law and criminal law are sub-divisions of public law.

B) Private law is that part of a legal system which is part of the jus commune that involves relationships between individuals, such as the law of contracts or torts, as it is called in the common law, and the law of obligations as it is called in civilian legal systems. It is to be distinguished from public law, which deals with relationships between natural and artificial persons (i.e., individuals, business entities, non-profit organizations) and the state including regulatory statutes, penal law and other law that effects the public order.

C) Corporate law refers to the law establishing separate legal entities known as the company or corporation and governs the most prevalent legal models for firms, for instance limited companies  Technically, a company is a juristic person which has a separate legal identity from its shareholding members, and is ordinarily incorporated to undertake commercial business.

D) Constitutional law deals with the relationship between the state and individual, and the relationships between different branches of the state, such as the executive, the legislative and the judiciary.

E) Administrative law refers to the body of law which regulates bureaucratic managerial procedures and is administered by the executive branch of a government and to the body of law that defines the powers of administrative agencies; rather than the judicial or legislative branches (if they are different in that particular jurisdiction). This body of law regulates international trade, manufacturing, pollution, taxation, and the like. Also called regulatory law, it is the body of law that arises from the activities of administrative agencies of government. Government agency action can include rulemaking, adjudication, or the enforcement of a specific regulatory agenda. Administrative law is considered a branch of public law. Administrative law expanded greatly during the twentieth century.

F) Criminal law involves the state imposing sanctions for crimes committed by individuals so that society can achieve justice and a peaceable social order. This differs from Civil law in that civil actions are disputes between two parties that are not of significant public concern.



The IRS Title 15 Is Their Achilles Heel (Debt Validation) Part 2


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(Blog Masters Note:
I apologize to my readers for the delay in posting. I was a necessary delay for reasons of the heart. I have been dating, and will probably not post until after the holidays. This is a happy time for me. Happy Holidays!!!

(For Frank ‘Austin’ England III) 

§ 1692g. Validation of debts

(a) Notice of debt; contents

Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing—
(1) the amount of the debt;
(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed;
(3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector;
(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and
(5) a statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor.
(b) Disputed debts
If the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period described in subsection (a) of this section that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, or that the consumer requests the name and address of the original creditor, the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt, or any disputed portion thereof, until the debt collector obtains verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment, or the name and address of the original creditor, and a copy of such verification or judgment, or name and address of the original creditor, is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector.
(c) Admission of liability

The failure of a consumer to dispute the validity of a debt under this section may not be construed by any court as an admission of liability by the consumer.

§ 1692h. Multiple debts

If any consumer owes multiple debts and makes any single payment to any debt collector with respect to such debts, such debt collector may not apply such payment to any debt which is disputed by the consumer and, where applicable, shall apply such payment in accordance with the consumer’s directions.

§ 1692i. Legal actions by debt collectors
(a) Venue
Any debt collector who brings any legal action on a debt against any consumer shall—
(1) in the case of an action to enforce an interest in real property securing the consumer’s obligation, bring such action only in a judicial district or similar legal entity in which such real property is located; or
(2) in the case of an action not described in paragraph (1), bring such action only in the judicial district or similar legal entity—
(A) in which such consumer signed the contract sued upon; or
(B) in which such consumer resides at the commencement of the action.
(b) Authorization of actions
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize the bringing of legal actions by debt collectors.

§ 1692j. Furnishing certain deceptive forms (a) Venue

(a) It is unlawful to design, compile, and furnish any form knowing that such form would be used to create the false belief in a consumer that a person other than the creditor of such consumer is participating in the collection of or in an attempt to collect a debt such consumer allegedly owes such creditor, when in fact such person is not so participating.

(b) Any person who violates this section shall be liable to the same extent and in the same manner as a debt collector is liable under section 1692k of this title for failure to comply with a provision of this subchapter

§ 1692k. Civil liability

(a) Amount of damages

Except as otherwise provided by this section, any debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of this subchapter with respect to any person is liable to such person in an amount equal to the sum of—

(1) any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of such failure;
(A) in the case of any action by an individual, such additional damages as the court may allow, but not exceeding $1,000; or

(B) in the case of a class action, (i) such amount for each named plaintiff as could be recovered under subparagraph (A), and (ii) such amount as the court may allow for all other class members, without regard to a minimum individual recovery, not to exceed the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the debt collector; and

(3) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability, the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court. On a finding by the court that an action under this section was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, the court may award to the defendant attorney’s fees reasonable in relation to the work expended and costs.
(b) Factors considered by court
In determining the amount of liability in any action under subsection (a) of this section, the court shall consider, among other relevant factors—
(1) in any individual action under subsection (a)(2)(A) of this section, the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance, and the extent to which such noncompliance was intentional; or
(2) in any class action under subsection (a)(2)(B) of this section, the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance, the resources of the debt collector, the number of persons adversely affected, and the extent to which the debt collector’s noncompliance was intentional.
(c) Intent
A debt collector may not be held liable in any action brought under this subchapter if the debt collector shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.
(d) Jurisdiction
An action to enforce any liability created by this subchapter may be brought in any appropriate United States district court without regard to the amount in controversy, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.
(e) Advisory opinions of Commission
No provision of this section imposing any liability shall apply to any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any advisory opinion of the Commission, notwithstanding that after such act or omission has occurred, such opinion is amended, rescinded, or determined by judicial or other authority to be invalid for any reason.

§ 1692l. Administrative enforcement

(a) Federal Trade Commission

Compliance with this subchapter shall be enforced by the Commission, except to the extent that enforcement of the requirements imposed under this subchapter is specifically committed to another agency under subsection (b) of this section. For purpose of the exercise by the Commission of its functions and powers under the Federal Trade Commission Act [15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.], a violation of this subchapter shall be deemed an unfair or deceptive act or practice in violation of that Act. All of the functions and powers of the Commission under the Federal Trade Commission Act are available to the Commission to enforce compliance by any person with this subchapter, irrespective of whether that person is engaged in commerce or meets any other jurisdictional tests in the Federal Trade Commission Act, including the power to enforce the provisions of this subchapter in the same manner as if the violation had been a violation of a Federal Trade Commission trade regulation rule.

(b) Applicable provisions of law

Compliance with any requirements imposed under this subchapter shall be enforced under—

(1) section 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act [12 U.S.C. 1818], in the case of—

(A) national banks, and Federal branches and Federal agencies of foreign banks, by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency;

(B) member banks of the Federal Reserve System (other than national banks), branches and agencies of foreign banks (other than Federal branches, Federal agencies, and insured State branches of foreign banks), commercial lending companies owned or controlled by foreign banks, and organizations operating under section 25 or 25(a) [1] of the Federal Reserve Act [12 U.S.C. 601 et seq., 611 et seq.], by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and

(C) banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (other than members of the Federal Reserve System) and insured State branches of foreign banks, by the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation;

(2) section 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act [12 U.S.C. 1818], by the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, in the case of a savings association the deposits of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation;

(3) the Federal Credit Union Act [12 U.S.C. 1751 et seq.], by the National Credit Union Administration Board with respect to any Federal credit union;

(4) subtitle IV of title 49, by the Secretary of Transportation, with respect to all carriers subject to the jurisdiction of the Surface Transportation Board;

(5) part A of subtitle VII of title 49, by the Secretary of Transportation with respect to any air carrier or any foreign air carrier subject to that part; and

(6) the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921 [7 U.S.C. 181 et seq.] (except as provided in section 406 of that Act [7 U.S.C. 226, 227]), by the Secretary of Agriculture with respect to any activities subject to that Act.

The terms used in paragraph (1) that are not defined in this subchapter or otherwise defined in section 3(s) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(s)) shall have the meaning given to them in section 1(b) of the International Banking Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3101).

(c) Agency powers

For the purpose of the exercise by any agency referred to in subsection (b) of this section of its powers under any Act referred to in that subsection, a violation of any requirement imposed under this subchapter shall be deemed to be a violation of a requirement imposed under that Act. In addition to its powers under any provision of law specifically referred to in subsection (b) of this section, each of the agencies referred to in that subsection may exercise, for the purpose of enforcing compliance with any requirement imposed under this subchapter any other authority conferred on it by law, except as provided in subsection (d) of this section.

(d) Rules and regulations

Neither the Commission nor any other agency referred to in subsection (b) of this section may promulgate trade regulation rules or other regulations with respect to the collection of debts by debt collectors as defined in this subchapter.

§ 1692m. Reports to Congress by the Commission; views of other Federal agencies

(a) Not later than one year after the effective date of this subchapter and at one-year intervals thereafter, the Commission shall make reports to the Congress concerning the administration of its functions under this subchapter, including such recommendations as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate. In addition, each report of the Commission shall include its assessment of the extent to which compliance with this subchapter is being achieved and a summary of the enforcement actions taken by the Commission under section 1692l of this title.

(b) In the exercise of its functions under this subchapter, the Commission may obtain upon request the views of any other Federal agency which exercises enforcement functions under section 1692l of this title.

§ 1692n. Relation to State laws

This subchapter does not annul, alter, or affect, or exempt any person subject to the provisions of this subchapter from complying with the laws of any State with respect to debt collection practices, except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with any provision of this subchapter, and then only to the extent of the inconsistency. For purposes of this section, a State law is not inconsistent with this subchapter if the protection such law affords any consumer is greater than the protection provided by this subchapter.

§ 1692o. Exemption for State regulation

The Commission shall by regulation exempt from the requirements of this subchapter any class of debt collection practices within any State if the Commission determines that under the law of that State that class of debt collection practices is subject to requirements substantially similar to those imposed by this subchapter, and that there is adequate provision for enforcement.


name and address

certified mail number ________________________

Linda E. Stiff, #   ,

AgentName, #  , IRSTitle,


Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Internal Revenue Service

Room 5226

1111 Constitution Avenue, NW

Washington, D.C. 20224



AgentName, #, IRSTitle

Mailing Address

City, State Zip



Notice of Demand for Verified Assessment for Year 20–,
account # 000- 00- 0000;
Demand to Cease and Desist Abusive Collection Practices

 Commissioner of Internal Revenue; Agent Name; To Whom This May Concern:

Commissioner, et al., “You” are herein demanded by the undersigned to verify that You, and Your delegates’, collection activities and performances are within Your official duties as the officer or employee or assignee of the United States Government; and specifically,  2) You are demanded by the undersigned to cause to be prepared and produced to the undersigned written verified assessment(s) concerning all alleged or presumed liability and thereby, outstanding debt for any and all taxable years currently in question re account # 000- 00- 0000, including, but not limited to, calendar year 20–; and, 20–) You are hereby noticed: You are not authorized to present yourself, or cause your delegate to take the liberty to appear at My dwelling(s) or work place(s) as such practice gives cause to intimidate Me, causes Me to suffer undue duress and distress and is absolutely unnecessary. Such presumptive and thereby, summary liberties are by their nature, abusive collection practices and recognized as such pursuant to U.S. federal and Oregon state law. 3) You are herein noticed that until You have duly provided to Me the herein referenced verified assessment(s) for any and all alleged liability and therefore alleged debt that all further activity by You or Your delegates, including, but not limited to, failed reimbursement of prior under color collections having not been verified by assessment, or the continued abuse of the collection process pursuant to Title 15 of an unverified liability or debt, is willful and abusive practice and categorically willful and direct violation of U.S. federal law and Oregon state law; and, 4) You are noticed that henceforth, I authorize Youto contact Me only by mail at the mailing address above; and, 5) You have 30 business days to act in accordance with this demand requiring substantive due process pursuant to Title 15 and in accordance with the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

 I anticipate Your timely cooperation in remediation of the aforesaid alleged liability(s) and debt(s), the immediate cessation of abusive practices by You and Your delegates, and the appropriate prompt return of all personal property plus interest.
Notice to agent is notice to principal; notice to principal is notice to agent.

Full Name
cc:  (name), Acting Attorney General, U.S.

          (name), Arizona Attorney General
          (name), Director Arizona Department of Revenue

 (example for Arizona)


Here is the affidavit I am sending.

By                                          VERIFIED DECLARATION 

(notary seal)          ) ss

For: Whom it may concern: In the Matter for Your Name Here, including any and all derivations and variations in the spelling thereof.

WHEREAS, the public record is the highest form of evidence, I, Your Name Here, am hereby timely creating for the public record by this Affidavit and by Verified Declaration within in the jurisdiction of  (state)   republic and the united States of America.


1. Fact: I, Your Name Here, have not seen or been presented with any substantive ofer of proof or evidence which demonstrates that, primarily, the entity known as the INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE is anything other than a foreign entity, having its origin and headquarters in the territorial jurisdiction of the territory of Puerto Rico and thereby, being nothing more, than a mere rogue collection agency employing agents to operate in the nature of privateers , while at all times, said agents are encouraged to presume to employ collection/prize measures in the form of Marque and Reprisal i.e. pillage and plunder in the said agent’s private and thereby, personal capacity for the express purpose to unjustly enrich themselves;

2. Fact: I, Your Name Here, have not seen or been presented with any substantive offer of evidence which demonstrates the entity known as the INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE is in fact, a registered entity, not to be confused as the corporation registered in the State of Delaware circa 1933, and firmly believe that the said INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE cannot in fact, make a valid offer of proof of its substantive existence other than a private entity;

3. Fact: I, Your Name Here, have not seen or been presented with an offer of proof of verifiable evidence which demonstrates that the INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE is anything other than a wholly private entity presuming to act under color of law while at all times, masquerading as a duly authorized government taxing agency for enforcement and collection purposes;

4. Fact: I, Your Name Here, have not seen or been presented with an offer of proof, that any verifiable evidence is available to demonstrate, the INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE is exempted to comply with the letter of law re Title 15 chapter 41 subchapter V  § 1962;      


 (Blog Master’s Note: the Affidavit continues and I will pick up at this point)                                                                                  

The IRS Title 15 Is Their Achilles Heel (Debt Validation) (part1)


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(For Frank ‘Austin’ England III) 

(Blog Masters Note:
This is part 1 of 3, in part 2 & 3 will be affidavits and court cases. Before beginning, look at the IRS laws in the Code of Federal Regulations, there you will find the brackets around the authorization. Meaning the authorization has been omitted. But this is another remedy.
All past posts are now in a drop down below comments. )


(Proof of Validation of Debt)

I know someone who wishes to remain anonymous but wants his story out. I can attest to the hassles he went through with the IRS and know that it has been a long time since he has had to deal with them. Over a few years he has accumulated an enormous amount of documentation and had repeated communications with the IRS. They eventually dragged him into UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT and during the trial he changed his direction and used Title 15 instead of Title 26 and the Constitution. The case eventually stopped.

His new contention was simple and in some ways similar to my charge concept, it is all about the bill not the law. Title 15 relates to “verified assessment”, in other words the collector must provide proof to validate the debt and any case involving debt must be held in the judicial district court. The concept is that the evil ones have circumvented the Constitution and use their law, Title 26, as a way to confuse their victims. Tax law does not apply since the IRS is strictly a debt collection agency, thusly they are required to follow Title 15. The IRS has no way to verify the debt even if they can verify taxes. W-2’s and 1099’s are only evidence that some one has paid something, not that someone owes something.

After reading all of Title 15 Chapter 41 Sub V section 1692 I can see his point is valid. Knowing that IRS is by corporate charter and their own admission a debt collection agency this all seems to make sense. I have started using this information in my own situation and will keep the group informed on the situation. This man told me he sent one letter, received a very uninformative denial response and sent a response to that response. This was done during his trial. He has not heard anything since, which was over a year ago. His case was terminated with no decision. I looked it up and the court just says CLOSED AND SEALED.  I have not seen a case terminated this way.

Conclusion: Once again it seems the evil one’s primary strategy is to get us to fight the wrong battle. Although Title 26 is the Internal Revenue Code, the IRS is just a collection agency and thereby is required to follow Title 15. If we don’t force them to verify the debt then we are agreeing the “bill” is valid. This, to me, is no different than the court tricking us into fighting an accusation when we should be fighting a charge.

Never enter into controversy by arguing the issues presented by the IRS . . . no controversy created or offered on your part, no cause to move forward. As long as you are seeking discovery, as the above provides specifically, there is no controversy . . . and if they can’t honorably answer your inquiry, the matter is closed.


§ 1692. Congressional findings and declaration of purpose

(a) Abusive practices
There is abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors. Abusive debt collection practices contribute to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy.

(b) Inadequacy of laws
Existing laws and procedures for redressing these injuries are inadequate to protect consumers.

(c) Available non-abusive collection methods
Means other than misrepresentation or other abusive debt collection practices are available for the effective collection of debts.

(d) Interstate commerce
Abusive debt collection practices are carried on to a substantial extent in interstate commerce and through means and instrumentalities of such commerce. Even where abusive debt collection practices are purely intrastate in character, they nevertheless directly affect interstate commerce.

(e) Purposes
It is the purpose of this subchapter to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.

§ 1692a. Definitions

As used in this subchapter—

(1) The term “Commission” means the Federal Trade Commission.

(2) The term “communication” means the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.

(3) The term “consumer” means any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt. (Remember, these administrative territorial district courts/tribunals due to their exclusive mercantile nature, can’t address the natural person as said courts have no authority to directly interact with a substantive and thereby biological party as they don’t hold title to that property. Paper to paper, flesh to flesh and never the twains shall meet.)

(4) The term “creditor” means any person who offers or extends credit creating a debt or to whom a debt is owed, but such term does not include any person to the extent that he receives an assignment or transfer of a debt in default solely for the purpose of facilitating collection of such debt for another.

(5) The termdebtmeans any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been reduced to judgment.

(6) The term “debt collector” means any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.  Notwithstanding the exclusion provided by clause (F) of the last sentence of this paragraph, the term includes any creditor who, in the process of collecting his own debts, uses any name other than his own which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts. For the purpose of section 1692f(6) of this title, such term also includes any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests. The term does not include—

(A) any officer or employee of a creditor while, in the name of the creditor, collecting debts for such creditor;
(B) any person while acting as a debt collector for another person, both of whom are related by common ownership or affiliated by corporate control, if the person acting as a debt collector does so only for persons to whom it is so related or affiliated and if the principal business of such person is not the collection of debts;
(C) any officer or employee of the United States or any State to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of his official duties;
(D) any person while serving or attempting to serve legal process on any other person in connection with the judicial enforcement of any debt;
(E) any nonprofit organization which, at the request of consumers, performs bona fide consumer credit counseling and assists consumers in the liquidation of their debts by receiving payments from such consumers and distributing such amounts to creditors; and

(F) any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such activity
(i) is incidental to a bona fide fiduciary obligation or a bona fide escrow arrangement;
(ii) concerns a debt which was originated by such person;
(iii) concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person; or
(iv) concerns a debt obtained by such person as a secured party in a commercial credit transaction involving the creditor.

(7) The term “location information” means a consumer’s place of abode and his telephone number at such place, or his place of employment.
(8) The term “Statemeans(please note it says means here instead of includes) any State, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any political subdivision of any of the foregoing.

§ 1692b. Acquisition of location information

Any debt collector communicating with any person other than the consumer for the purpose of acquiring location information about the consumer shall—

(1)identify himself(using a pseudonym is not identifying oneself), state that he is confirming or correcting location information concerning the consumer, and, only if expressly requested, identify his employer;
(2) not state that such consumer owes any debt (IRS forms violate this);
(3) not communicate with any such person more than once unless requested to do so by such person or unless the debt collector reasonably believes that the earlier response of such person is erroneous or incomplete and that such person now has correct or complete location information;

(4) not communicate by post card;
(5) not use any language or symbol on any envelope or in the contents of any communication effected by the mails or telegram that indicates that the debt collector is in the debt collection business or that the communication relates to the collection of a debt (IRS forms violate this”)
; and
(6) after the debt collector knows the consumer is represented by an attorney with regard to the subject debt and has knowledge of, or can readily ascertain, such attorney’s name and address, not communicate with any person other than that attorney, unless the attorney fails to respond within a reasonable period of time to communication from the debt collector.

§ 1692c. Communication in connection with debt collection
(a) Communication with the consumer generally
Without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, a debt collector may not communicate with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt—
(1) at any unusual time or place or a time or place known or which should be known to be inconvenient to the consumer. In the absence of knowledge of circumstances to the contrary, a debt collector shall assume that the convenient time for communicating with a consumer is after 8 o’clock antemeridian and before 9 o’clock postmeridian, local time at the consumer’s location;
(2) if the debt collector knows the consumer is represented by an attorney with respect to such debt and has knowledge of, or can readily ascertain, such attorney’s name and address, unless the attorney fails to respond within a reasonable period of time to a communication from the debt collector or unless the attorney consents to direct communication with the consumer; or
(3) at the consumer’s place of employment if the debt collector knows or has reason to know that the consumer’s employer prohibits the consumer from receiving such communication.
(b) Communication with third parties
Except as provided in section 1692b of this title, without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector, or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, or as reasonably necessary to effectuate a post-judgment judicial remedy, a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person other than the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector.
(c) Ceasing communication

If a consumer notifies a debt collector in writing that the consumer refuses to pay a debt or that the consumer wishes the debt collector to cease further communication with the consumer, the debt collector shall not communicate further with the consumer with respect to such debt, except—

(1) to advise the consumer that the debt collector’s further efforts are being terminated;
(2) to notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor may invoke specified remedies which are ordinarily invoked by such debt collector or creditor; or
(3) where applicable, to notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor intends to invoke a specified remedy.
If such notice from the consumer is made by mail, notification shall be complete upon receipt.
(d) “Consumer” defined
For the purpose of this section, the term “consumer” includes the consumer’s spouse, parent (if the consumer is a minor), guardian, executor, or administrator.

§ 1692d. Harassment or abuse

A debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section:

(1) The use or threat of use of violence or other criminal means to harm the physical person, reputation, or property of any person.

(2) The use of obscene or profane language or language the natural consequence of which is to abuse the hearer or reader.

(3) The publication of a list of consumers who allegedly refuse to pay debts, except to a consumer reporting agency or to persons meeting the requirements of section 1681a(f) or 1681b(3)
[1] of this title.
(4) The advertisement for sale of any debt to coerce payment of the debt.
(5) Causing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number.
(6) Except as provided in section 1692b of this title, the placement of telephone calls without meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity.

§ 1692e. False or misleading representations (the IRS violates every provision in this section)

A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation (IRS forms violate this in several ways)or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section:

(1)The false representation or implication that the debt collector is vouched for, bonded by, or affiliated with the United States or any State, including the use of any badge, uniform, or facsimilethereof.(way too many violations by IRS agents to list for this one)

(A) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt; or

(B) any services rendered or compensation which may be lawfully received by any debt collector for the collection of a debt.

(3) The false representation or implication that any individual is an attorney or that any communication is from an attorney.

(4) The representation or implication that nonpayment of any debt will result in the arrest or imprisonment of any person or the seizure, garnishment, attachment, or sale of any property or wages of any person unless such action is lawful and the debt collector or creditor intends to take such action.

(5) The threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken.

(6) The false representation or implication that a sale, referral, or other transfer of any interest in a debt shall cause the consumer to—

(A) lose any claim or defense to payment of the debt; or

(B) become subject to any practice prohibited by this subchapter.

(7) The false representation or implication that the consumer committed any crime or other conduct in order to disgrace the consumer.

(8) Communicating or threatening to communicate to any person credit information which is known or which should be known to be false, including the failure to communicate that a disputed debt is disputed.

(9) The use or distribution of any written communication which simulates or is falsely represented to be a document authorized, issued, or approved by any court, official, or agency of the United States or any State, or which creates a false impression as to its source, authorization, or approval.

(10) The use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer.

(11) The failure to disclose in the initial written communication with the consumer and, in addition, if the initial communication with the consumer is oral, in that initial oral communication, that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose, and the failure to disclose in subsequent communications that the communication is from a debt collector, except that this paragraph shall not apply to a formal pleading made in connection with a legal action.

(12) The false representation or implication that accounts have been turned over to innocent purchasers for value.

(13) The false representation or implication that documents are legal process.

(14) The use of any business, company, or organization name other than the true name of the debt collector’s business, company, or organization.

(15) The false representation or implication that documents are not legal process forms or do not require action by the consumer.
(16) The false representation or implication that a debt collector operates or is employed by a consumer reporting agency as defined by section 1681a(f)of this title.

§ 1692f. Unfair practices

A debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section:

(1) The collection of any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.

(2) The acceptance by a debt collector from any person of a check or other payment instrument postdated by more than five days unless such person is notified in writing of the debt collector’s intent to deposit such check or instrument not more than ten nor less than three business days prior to such deposit.

(3) The solicitation by a debt collector of any postdated check or other postdated payment instrument for the purpose of threatening or instituting criminal prosecution.

(4) Depositing or threatening to deposit any postdated check or other postdated payment instrument prior to the date on such check or instrument.

(5) Causing charges to be made to any person for communications by concealment of the true purpose of the communication. Such charges include, but are not limited to, collect telephone calls and telegram fees.

(6) Taking or threatening to take any non-judicial action to effect dispossession
or disablement of property if—

(A) there is no present right to possession of the property claimed as collateral through an enforceable security interest;

(B) there is no present intention to take possession of the property; or

(C) the property is exempt by law from such dispossession or disablement.

(7) Communicating with a consumer regarding a debt by post card.

(8) Using any language or symbol, other than the debt collector’s address, on any envelope when communicating with a consumer by use of the mails or by telegram, except that a debt collector may use his business name if such name does not indicate that he is in the debt collection business.

Traffic – Ratification Of Commencement of Action


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(For Frank ‘Austin’ England III) 

All past posts are now in a drop down below comments. )

(Blog Masters Note: Over a year ago, I was almost ticketed for not wearing a seat belt, got a warning notice instead. I asked Frank ‘Austin’ England III how I could proceed if I had gotten the ticket. Then we will proceed with an attachment that was e-mailed to me by Frank on the above title.

Do you sign citations in New Mexico?  We don’t here, because someone had litigated the issue of a compelled contract and the state bailed before the precedent went the wrong way.

I return the citation to the issuing officer with  . . .


________________________thumb print in red ink as your seal

Got lots more on the statutory process and said process being private for profit copy right law . . . the statute can’t be enforced, it must be sold by the law merchant . . . that being the cop . . . but be careful not to go into controversy!  I always ask the cop “Do we have an appointment?” and begin having fun from there , , ,
I told him I was not sovereign yet.
Absolutely . . . don’t get into the sovereign issue . . . boils down to you exercising your “natural right” to travel” in lieu of being regulated in commerce . . . all you are, is a customer of the DMV . . . you are being “treated” as a “driver”.  You are simply the “Holder” (holder in due course) of the “License” that is needed to be in your possession for the law merchant to do business with you under the commerce clause, it is not your license, it belongs to the DMV.  At the actual presentment of the citation, you can note, without prejudice UCC 1-308 and sign your name . . . this is the remedy built into the Uniform Commercial Code and you have the right to exercise that right.  After you sign the citation, go home write across the face of the copy what I suggested and return it to the agent who made the offer. (be sure to get his or her complete name and the address of their office or barracks.  When he stops you, he is acting in the nature of a police officer . . . then he makes the offer, he changes his hat and goes into law merchant mode and tries to sell you the statute . . . I tell them I’m not interested in doing business with them . . . they are dealing in private for profit copy right law, a law that cannot be enforced, only offered for acceptance . . .  I’m not interested, what’s my consideration? See the attachments.

By Joinder of a Trustee for the “Beneficiary” of the Trust

Title 28, Rules, Rule 17

Rule 17. Parties Plaintiff and Defendant; Capacity

(a) Real Party in Interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.

An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may sue in that person’s own name without joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought. No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest.

[emphasis by me] (Frank ‘Austin’ England)

(b) Capacity to Sue or Be Sued. The capacity of an individual, other than one acting in a representative capacity, to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of the individual’s domicile. The capacity of a corporation to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law under which it was organized. In all other cases capacity to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of the applicable state, except (1) that a partnership or other unincorporated association, which has no capacity by the law of its state, may sue or be sued in its common name for the purpose of enforcing for or against it a substantive right existing under the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that the capacity of a receiver appointed by a court of the United States to sue or be sued in a court of the United States is governed by Title 28, U.S.C., Sections 754 and 959 (a).

(c) Infants or Incompetent Persons. Whenever an infant or incompetent person has a representative, such as a general guardian, committee, conservator, or other like fiduciary, the representative may sue or defend on behalf of the infant or incompetent person. An infant or incompetent person who does not have a duly appointed representative may sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem. The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant or incompetent person not otherwise represented in an action or shall make such other order as it deems proper for the protection of the infant or incompetent person.

“Your honor, I am the creditor and trustee. Do I have standing to speak?”

Another thing I heard on a Jack Smith audio, and this too was very interesting, was about a man that had to go into court on a ticket.
Here’s what he said when his name was called, and he was still outside the bar.

“Your honor, I am the creditor and trustee, do I have standing to speak?”

“I am the creditor and trustee of my independent account in the public trust, is the claimant present so I may accept his offer and close this account? And the judge was silent. So the guy said “How can we proceed without a claimant or agent coming forth on behalf of the claimant?” and the judge said “remove yourself from my courtroom immediately!

The guys next move, if he would have had the opportunity or the judge would attempt to push the courts bluff, would have been to appoint the judge as the agent/fiduciary for the claiment, so the judge would have had to appoint a trustee to settle and close the matter. 


An E-Mail From ‘Frank Austin England III’


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(Blog Masters Note:
This is an e-mail from Frank ‘Austin’ England III that I hope will be of use for people caught in the court system.

All past posts are now in a drop down below comments. )

I have Arron’s CD and having seen it. . . dead on. You would have to wonder what the protocol would have to be when visiting the past . . . don’t be trying to seduce your grandma would have to be right at the top of the list. You could wind up being your own great great great grandpa. Those very tall skeletal finds, were probably an ancient basketball team who’s bus ran off the road on the way back from a game.

I read an article about 10 years ago, written by a man who interviewed
a dying Air Force Colonel who said he was sworn to secrecy or he would lose his pension . . . pointing out he was on his way out anyway.
Evidently, this colonel and several other high-ranking members of
government, were invited aboard a craft and taken around the moon and viewed several ruins on the surface in the twilight quadrant of the
said moon.  He said the most important issue, was the warning by these
aliens re the present forced manipulation of the population on the
planet into a form of involuntary servitude.  They said it would be
our downfall.  These aliens were described as attractive, tall, blond
and very nordic looking men and women  The colonel said he couldn’t
die without telling the story.

Having had a primary MOS in demolition in Special Forces and then
later become a structural steel Ironworker, raising the steel for
dams, bridges and highrises, among other things, I only had to watch
the implosions (9-11) once, to know what took place.  There is an explosive system that is known as A-Neutronic, which is pound for pound many times greater that Plastic i.e. C-4.

Ultimately, I will accept their offer for value and return it for
value, demanding that the responsible parties bringing the charges
file the Form 1099 OID identifying themselves, the nature of the
bond(s) and the dollar amount that have issued so far.  Actually,
they’re after your tax exemption and your account number (SSN).  If
you dishonor them by not understanding their process and thereby,
game, you create an actual controversy and grant the court
jurisdiction to move forward.  I tell them there is no controversy,
that I accept their offer/presentment/citation/charges and the like for value and return the offer for value.  I will issue the Form 1099 OID and 1096 with a 1040-V to the IRS to identify just who is presuming to request that I sponsor the necessary credit sought through the preceding and thereby, set-off the accounting and bring it to ZERO . . . after all I am prepaid and exempt from levy and am prepared to do business with you weasels as long as you pay the taxes on your part of this transaction.  Then I get a check, dollar for dollar from the IRS for the funding generated and the goons won’t be able to hide behind my tax exemption to defer indefinitely, the taxes owed by each of them personally.  Pulling up Dunn & Bradstreet and getting a printout that the court is “Trading as” on the bond market, the bonds issued as a result of the preceding, also unnerves them a bit.  One demand that really backs them off is even after a trial and conviction of your constructive trust account and the second
phase of the preceding in which you are asked do you have any
objection to passing sentence, they must have the permission of the
actual biological party to incarcerate him or her for surety purposes.
Simply tell them that you will not agree to the subornation of your
biological and thereby substantive body for surety purposes and you
will now take your leave.  Turn and leave and don’t look back.  Should
they try to intercept you, demand the party that presumes to hold
title to your biological party to produce that title.  When they
can’t, tell them you are leaving, unless they have any further
business. The other ace in the hole, is to bring along a certified
copy of your birth certificate i.e. certificated security which is
crafted in the nature of a “Bearer Bond.”  Endorse the certificate,
deliver it to the judge and tell him, that this certificate should
cover any and all expenses and bonds having issued in this instant
case. asta la vista baby . . .

These guys are in the life destroying business . . . you knuckle under
or they will bury you unless you have the big balls and can stand nose
to nose with them . . . Just like being a special ops soldier, some
will take more than a few with them and some are still standing and
ready for more . . . the enemy tries to avoid confrontation with these
types.  The targeted individual is the one who tries to begin a
program, whereby he or she is going to save everyone from the boogie
man . . . really bad place to be, Christ already made that offer and
the sacrifice.  You have to know the underlying pit falls and be able
to recognize the traps that appear not to be there . . . Always ask
them the questions, never try to give them the answers . . . you will
be held to prove those conclusions and you can’t prove a negative.
Think about it . . . “Failure to File” isn’t that a negative that must
be proven . . . who has firsthand knowledge that can testify to the
fact that you failed to specifically perform . . . and to do that,
doesn’t the accuser have to produce the agreement that carries with it
the specific performance agreed to and the parties to the agreement .
. . which would require also revealing the consideration for both
parties?  Agreements and contracts must reflect a quid pro quo
consideration. value for value . . . dollar for dollar . . . public
policy’s prime directive is to discharge the public debt, dollar for

And yes!  I do know those who have prevailed . . . the system doesn’t
do press releases in these instances, nor does the media . . .

February 18, 2007 Here’s one the mainstream media isn’t going to tell
you: County sheriffs in Wyoming are demanding that federal agents
actually abide by the Constitution, or face arrest. Even better, a
U.S. District Court agreed according to the Keene Free Press:

The court decision was the result of a suit against both the BATF and the IRS by Mattis and other members of the Wyoming Sheriff’s Association. The suit in the Wyoming federal court district sought restoration of the protections enshrined in the United States Constitution and the Wyoming Constitution.

Guess what? The District Court ruled in favor of the sheriffs. In fact, they stated, Wyoming is a sovereign state and the duly elected sheriff of a county is the highest law enforcement official within a county and has law enforcement powers exceeding that of any other state or federal official.” Go back and re-read this quote.

The court confirms and asserts that “the duly elected sheriff of a county is the highest law enforcement official within a county and has law enforcement powers EXCEEDING that of any other state OR federal official.” And you thought the 10th Amendment was dead and buried ­not in Wyoming, not yet.

Bighorn County Sheriff Dave Mattis comments:

“If a sheriff doesn’t want the Feds in his county he has the constitutional right and power to keep them out, or ask them to leave, or retain them in custody.”

“I am reacting in response to the actions of federal employees who have attempted to deprive citizens of my county of their privacy, their liberty, and their property without regard to constitutional safeguards. I hope that more sheriffs all across America will join us in protecting their citizens from the illegal activities of the IRS, EPA, BATF, FBI, or any other federal agency that is operating outside the confines of constitutional law. Employees of the IRS and the EPA are no longer welcome in Bighorn County unless they intend to operate in conformance to constitutional law.”

The implications are huge:

But it gets even better. Since the judge stated that the sheriff “has law enforcement powers EXCEEDING that of any other state OR federal official,” the Wyoming sheriffs are flexing their muscles. They are demanding access to all BATF files. Why? So as to verify that the agency is not violating provisions of Wyoming law that prohibits the registration of firearms or the keeping of a registry of firearm owners. This would be wrong.

The sheriffs are also demanding that federal agencies immediately cease the seizure of private property and the impoundment of private bank accounts without regard to due process in Wyoming state courts.

This case is not just some amusing mountain melodrama. This is a BIG deal. This case is yet further evidence that the 10th Amendment is not yet totally dead, or in a complete decay in the United States. It is also significant in that it can, may, and hopefully will be interpreted to mean that “political subdivisions of a State are included within the meaning of the amendment, or that the powers exercised by a sheriff are an extension of those common law powers which the 10th Amendment explicitly reserves to the People, if they are not granted to the federal government or specifically prohibited to the States.”

James Foley
Property Rights Advocate Klamath River, California

Generally the web sites create a circumstance, that people with very little background, jump on the bandwagon and go suicide when they run out of instructions or simply panic.  Just like a pilot on his first solo, flys into a thunderhead and has no idea what he just got into . . .

I’ll pass some background info along for you to read first. 23 pages

Most of what I get is close to the chest and from guarded sources . . . as I noted, the fed nor the media does press releases on their having their asses handed to them on a platter.  Right now, I’m watching a IRS case and related conviction that looks like it may well be dismissed or abandoned shortly . . .  I’ll let you know how it comes out.  The people involved are friends of mine . . .

The Real ID can be defeated individually if you challenge the nature regarding just what subject matter is intended to be identified.  They have no power to compel the “Natural Person” i.e. biological property to accept and thereby submit to this defacto I.D.. As I believe I have pointed out before, the entire system is one huge paper chase and thereby, commercial in nature and can only interact with fictional creations of the legislature aka statutes.  The system relies on the general publics ignorance of this fact and simply presumes any tacit acceptance of their offer to participate  is voluntary.  Boils down to “Just Say NO!”

Another example of this legislative slight of hand, is the “Draft.”  You comply with all of the civil process, to wit: register and show up for the physical when notified.  After the physical, when they “suggest” you go to another room and “volunteer” to accept the offer to “join” with the military services/jurisdiction,(“Repeat after me!” in other words, swear in, Just Say NO!”) . . . you have already met all of the civil obligations in a jurisdiction that you are presently participating in and beyond that, the civil law has no further power to compel you to join with the military.  The military at that point has no power to take jurisdiction over you, as you have not agreed to join with that jurisdiction . . . no need to go to Canada . . . put on your pants and go home . . .  Can’t wait to see the process they concoct to get you to accept the Real ID Act.  Remember, this defacto government is all about “Offer and Acceptance” only they will lead you to believe everything they offer is mandatory . . . and due to the ignorance of the administrative operative, they actually believe they have the right to wield summary power of the individual . . . and that’s the jist of it.

Dealing properly with the goons is a balancing act and you must never do anything that would create an “Actual Controversy” and thereby, grant jurisdiction.  You have a right to discovery before you
determine what your plan of action will be in any service of process resulting in “charges”.  Most people treat first contact at the administrative level with reckless abandon and ignore such contact . .. this is where the state creates a winning record and you give it to them by not rebutting the assertions timely.  What you don’t get on
the administrative record, won’t be permitted in court and that record will defeat you in a judicial tribunal proceeding. And remember, you must always ask your questions in the negative and to your advantage . . . if they fail to respond, you prevail by their tacit acceptance of your negative question.  Example:  “Is it not true regarding the charges presented, there is no one who can testify to first hand knowledge of said allegations?”  I’ve had several instances where the judges simply dismisses on the spot when no one steps forward and declares they can testify to first hand knowledge.  Serving a prosecutor,  judge or both,  with the IRS Form 56 making them your fiduciary in the proceedings and thereby, giving them the responsibility to protect your personal interests in the national bankruptcy and joint venture with the state of the forum . . . gets big results. Also be sure to accept on the record, the judge’s oath of
office for value . . . at this point you have a binding contract with the judge to obey every facet of that oath of office . . . absent the acceptance of the oath, no judge has any personal responsibility to you regarding his oath.

None of those documents apply to you in the flesh, they are issued through your constructive trust account to you . . . that account is identified by the SSN.  The port registry of your public vessel is your birth registration and the district that said registration was issued. (In other words, the keel for your public vessel was laid in that district, authorizing a bond to issue on that “constructive” vessel.  The fictional party identified in this instance is the public vessel, the JOHN Q DOE . . . you are the master of that vessel, Master John Quincy Doe.  And never the twains shall meet.  Every public officer or employee has a fiduciary duty to protect your commercial interests and thereby related remedy in this debtor system . . . you are pre-paid and exempt from levy if you know how to assert this advantage honorably . . .

Wise choice . . . in the Special Forces the term was . . . “Stay in the Tree Line”  There is a point, that getting the full explanation re how to use the material will never be available, as there is never any circumstance that is identical to the other . . . also, you can’t ignore the personalities on both sides of this issue . . . some are quite flexible and when confronted with sufficient material and cause to back away, they will . . . then you have the hard ass prosecutor and foam at the mouth judge, that isn’t going to be intimidated . . .these two types are the real challenge . . . many times they will go right to the edge of criminal acts on their part and the record to take you out.

Accept the citation for value and return it for value, marked, pay to the United States Treasury with a Form 1040-V made out for the amount of the citation . . . . mail the citation and Form 1040-V to the Treasury for set-off and closure and a copy’s to the traffic court and Secretary of State of the state you received the citation in the name of, with a note indicating . . . if you have any questions, contact the Secretary of the Treasury for your funding. You can also go into the court and produce a certified copy of your birth registration and attach the citation or charges.  When your name is called, deliver the documents to the bailiff and tell the judge, you are offering evidence of the creation of the named party (that no being you) and the judge must exercise his fiduciary responsibility to settle this instant matter and protect your economic well being in this on going re-organization of national bankruptcy . . . please accept my notice of Birth Registration, which is crafted in the nature of a Bearer Bond and thereby, needs no endorsement . . . fuck you very much!

 Another angle: If you have the where-with-all to move any Public Policy trial to an Article III proceeding demanding substantive Due Process and the Natural Rights that attach.  If they bring “charges” you plead guilty to the “Facts!” . . . it’s all about charges and bonds, not facts, they have no facts that can be certified, they’re dead in the water. You can also counter sue.  You pay for a counter claim and thereby own the case . . . as a result, you demand an Article III proceeding . . .

As I once told an assistant California Attorney General after giving him certain info that surprised him I was privy to and he made the comment that such knowledge could be dangerous . . . I said, You can kill me, but remember, it’s against the law to eat me!  He turned and left without comment.
You never were, nor are you in “their” jurisdiction, you are an independent power unto yourself.  They are operating as privateers, much the same as the Pirates of Old pillaged in the name of the King by letters of marque and reprisal.  Notice the pleading in many cases that begin . . . “In the name of the state of . . .”  such a declaration is nonsensical.  There is no more . . . “By the power vested  by the state of . . . ” Because all of this process is in admiralty, the law of the sea prevails, including piracy as recognized by the Law of nations i.e. Jus Gentium.  The IRS is in fact, a pirate enterprise.  Letters of Marque, allow for pillage on the sea, letters of reprisal provide for pillage on land. . . .the black flag of piracy is worn by the judges in these maritime tribunal . . . and on occasion the black flag is flown over the prisons in this country when certain secret process it taking place.

I’ve been in this truth seeking process for a very long time . . . probably since I was in middle school.  Nothing in the nature of commercial pursuits seemed to really interest me, though I knew I had to earn a living.  I had the intellect to achieve above average advantage, but I sensed I had something that I needed to do . . . I always saw the self-serving nature of the commercial world and was particularly put off by how the back biting was an acceptable way to do business. I knew I had to acquire a deeper understanding of the why’s and how’s this passion play called life really worked . . . I also realized I had a guide or guides to lead me on that path, and that this power didn’t originate from this earthly realm.  Going back to just after my birth, at just a few months of age, I clearly remember having almost died in my crib, when a kerosene stove went out and pumped acrid smoke into my room.  I remember reasoning that I was going to die, if my mother didn’t come in and save me . . . I was too  small to move off my back without assistance and was frustrated with this new body that couldn’t perform for me at that time to save myself . . .  there were two entities that appeared off to my right, as though waiting to take my essence back to where it originated and then suddenly, my mother appeared and saved me.  I even remember her words and concern for the soot covering my face.  Years later, I shared my side of that experience with my mother and she was amazed that at only a few months of age, I remembered everything exactly as it happened . . .  of course the two entities  were news to her. To this day, I can envision exactly what happened over 70 years ago.  Much of what I have been able to acquire in the way of knowledge, has been directed to me or I have been directed to and as a result, I have also been able to help many people who will help themselves and learn to stand on their own two feet and do battle . . . I don’t save people, Christ beat me to that . . .  and with a much better offer overall.

Many people have come into my life regarding this issue, and most have been directed to me, not the other way round.  I’m pretty sure I have come here for this particular purpose and I’ll stay with it until I return to my origin. 

I did get jumped by the FTB when in California over 20 years ago and eventually was tried and convicted, serving 90 days in one of their pre-paid resorts up in Solano County.  That’s another story and had I possessed the knowledge I have now, there would never have been a conviction . . . and even with the limited knowledge I had then, there almost wasn’t.  I do realize however, that my short stint at the resort California, allowed me to specifically perform and get two guys out on writs of Habeas and file briefs for others, completely upsetting the same court that slam dunked me.  I became friends with the guards and eventually the commander of the facility. The commander shared with me, that the incidence of violence had dropped considerably since I took up residence and appeared to have been because I had given some element of hope to the inmates that we could upset the system using that systems own process and he had no problem with that as long as it was directed at the courts . . . long story short, the commander came to me one day and told me, the judges wanted me out of lockup, because I was creating too much shit in the courts with all the filings I had been writing for these guys.  Two days later, I was “Kicked” out of the facility (The commanders words)  Most of the guards came to say goodbye and said they would miss me and the commander gave me his home address and phone number in case I needed him as a character witness in any case I might file.  He even offered to drive me home . . . Quite an experience.  I also worked in the kitchen and created some great chocolate orange cookies that became popular with everyone, including the guards . . . and got the cook to smuggle some cilantro into the kitchen to create some real salsa instead of the crap we had been getting . . . the Mexicans appreciated that . . .  Anyway, we are not alone and we have a constant presence provided by our “Creator”; that presence  has nothing to do with the pomp and circumstance of churches and the people who put on the show for those who still need to be reminded once or twice a week that God is out there somewhere.  God is not extraterrestrial . . . I suspect inter-dimensional for lack of a better description . . . I know Gordon has difficulty with the concept of a creator or supreme being and I suspect it may be, due to the constrictive nature religion has placed the concept in.

More so, voting is the personal ratification and choice to acknowledge your slavemasters as possessing the authority to tell you when and how you are to live your life . . . just short of the sign of the biblical slave, boring a hole in his ear.  Interestingly enough, many of the recent offspring of our mislead life style, are now doing body piercings, to include boring holes in their ears . . .saw one yesterday.

The Declaration Of Seperate And Equal Stations


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(For Frank ‘Austin’ England III) 

(Blog Masters Note:
This is from an e-mail from Frank ‘Austin’ England III,  titled an ‘A Very Informative Read’ and is a teaching tool.   The original can be found Here.

All past posts are now in a drop down below comments. )



The document below is an exact copy of the original document that Mr.John Nelson wrote on February 21, 1992 with the following exceptions: (1) many statements have been made bold or italicized to emphasize their importance. The original document had neither bold nor italic text.

TO: The American� People, The People Of The State Of Colorado, U.S.A. February 21, 1992 DECLARATION OF CAUSE AND NECESSITY TO ABOLISH AND DECLARATION OF SEPARATE AND EQUAL STATION I suggest you read Senate Report No. 93-549, 93rd Congress, 1st Session (1973), “Summary Of Emergency Power Statutes”, consisting of 607 pages, which I believe you will find most interesting. The United States went “Bankrupt” in 1933 and was declared so by President Roosevelt by Executive Orders 6073, 6102, 6111 and by Executive Order 6260 on March 9, 1933 (See: Senate Report 93-549, pgs. 187 & 594), under the “Trading with The Enemy Act” (Sixty-Fifth Congress, Sess. I, Chs. 105, 106, October 5, 1917), and as codified at 12 U.S.C.A. 95a. On May 23, 1933, Congressman, Louis T. McFadden, brought formal charges against the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Bank System, the Comptroller of the Currency and the Secretary of the United States Treasury for criminal acts. The petition for Articles of Impeachment was thereafter referred to the Judiciary Committee, and has yet to be acted upon (See: Congressional Record, pp. 4055-4058). Congress confirmed the Bankruptcy on June 5, 1933, and impaired the obligations and considerations of contracts through the “Joint Resolution To Suspend The Gold Standard and Abrogate The Gold Clause, June 5, 1933”, (See: House Joint Resolution 192, 73rd Congress, 1st Session). The several States of the Union pledged the faith and credit thereof to the aid of the National Government, and formed numerous socialist committees, such as the “Council Of State Governments”, “Social Security Administration” etc., to purportedly deal with the economic “Emergency.” These Organizations operated under the “Declaration of INTER-dependence” of January 22, 1937, and published some of their activities in “The Book of the States.” The 1937 edition of the Book of the States openly declared that the people engaged in such activities as the Farming/Husbandry Industry had been reduced to mere feudal “Tenants” on their Land. Book Of The States, 1937, pg. 155.

This of course was compounded by such activities as price fixing of wheat and grains 7 U.S.C.A. 1332, quota regulations 7 U.S.C.A. 1371,  and livestock products 7 U.S.C.A. 1903(Blog Masters Note:Repealed), which have been consistently below the costs of production, interest on loans and inflation of the paper “Bills of Credit”, leaving the food producers and others in a state, and thereby a condition of abject peonage and involuntary servitude, constituting the taking of private property, for the benefit and use of others, without just compensation.

NOTE: The Council Of State governments has now been absorbed into such things as the “National Conference Of Commissioners On Uniform State Laws”, whose Headquarters Office is located at 676 North St. Clair Street, Suite 1700, Chicago, Illinois 60611, and “all” being “members of the Bar”, and operating under a different “Constitution and By Laws”, far distant from the depositories of the public Records, has promulgated, lobbied for, passed, adjudicated and ordered the implementation and execution of their purported “Uniform” and “Model” Acts and pretended statutory provisions, to “help implement international treaties of the United States or where world uniformity would be desirable.” (See: 1990/91 Reference Book, National Council Of Commissioners On Uniform State Laws, pg. 2). This is apparently what Robert Bork meant when he wrote “we are governed not by law or elected representatives but by an unelected, unrepresentative, unaccountable committee of lawyers applying no will but their own.”(See: The Tempting Of America, Robert H. Bork, pg. 130). This association has been engaged in activities such as turning “Marriage” (licensed) into “International Private Law”, through its International Liaisons, which meet at such places as the Hague Conferences (See: Handbook Of Commissioners On Uniform State Laws, 1966 Ed., pg. 156-157). On April 25, 1938, the Supreme Court overturned the standing precedents of the prior 150 years concerning “common law,” in the Federal Government. “THERE IS NO FEDERAL COMMON LAW, AND CONGRESS HAS NO POWER TO DECLARE SUBSTANTIVE RULES OF COMMON LAW APPLICABLE IN A STATE, WHETHER THEY BE LOCAL OR GENERAL IN THEIR NATURE, BE THEY COMMERCIAL LAW OR A PART OF THE LAW OF TORTS”

(See: Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins , 304 U.S. 64, 82 L.Ed. 1188). The Common Law is the fountain source of Substantive and Remedial Rights, if not our personal right to inalienable Liberty (See: Stephen, A Treaties On The Principles Of Pleading, Introduction, Pg. 23; Hemmingway, History Of Common Law Pleading As Evidence Of The Growth Of Individual Liberty And Power Of The Courts, 5 Alabama Law Journal 1; Swift v. Tyson, 16 Peters 1, 10 L.Ed. 865; Constitution, Article III, Section 2, Amendments VII, IX and X.) The members and association of the Bar thereafter formed committees, granted themselves special privileges, immunities and franchises, and held meetings concerning the Judicial procedures, and further, to amend laws “to conform to a trend of judicial decisions or to accomplish similar objectives”, including hodge podging the jurisdictions of Law and Equity together, which is known today as “One Form Of Action.” (See: Constitution And By Laws, Article 3, Section 3.3(c), 1990-91 Reference Book, supra, see also, Colorado Methods of Practice, West Pub., Vol. 4, pgs. 2-3, Authors Comments.) NOTE: The enumerated, specified and distinct Jurisdictions established by the ordained Constitution (1789), Article III, Section 2, and under the Bill of Rights (1791), Amendment VII, were further hodgpodged and fundamentally changed in 1982 to include Admiralty Jurisdiction, which was once again brought inland. “This is the FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE necessary to effect unification of CIVIL and ADMIRALTY PROCEDURE. Just as the 1938 Rules ABOLISHED THE DISTINCTION between ACTIONS AT LAW and SUITS IN EQUITY, this change would ABOLISH THE DISTINCTION between CIVIL ACTIONS and SUITS IN ADMIRALTY.” (Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure, 1982 Ed., pg. 17, also see, Federalist Papers No. 83 ; Declaration Of Resolves Of The First Continental Congress; Oct. 14, 1774, Declaration Of Cause And Necessity Of Taking Up Arms; July 6, 1775, Declaration of Independence; July 4, 1776, Bennett v, Butterworth, 52 U.S. 669.) The United States thereafter entered the Second World War during which time the “League of Nations” was re-instituted under pretense of the “United Nations” (See: 22 U.S.C.A. 287 et. seq. ), and the “Bank For International Settlements” re-instituted under pretense of the “Bretton Woods Agreement” (See: 60 Stat. 1401, 22 U.S.C.A. 286 et. seq.) as the “International Monetary Fund” (The Fund) and the International Bank For Reconstruction And Development” (The Bank). The United States as a corporate body politic (artificial) came out of World War II in worse economic shape than when it entered, and in 1950 declared Bankruptcy and “Reorganization.” The Reorganization is located in Title 5 of United States Codes Annotated. The “Explanation” at the beginning of 5 U.S.C.A. is most informative reading. The “Secretary of Treasury” was appointed as the “Receiver” in Bankruptcy. (See: Reorganization Plan No. 26, 5 U.S.C.A. 903, Public Law 94-564, Legislative History, pg. 5967). The United States went down the road and periodically filed for further Reorganization. Things and situations worsened, having done what they were Commanded NOT to do, (See: Madison’s Notes , Constitutional Convention, August 16, 1787, Federalist Papers No. 44) and in 1965 passed the “Coinage Act of 1965” completely debasing the Constitutional Coin (gold & silver i.e. Dollar). (See: 18 U.S.C.A. 331, ; 332 United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. 560, 13 L.Ed. 257). At the signing of the Coinage Act on July 23, 1965, then President Lyndon B. Johnson stated in his Press Release that: “When I have signed this bill before me, we will have made the first fundamental change in our coinage in 173 years. The Coinage Act of 1965 supersedes the Act of 1792. And that Act had the title: An Act Establishing a Mint and Regulating the Coinage of the United States….” “Now I will sign this bill to make the first change in our coinage system since the 18th Century. To those members of Congress, who are here on this historic occasion, I want to assure you that in making this change from the 18th Century we have no idea of returning to it.” It is important to take cognizance of the fact that NO Constitutional Amendment was ever obtained to FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGE, amend, abridge or abolish the Constitutional mandates, provisions or prohibitions, but due to internal and external diversions surrounding the Viet Nam War etc., the usurpation and breach went basically unchallenged and unnoticed by the general public at large, who became “a wealthy man’s cannon fodder or cheap source of SLAVE LABOR.” (See: Silent Weapons For Quiet Wars, TM-SW7905.1, pgs. 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13 & 56). Congress was clearly delegated the Power and Authority to regulate and maintain the true and inherent “value” of the Coin within the scope and purview of Article I, Section 8, Clauses 5 & 6 and Article I, Section 10, Clause 1, of the ordained Constitution (1787), and further, under a corresponding duty and obligation to maintain said gold and silver Coin and Foreign Coin at and within the necessary and proper “equal weights and measures” clause (See also: Bible, Dueteronomy, Chapter 25, verses 13 thru 16, Proverbs, Chapter 16, verse 11, Public Law 97-289, 96 Stat. 1211).

Those exercising the Offices of the several States, in equal measure, knew such “De Facto Transitions” were unlawful and unauthorized, but sanctioned, implemented and enforced the complete debauchment and the resulting “governmental, social, industrial economic change” in the “De Jure” States and in United State of America (See: Public Law 94-564, Legislative History, pg. 5936, 5945, 31 U.S.C.A. 314, 31 U.S.C.A 321, 31 U.S.C.A. 5112, C.R.S. 11-61-101 C.R.S. 39-22-103.5 and C.R.S. 18-11-203 ), and were and are now under the delusion that they can do both directly and indirectly what they were absolutely prohibited from doing (See: also, Federalist Papers No. 44, Craig v. Missouri, 4 Peters 903). In 1966, Congress being severely compromised, passed the “ Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 “, by which the entire taxing and monetary system i.e. “Essential Engine” (See: Federalist Papers No. 31 ) was placed under the Uniform Commercial Code. (See: Public Law 89-719 , Legislative History, pg. 3722, also see; C.R.S. 5-1-106 ). The Uniform Commercial Code was of course promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners On Uniform State Laws in collusion with American Law Institute for the “banking and business interests.” (See: Handbook Of The National Conference Of Commissioners On Uniform State Laws. (1966) Ed. pgs. 152 &153). The United States being engaged in numerous United Nation conflicts, including the Korean and the Viet Nam Conflicts, which were under direction of the United Nations (See: 22 U.S.C.A. 287d), and agreeing to foot the bill (See: 22 U.S.C.A. 287j), and not being able to honor their obligations and re-hypothecated debt credit, openly and publicly dishonored and disavowed their “Notes” and “Obligations” (12 U.S.C.A. 411 ) i.e. “Federal Reserve Notes” Through Public Law 90-269, Section 2, 82 Stat. 50 (1968) to wit: “Sec. 2. The first sentence of section 15 of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 391) is amended by striking ‘and the funds provided in this Act for the redemption of Federal Reserve Notes’.” 22 U.S.C.A. 287 et. seq.

Things steadily grew worse and on March 28, 1970, then President Nixon issued Proclamation No. 3972, declaring an “emergency” because the Postal Employees struck against the de facto government(?) for higher pay, due to inflation of the paper “Bills of Credit.” (See: Senate Report No. 93-549, pg. 596). Nixon placed the U.S. Postal Department under the control of the “Department of Defense.” (See: Department Of the Army Field Manual, FM 41-10 (1969 ed.)). “The System had been faltering for a decade, but the bench mark date of the collapse is put at August 15, 1971. On this day, then President Nixon reversed U.S. International Monetary Policy by officially declaring the non-convertibility of the “U.S. dollar” (the Federal Reserve Note (FRN)) into gold.” (See: Public Law 94-564, Legislative History, pg. 5937 & Senate Report No. 93-549, Foreword, pg. III, Proclamation No. 4074, pg. 597, 31 U.S.C.A. 314 & 31 U.S.C.A. 5112). On September 21, 1973, Congress passed Public Law 93-110, amending the Bretton Woods Par Value Modification Act, 82 Stat. 116, 31 U.S.C.A. 449, and reiterated the “Emergency”, 12 U.S.C.A 95a, and Section 8 of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act of 1945 ( 22 U.S.C.A. 286f ), and which included “reports on foreign currency transactions.” (Also See: Executive Order 10033). This act further declared in Section 2 (b) that: “No provision of any law in effect on the date of enactment of this Act, and no rule, regulation, or order under authority of any such law, may be construed to prohibit any person from purchasing, holding, selling, or otherwise dealing with gold.” On January 19, 1976, Marjorie S. Holt noted for the record, a second “Declaration Of INTER-dependence” and clearly identified the U.N. as a “Communist” organization, and that they were seeking both production and monetary control over the Union and People through International Organization promoting the “One World Order.” (See: Congressional Record, January 19, 1976, Extension of remarks; also see, 8 U.S.C.A. 1101 (40) , 50 U.S.C.A. 781 & 783). The socio/economic situation worsened as noted in the Complaint/Petition, filed in the U.S. Court of Claims, Docket No. 41-76, on February 11, 1976, by 44 Federal Judges, Atkins et al. vs. U.S.. Atkins et al. complained that “As a result of inflation, the compensation of federal judges has been substantially diminished each year since 1969, causing direct and continuing monetary harm to plaintiffs…the real value of the “dollar” (FRN’s) decreased by approximately 34.5 percent from March 15, 1969 to October 1, 1975….As a result, plaintiffs have suffered an unconstitutional deprivation of earnings”, and in the prayer for relief claimed “damages for the constitutional violations enumerated above, measured as the diminution of his earnings for the entire period since March 9, 1969.”

It is quite apparent that the persons holding and enjoying Offices of Public Trust, Honor and/or Profit knew of the emergency emergent problem and sought protection for themselves, to the damage and injury of the People and Children, who were classified as “a club that has many other members” who “have no remedy.”

And knowing that “heinous” acts had been committed, stated that they [judges/lawyers] would not apply the Law, nor would any substantive remedy be applied (“checked more or less, but never stopped”) “until all of us [judges] are dead.” Such persons Fraudulently swore an Oath to uphold, defend and preserve the sovereignty of the Nation and several Republican States of the Union, but never the less intentionally breached that Duty to protect the People/Citizens and their Posterity from fraud, imposition, avarice and stealthy encroachment.� (See: Atkins et al. vs. U.S., 556 F.2d 1028, pg. 1072, 1074, The Tempting of America, supra, pgs. 155-159 also see, 5 U.S.C.A. 5305 & 5335, Senate Report No. 93-549, pgs. 69-71, C.R.S. 24-75-101). This is verified in Public Law 94-564, Legislative History, pg. 5944, which states: “Moving to a floating exchange rate for international commerce means private enterprise and not central governments bear the risk of currency fluctuations.” Numerous serious debates were held in Congress, including but not limited to, Tuesday, July 27, 1976 (See: Congressional Record – House, July 27, 1976), concerning the International Financial Institutions and its operations. Representative, Ron Paul, Chairman of the House Banking Committee, made numerous references to the true practices of the “International” financial institutions, including but not limited to, the conversion of 27,000,000 (27 million) in gold, contributed by the United States as part of its “quota obligations”, which the International Monetary Fund (Governor-Secretary of Treasury) sold (See: Public Law 94-564, Legislative History, pg. 5945 & 5946), under some very questionable terms and concessions. (Also see: The Ron Paul Money Book, (1991), by Ron Paul, Plantation Publishing, 837 W. Plantation, Clute, Texas 77531). On October 28, 1977 the passage of Public Law 95-147, 91 Stat. 1227 declared most banking institutions, including State banks, to be under direction and control of the corporate “Governor” of the International Monetary Fund (See: Public Law 94-564, Legislative History, pg. 5942, United States Government Manual 1990/91, pgs. 480-481). The Act further declared that: “(2) Section 10(a) of the Gold Reserve Act of 1934 ( 31 U.S.C.A. 822a (now 22 U.S.C. 286e) ) is amended by striking out the phrase ‘stabilizing the exchange value of the dollar’…” (c) The joint resolution entitled ‘Joint resolution to assure uniform value to the coins and currencies of the United States’, approved June 5, 1933 ( 31 U.S.C.A. 463 (now 5118) ) shall not apply to obligations issued on or after the date of enactment of this section.” The International Organizations, Corporations and Associations, had refused to pay their debts and could not pay their debts, and determined that they could pass the loss of their non-redeemable, non-current notes, bonds and evidences of debt off on others, and thereby crown their fraud with success. (See: Letter, October 26, 1989 from Department of Treasury, Russell L. Munk, Assistant General Counsel (International Affairs), as recorded in the Office of Clerk and Recorder, Baca County, Colorado, at Book, 540 Page 364). The de facto United States as Corporator, (22 U.S.C.A. 286e, et seq.) and “state” (C.R.S. 24-36-104, C.R.S. 24-60-1301, Article IV(h) ) had declared “Insolvency.” (See: 26 I.R.C. 165 (g)(1), U.C.C 1-201 (23), C.R.S. 39-22-103.5, Westfall vs. Braley. 10 Ohio 188, 75 Am. Dec. 509, Adams vs. Richardson, 337 S.W.2d 911 Ward v. Smith, 7 Wall 447). In 1980 Congress passed, among other things, Public Law 96-221, providing for the furtherance and expansion of the profligate re-hypothecated debt pyramid scheme, and reduced the reserve requirements on “transaction accounts” to a minimum of 3% per centum to a maximum of 14 per centum (See: Depository Institutions Deregulation And Monetary Control Act of 1980 Section 103(b) (E)(2)). “In the United States neither paper currency nor deposits have value as commodities. Intrinsically, a dollar bill is just a piece of paper, a dollar will only exchange for a dollar. Deposits are merely book entries. Coins do have some intrinsic value as metal, but generally far less than their face amount….” Compare this with the United States Constitution, which says: “No State shall make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debt…” and which also says: “Congress shall have the power to coin money and regulate the value thereof…” (Italics added for emphasis; this paragraph added to the original John B. Nelson document of February 21, 1992 on July 18, 1999 to reiterate what was stated previously in this document and to demonstrate, first hand, yet another way the Constitution is being usurped, in fact and in intent). “In the absence of legal reserve requirements, banks can build up deposits by increasing loans and investments so long as they keep enough currency on hand to redeem whatever amounts the holders of deposits want to convert into currency. This unique attribute of the banking business was discovered several centuries ago. At one time, bankers were merely middlemen. They made profit by accepting gold and coins brought to them for safekeeping and lending them to borrowers. But they soon found that the receipts they issued to depositors were being used as money since whoever held them could go to the banker and exchange them for metallic money.

Then bankers discovered that they could make loans merely by giving borrowers their promises to pay (bank notes). In this way, banks began to create money.

More notes could be issued than the gold and coin on hand because only a portion of the notes outstanding would be presented for payment at any one time. Enough metallic money had to be kept on hand, of course, to redeem whatever volume of notes was presented for payment. Transaction deposits are the modern counter-part of bank notes.

It was a small step from printing notes to making book entries to the credit of borrowers which the borrowers, in turn, could “spend” by writing checks, thereby “printing their own money.” (See: Modern Money Mechanics , a workbook on deposits currency and bank reserves., 1982 Rev. Ed., Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, P.O. Box 834, Chicago, Illinois 60690, pgs. 3 & 4).

Seventy four (74) years is NOT “temporary.” It’s a permanent state of “Emergency”, and was clearly instituted, formed and erected within the Union through gross usurpations, abridgments, malfeasance and breach of legal and fiduciary duties, and the continual contrivance, misrepresentation, conversion, fluctuations, fraud and avarice of the International Financial Institutions, Organizations, Corporations and Associations, including the Federal Reserve, their “fiscal and depository agent” 22 U.S.C.A. 286d. This profligate practice has led to such “Emergency” legislation as the “Public Debt Limit-Balance Budget And Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985”, Public Law 99-177, etc. The government by becoming a corporator, (See: 22 U.S.C.A 286e ) lays down its sovereignty and takes on that of a private citizen. It can exercise no power which is not derived from the corporate charter (See: The Bank of United States v. Planters’ Bank of Georgia, 6 L. Ed. (9 Wheat) 244, United States v. Burr, ). The real party in interest is not the dejure “United States of America” or “State”, but “The Bank” and “The Fund.” (22 U.S.C.A 286, et seq., C.R.S. 11-60-103). The acts committed under fraud , force and seizures are many times done under “Letters of Marque and Reprisal” i.e. “recapture.” (See: 31 U.S.C.A. 5323 ). Such principles as “Fraud and Justice NEVER dwell together” Wingate’s Maxims 680, and “A right of action cannot arise out of fraud.” Broom’s Maxims 297, 729; Cowper’s Reports 343; 5 Scott’s New Reports 558; 10 Mass. 276; 38 Fed. 800, are too high of a thought concept, as is “Due Process”, “Just Compensation” and Justice itself.� Honor is earned by honesty and integrity, not under false and fraudulent pretenses, nor will the color of the cloth one wears cover-up the usurpations, lies, trickery, deceits and the outright furtherance of the fraud. When Black is fraudulently declared to be White, not all will live in darkness. As astutely observed by Will Rogers, “there are men running governments who shouldn’t be allowed to play with matches”, and is as applicable today as Jesus’ statements about Lawyers. The contrived “emergency” has created numerous abuses and usurpations, and abridgments of delegated Powers and Authority. As stated in Senate Report 93-549: “Since March 9, 1933, the United States has been in a state of declared national emergency. In fact, there are now in effect four presidential proclaimed states of national emergency: In addition to the national emergency declared by President Roosevelt in 1933, there are also the national emergency proclaimed by President Truman on December 16, 1950, during the Korean conflict, and the states of national emergency declared by President Nixon on March 23, 1970, and August 15, 1971. These proclamations give force to 470 provisions of Federal Law. These hundreds of statutes delegate to the President extraordinary powers, ordinarily exercised by the Congress, which affect the lives of American citizens in a host of all-encompassing manners. This vast range of powers, taken together, confer enough authority to rule the country without reference to normal constitutional process. Under the powers delegated by these statutes, the President may: seize property; organize and control the means of production; seize commodities; assign military forces abroad; institute martial law; seize and control all transportation and communication; regulate the operation of private enterprise; restrict travel; and in a plethora of particular ways, control the lives of all American citizens.” (See: Foreword, pg. III). The “Introduction”, on page 1, begins with a phenomenal declaration, to wit: “A majority of the people of the United States have lived all of their lives under emergency rule. For 40 years, freedoms and governmental procedures guaranteed by the Constitution have in varying degrees been abridged by laws brought into force by states of national emergency…”

According to the research done in 16 American Jurisprudence, 2nd Edition, Sections 71 and 82, no “emergency” justifies a violation of any Constitutional provision. Arguendo, “Supremacy Clause” and “Separation of Powers”, it is clearly admitted in Senate Report No. 93-549 that abridgment has in fact occurred.

The statements heard in the federal and state Tribunals, on numerous occasions, that Constitutional arguments are “immaterial”, “frivolous” etc., is based upon the concealment, furtherance and compounding of the Frauds and “Emergency” created and sustained by the “Expatriated”, ALIENS of the United Nations and its Organizations, Corporations and Associations.

(See: Letter , Insight Magazine, February 18, 1991, pg. 7, Lowell L. Flanders, President, U.N. Staff Union, New York) 8 U.S.C.A. 1481 is one of the controlling statutes on expatriation, as is 22 U.S.C.A. 611, 612 & 613 and 50 U.S.C.A. 781. The Internal Revenue Service entered into a “service agreement” with the U.S. Treasury Department� (See: Public Law 94-564, Legislative History, pg. 5967, Reorganization Plan No. 26) and the Agency for International Development, pursuant to Treasury Delegation Order No. 91.

The Agency For International Development is an International paramilitary operation (See: Department Of The Army Field Manual, (1969) FM 41-10, pgs. 1-4, Sec. 1-7(b) & 1-6, Section 1-10(7) (c)(1), 22 U.S.C.A. 284), and includes such activities as “Assumption of full or partial executive, legislative, and judicial authority over a country or area.” (See: FM 41-10, pg. 1-7, Section 110(7)(c)(4)) also see, Agreement Between The United Nations And The United States Of America Regarding The Headquarters Of the United Nations, Section 7(d) & (8), 22 U.S.C.A 287 (1979 Ed.) at pg. 241). It is to be further observed that the “Agreement” regarding the Headquarters District of the United Nations was NOT agreed to (See: Congressional Record – Senate, December 13, 1967, Mr. Thurmond), and is illegally in the Country in the first instant. The International Organizational intents, purposes and activities include complete control of “Public Finance” i.e. “control, supervision, and audit of indigenous fiscal resources; budget practices, taxation, expenditures of public funds, currency issues, and banking agencies and affiliates.” (See: FM 41-10, pgs.2-30 thru 2-31, Section 251. Public Finance). This of course complies with “Silent Weapons for Quiet Wars” Research Technical Manual TM-SW7905.1, which discloses a declaration of war upon the American people (See: pg. 3 & 7), monetary control by the Internationalist, through information etc. solicited and collected by the Internal Revenue Service ( See: TM-SW7905.1 , pg. 48, also see, 22 U.S.C.A 286f & Executive order No. 10033, 26 U.S.C.A 6103 (k)(4)) and who is operating and enforcing the seditious International program. (See: TM-SW7905.1, pg. 52). The 1985 Edition of the Department Of Army Field Manual, FM 41-10 further describes the International “Civil Affairs” operations. At page 3-6 it is admitted that the A.I.D. is autonomous and under direction of the International Development Cooperation Agency, and at page 3-8 that the operation is “paramilitary.” The International Organization(s) intents and purposes was to promote, implement,, and enforce a “DICTATORSHIP OVER FINANCE IN THE UNITED STATES.” (See: Senate Report No. 93-549, pg. 186). It appears from the documentary evidence that the Internal Revenue Service Agents. etc., are “Agents of a Foreign Principal” within the meaning and intent of the “Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938.” They are directed and controlled by the corporate “Governor” of “The Fund” a/k/a “Secretary of Treasury” (See: Public Law 94-564, supra, pg. 5942, U.S. Government Manual 1990/91, pgs. 480 & 481, 26 U.S.C.A 7701 (a)(11), Treasury Delegation Order No. 150-10), and the corporate “Governor” of “The Bank” 22 U.S.C.A 286 & 286a, acting as “information-service employees” 22 U.S.C.A. 611 (c)(ii), and have been and do now “solicit, collect, disburse or dispense” contributions [Tax-pecuniary contribution, Blacks Law Dic. 5th ed.], loans, money or other things of value for or in interest of such foreign principal 22 U.S.C.A 611(c)(iii), and they entered into agreements with a Foreign Principal pursuant to Treasury Delegation Order No. 91 i.e. the “Agency For International Development.” (See: 22 U.S.C.A)

And that . . . is the corruptible history of American finance over the past ninety plus years and the slippery slope of foreign manipulation and intervention by international banking interests who by their pre-meditated contrivance, have disassembled and subverted our Constitutional protections of the guarantee to protect and preserve the honest and substantive money of the America people, bringing upon our American shores in derogation of our Common Law, the statute merchants law of Admiralty process, and thereby, secretly move our country and its people under the badge of peonage imposed by the law merchant who by encroaching judicial precedent, establish an ever expanding condition of perpetual involuntary bankruptcy and the endless generational economic bondage of the wage slave!

Note: Congress was clearly delegated the Power and Authority to regulate and maintain the true and inherent “value” of the Coin within the scope and purview of Article I, Section 8, Clauses 5 & 6 and Article I, Section 10, Clause 1, of the ordained Constitution (1787), and further, under a corresponding duty and obligation to maintain said gold and silver Coin and Foreign Coin at and within the necessary and proper “equal weights and measures” clause (See also: Bible, Dueteronomy, Chapter 25, verses 13 thru 16, Proverbs, Chapter 16, verse 11, Public Law 97-289, 96 Stat. 1211).

He who does not freely speak the truth is a betrayer of the truth {Qui non libere veritatem pronunciat proditor est veritatis};

He who does not blame, approves {Qui non improbat, approbat};

He who is silent appears to consent {Qui tacet, consentire videtur; 6 Toull. liv. 3, t. 3, n. 32, note; 14 Serg. & Rawle, 393; 2 Supp. to Ves. jr. 442; 1 Dane’s Ab. c. 1, art. 4, � 3; 8 T. R. 483; 6 Penn. St. R. 336; 1 Greenl. Ev. 201; 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 1313; Jenk. Cent. 32; 6 Barb. N.Y. 28, 35;};

He who does not speak the truth freely is a traitor to the truth {Veritatem qui non liber� pronunciat, proditor veritatis; Coke, 4th Inst. Epil.};

Damage suffered by consent is not a cause of action {Volenti non fit injuria};



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(For Frank ‘Austin’ England III) 

(Blog Masters Note:   All past posts are now located in a drop-down under comments.  This post starts off as ‘pure’ Austin and ends in his style.)



Step 1: Fraud in the Inducement: “… is intended to and which does cause one to execute an instrument, or make an agreement… The misrepresentation involved does not mislead one as the paper he signs but rather misleads as to the true facts of a situation, and the false impression it causes is a basis of a decision to sign or render a judgment”.
Source: Steven H. Gifis, ‘Law Dictionary’, 5th Edition, Happauge: Barron’s Educational Series, Inc., 2003, s.v.: ‘Fraud’.

Step 2: Fraud in Fact by Deceit (Obfuscation and Denial) and Theft:

• “ACTUAL FRAUD. Deceit. Concealing something or making a false representation with an evil intent [scanter] when it causes injury to another…”. Source: Steven H. Gifis, ‘Law Dictionary’, 5th Edition, Happauge: Barron’s Educational Series, Inc., 2003, s.v.: ‘Fraud’.

“THE TORT OF FRAUDULENT DECEIT… The elements of actionable deceit are: A false representation of a material fact made with knowledge of its falsity, or recklessly, or without reasonable grounds for believing its truth, and with intent to induce reliance thereon, on which plaintiff justifiably relies on his injury…”. Source: Steven H. Gifis, ‘Law Dictionary’, 5th Edition, Happauge: Barron’s Educational Series, Inc., 2003, s.v.: ‘Deceit’.

Step 3: Theft by Deception and Fraudulent Conveyance:


• “FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENTThe hiding or suppression of a material fact or circumstance which the party is legally or morally bound to disclose…”.

“The test of whether failure to disclose material facts constitutes fraud is the existence of a duty, legal or equitable, arising from the relation of the parties: failure to disclose a material fact with intent to mislead or defraud under such circumstances being equivalent to an actual ‘fraudulent concealment’…”.

To suspend running of limitations, it means the employment of artifice, planned to prevent inquiry or escape investigation and mislead or hinder acquirement of information disclosing a right of action, and acts relied on must be of an affirmative character and fraudulent…”.

Source: Black, Henry Campbell, M.A., ‘Black’s Law Dictionary’, Revised 4th Edition, St Paul: West Publishing Company, 1968, s.v. ‘Fraudulent Concealment’.


• “FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE… A conveyance or transfer of property, the object of which is to defraud a creditor, or hinder or delay him, or to put such property beyond his reach…”.

• “Conveyance made with intent to avoid some duty or debt due by or incumbent or person (entity) making transfer…”.

Source: Black, Henry Campbell, M.A., ‘Black’s Law Dictionary’, Revised 4th Edition, St Paul: West Publishing Company, 1968, s.v. ‘Fraudulent Conveyance’.

(Blog Masters Note: This is the portion that is not Frank ‘Austin England III’s here is the Link I will fill in portions below, as I can.)


• NASD Rule 3120 et al.
• NASD Rule 2330, et al
• NASD Conduct Rules 2110 and 3040
• NASD Conduct Rules 2110 and IM-2110-1
• NASD Conduct Rules 2110 and SEC Rule 15c3-1
• NASD Conduct Rules 2110 and 3110
• SEC Rules 17a-3 and 17a-4
• NASD Conduct Rules 2110 and Procedural Rule 8210
• NASD Conduct Rules 2110 and 2330 and IM-2330
• NASD Conduct Rules 2110 and IM-2110-5
• NASD Systems and Programme Rules 6950 through 6957
• 97-13 Bank Secrecy Act, Recordkeeping Rule for funds transfers and transmittals of funds, et al.


• Annunzio-Wylie Anti- Money Laundering Act
Anti-Drug Abuse Act
• Applicable international money laundering restrictions
Bank Secrecy Act
• Crimes, General Provisions, Accessory After the Fact [Title 18, USC]
Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act
Economic Espionage Act
Hobbs Act
Imparting or Conveying False Information
Maloney Act
Misprison of Felony [Title 18, USC] (1)
Money-Laundering Control Act
Money-Laundering Supression Act
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970
• Perpetration of repeated egregious felonies by State and Federal public employees and their Departments and agencies, which are co-responsible with the said employees for ONGOING illegal and criminal actions, to sustain fraudulent operations and crimes in order to cover up criminalist activities and High Crimes and Misdemeanours by present and former holders of high office under the United States
• Provisions pertaining to private business transactions being protected under both private and criminal penalties [H.R. 3723]
• Provisions prohibiting the bribing of foreign officials [F.I.S.A.]
• Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (R.I.C.O.)
• Securities Act 1933
• Securities Act 1934
Terrorism Prevention Act
• Treason legislation, especially in time of war.

• Please be advised that the Editor of International Currency Review and associated intelligence services cannot enter into email correspondence related to this or to any of the earlier reports.

We are a private intelligence publishing house and have no connections to any outside parties including intelligence agencies. The word ‘intelligence’ on this website and in all our marketing material is used for marketing/sales purposes only and has no other connotations whatsoever: see ‘About Us’ on the red panels under the Notes on the Editor, Christopher Story FRSA, who has been solely and exclusively engaged as an investigative journalist, Editor, Author and private financial and current affairs Publisher since 1963 and is not and never has been an agent for a foreign power, suggestions to the contrary being actionable for libel in the English Court.


Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).” (Purportedly decided if the constitution applies to U.S. territories.  In actuality, unleashed the great fraud of unlimited statutory power misapplied throughout the continental united States of America.  Dissenting opinion of Justice Marshall Harlan.  “…two national governments, one to be maintained under the Constitution, with all its restrictions, the other to be maintained by Congress outside and independently of that instrument, by exercising such powers as other nations of the earth are accustomed to…a radical and mischievous change in our system of government will result…We will, in that event, pass from the era of constitutional liberty guarded and protected by a written constitution into an era of legislative absolutism…It will be an evil day for American liberty if the theory of a government outside the supreme law of the land finds lodgment in our constitutional jurisprudence.”  In other words, a genuine de jure united States of America congress is always bound to enact laws within the jurisdiction of the constitution.  He held to the obvious truth that congress does not exist, let alone have powers, outside the constitution.  Harlan said, “This nation is under the control of a written constitution, the supreme law of the land and the only source of the powers which our government, or any branch or officer of it, may exert at any time or at any place.”)

– Section 802, Patriot Act.  (Defining the People as terrorists.  Defining terrorism as a maritime event.  Excluding private meetings on the land from terrorism:  “(5) the term `domestic terrorism’ means activities that–(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended– (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and  (C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”) 

Constitution of the State of Oregon Article I,Section 10 (1857) (Administration of justice) (No court shall be secret, but justice shall be administered, openly and without purchase, completely and without delay, and every man shall have remedy by due course of law for injury done him in his person, property, or reputation.);

New York Times v. Alberto Gonzales, 04 Civ. 7677 (RWS) (USDC S.Dist. N.Y. 02/24/2005) (These motions present competing considerations of the role of secrecy in our society. Secrecy may well be seen as the enemy of freedom when it conceals facts important to public understanding.2 [2] “Everything secret degenerates, even the administration of justice; nothing is safe that does not show how it can bear discussion and publicity.” John Emerich Edward Dalberg, Lord Acton, Letter of Jan. 23, 1861, in Lord Acton and his Circle 166 (Abbot Gasquet ed., 1906);

“The very word ‘secrecy’ is repugnant in a free and open society; and we are as a people inherently and historically opposed to secret societies, to secret oaths, and to secret proceedings.”

Nam: The reason of contrary things is contrary {Contrariorum contraia est ratio};

The law is so written {Ita lex scripta est};

Nothing against reason is lawful {Nihil quod est contra rationem est licitum; Coke, Litt. 97};

Nothing that is inconvenient is lawful {Nihil quod est inconveniens est licitum};

That which is inconvenient or against reason is not permissible in law {Quod est inconveniens aut contra rationem non permissum est in lege};

The thing speaks for itself {Res ipsa loquitur};


Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74, 26 S.Ct. 370, 50 L.Ed. 652 (1906) (The individual may stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen. He is entitled to carry on his own business in his own way. His power to contract is unlimited. He owes no duty to the state or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or to open his doors to an investigation, so far as it may tend to incriminate him. He owes no such duty to the state, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life and property. His rights are such as existed by the law of the land long antecedent to the organization of the state, and can only be taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution. Among his rights are a refusal to incriminate himself, and the immunity of himself and his property from arrest or seizure except under a warrant of law. He owes nothing to the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights. On the other hand, the corporation is a creature of the state. It is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. It receives certain special privileges and franchises, and holds them subject to the laws of the state and the limitations of its charter. Its powers are limited by law. It can make no contract not authorized by its charter. Its rights to act as a corporation are only preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation. There is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its power.) aff’d. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 31 S.Ct. 538, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911).

Legalese (Government Manipulation of Language)


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(Blog Masters Note:   Attention: All Posts are now listed in a drop down below comments.  Click on any post, go to the bottom under comments.)
(For Frank ‘Austin’ England III) 
(Blog Masters Note: The first part of this post is from other websites and is Austin’s teaching tool.  The second portion, under “Constructions” is Austin’s additional information including case law and un-published cases. )

Government Manipulation of Language

A Natural Person vs Artificial Person (A Legal Fiction)

Government Manipulation of Language

Government Tricks:
This is perhaps the most important page on this web-site.
First Trick:

The first “trick” of the Government is the re-definition of certain critical words in each Statute (Act). They (the Government) want you to assume the ordinary meaning of the word so as to trick you into reading and interpreting the Statute in their favour. Here is a summary of some of the Trick Words. Two key words that are re-defined in almost every Statute are the words “person” and “individual”. There are at least two “person” in law:

A natural-person is a legal entity for the human-being.

An artificial-person is a legal entity that is not a human being.

Here are the exact definitions from Barron’s Canadian Law Dictionary, fourth edition (ISBN 0-7641-0616-3):

* natural person. A natural person is a human being that has the capacity for rights and duties.
* artificial person. A legal entity, not a human being, recognized as a person in law to whom certain legal rights and duties may attached – e.g. a body corporate.

You will observe that the natural-person has the “capacity” (i.e. ability) for rights and duties, but not necessarily the obligation. The artificial-person has rights and duties that may be attached (i.e. assigned) by laws.

Second Trick:

The second “trick” of the Government is to use the Interpretation Act to define words that apply to all Statutes, unless re-defined within a particular Statute. Without this knowledge, you could assume the ordinary meaning for the words you are reading, not realizing that they may have been defined by the Interpretation Act. Unless these words have been re-defined in another Statute, the underlying definitions for the two most important words still apply, either from the Interpretation Act, or the Canadian Law Dictionary. Basically, they are defined as follows:

from the Canadian Law Dictionary we find that:
individual means a natural person,
from the Income Tax Act we find the re-definition:
individual means an artificial person.

from the Canadian Law Dictionary we find that:
person means an individual (natural person) or incorporated group (artificial person),
from the Interpretation Act we find the re-definition:
person means a corporation (an artificial- person),
from the Income Tax Act we find the re-definition again:
person means an artificial person (amongst other things).

In the Canadian Human Rights Act you will see how individual and person are used and how they apply to natural and artificial persons.

Third Trick:

The third “trick” of the Government is to use the word “includes” in definitions instead of using the word “means”. They do this in some critical definitions that they want you to misinterpret. If they used “means” instead of “includes” then their deception would be exposed, but by using “includes” they rely upon the reader to assume that “includes” expands the definition, whereas in reality it restricts the definition in the same manner that “means” restricts the definition.

Here is a means definition of the word “person” from the Bank Act:
person means a natural person, an entity or a personal representative;
Here is an includes definition of the word “person” from the Interpretation Act:
person, or any word or expression descriptive of a person, includes a corporation
To expose their deception, substitute the word means and you have
person , or any word or expression descriptive of a person, means a corporation (viz. – artificial-person)

Both “means” and “includes” are restrictive in scope because they only encompass part of the whole. Typically they are used in the following form:

person means A or B or C (and nothing else).
person includes A and B and C (and nothing else).

From the above example, you will see the logical difference. The list that follows means is constructed using “or”, whereas the list that follows includes is constructed using “and”.

There is a Legal Maxim that supports the restriction of “includes”:

Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.

The inclusion of one is the exclusion of another.

The definition of the word include is key to understanding your potential loss of natural-person. This is the major trick used by the Government in an attempt to take away your natural-person rights. Unless you know this, you will voluntarily forfeit your rights.

Forth Trick:
The fourth “trick” of the Government is to modify how the word “includes” is used in order to make an expansion in the definition when such expansion is required. This “trick” helps add confusion to the use of “includes” convincing most readers that “includes” should always be expansive rather than limiting. Here are some legitimate ways in which “includes” is modified to become expansive rather than restrictive:

also includes
and includes
includes, without limitation,
including but not limited to

The expansive definitions usually take the following form:

person means A or B or C and includes D. (A,B, C and D)

However, there is also a possibility that “and includes” is restrictive in some constructions. There are some people investigating this possibility right now. Their logic is demonstrated by the following example of a definition that states:

province means a province of Canada and includes Ontario and Quebec.

So, if we presume that “and includes” does provide expansion then we must ask why Ontario and Quebec had to be specifically mentioned when they are already part of a so-called province.

The above construction clearly defines the scope of what is meant by province, that is a province of Canada (it does not say which one), and includes only Ontario and Quebec (compiled from a list of two from the original scope of all provinces). In this construction means provides the scope of the definition and includes provides the list of what is actually included in the definition.

The foregoing analysis is one interpretation, but is not the only interpretation. The use of “includes” in statutory definitions can be argued both ways and is the backbone of understanding interpretations.

With the presumption that “and includes” is restrictive, then we must take a very close look at the following definition, taken from the Interpretation Act:

province means a province of Canada and includes the Yukon Territory, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut .

With this presumption what is stated is: unless another statute re-defines province, the default definition of province only includes the Yukon Territory, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut.

So in order to not become absurd, we must allow for “and includes” to be expansive, however more work needs to be done on this subject before placing the last nail in the coffin, so to speak.


Barron’s Canadian Law Dictionary does not provide definitions for “include” or “means” therefore we have to look in the next Source for the definitions.

From Black’s Law Dictionary, fourth edition, here is the definition for the word “include”:

* include. To confine within, hold as in an inclosure, take in , attain, shut up, contain, inclose, comprise, comprehend, embrace, involve. Including may, according to context, express an enlargement and have the meaning of and or in addition to, or merely specify a particular thing already included within general words theretofore used.
* inclose. To surround; to encompass; to bound; fence, or hem in, on all sides.

It is stated in the above definition that the verb include is clearly restrictive and only has limited scope. On the other hand the participle, including (but not limited to) enlarges the scope.

Therefore the conclusion is that when used in a definition, include does not expand the existing definition of the word it is attempting to define. It is easy to be confused because we naturally assume the existing definition of the word, then assume include means to add this new interpretation to the existing assumed definition of the word. Our assumptions fail us in this case.

From now on, when you see the word includes, mentally substitute the word means and you will not be “tricked” by this definition any more.

For the Doubting Thomas:

If you look into any statute, you will be able to find a definition that uses the word includes and when you attempt to broaden the scope of that word to include the ordinary meaning, you will find that the statute will break down because it will not be able to support the inclusion of the ordinary meaning of the word. The breakdown usually occurs when slavery is invoked.

“Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law,”
( Preamble – Universal Declaration of Human Rights)


“How’s the dictionary getting on?” Winston asked his comrade Syme, who worked with him in the Research Department.

“We’re getting the language into its final shape,” Syme answered. “By the year 2050 at the very latest not a single human being will be alive who could understand the conversation we are having now.”
1984, George Orwell.

In America we speak three languages: Slang, Formal English, and Legal English, Though simular, if one tries to communicate using one language while the listener is listening using another language, there is great opportunity for miscommunication. This article is written in Legal English.


It’s the language of the street. It is a dynamic, loosely defined language, and it can vary considerably from one geographical area to the next. It abounds with special and paradoxical interpretations. Once must “grow up” with the language to fully appreciate its peculiarities.

Foreigners always have great difficulty dealing with the various idioms. For example, if you think something is genuinely wonderful, you could say either, “That’s really cool!” or “That’s really hot!” Another way to express great approval is to exclaim, “That’s B-A-D!” or “That’s G-O-O-D!”

Formal English

Precise communications require a more formal structure. Formal English is taught in the schools, and it is the language of choice when strangers meet to execute common transactions. It is a stable language that typically requires multi-decades or centuries to evolve its meanings.

Unless otherwise specified, English dictionaries cast all words in Formal English, with the more common usage placed at the beginning of the definition. Dictionaries often will show slang or legal meanings as well. They are placed after the more popular usages.

This author favors Webster’s 1828 Dictionary because it is useful in understanding words used in the U.S. Constitution. G. & C. Merriam Webster’s unabridged dictionary published in 1953 and earlier is great for modern meanings.

Legal English

When you want accuracy in communication, Legal English is the preferred language. Also known as King’s English, or the Language of the Court Room, Legal English is extremely stable, requiring thousands of years for changes in meaning.

Because accuracy is required for good legal communication, legal definitions tend to be rather verbose. The extended explanations are necessary to achieve that accuracy. Legal dictionaries are not all called dictionaries. The more thorough dictionaries are entitled “Corpus Juris” and “Words and Phrases.” A given word could require fifty or more pages to arrive at its exact meaning. Other dictionaries (in descending order of this author’s preference) include Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1872 Edition), Ballentine’s Law Dictionary, and Black’s Law Dictionary (4th edition or earlier).

Later editions of Bouvier’s Law Dictionary are more like legal encyclopedias

Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th through 7th Editions are not as accurate because references to common law are progressively removed, and Roman Civil Law concepts are augmented in order to conform to the law enforcement needs of political power centers such as the Federal Government and the United Nations.

The rule of thumb is that older dictionaries are useful for understanding natural rights, common law, personal sovereignty, and the people’s point of view. Newer dictionaries are useful for understanding civil rights, Roman civil law, centralized authority, and the government’s point of view. All attorneys are trained in the latter. Judges may go to special seminars to learn the former.

For an excellent research paper on the use of dictionaries in the Supreme Court of the United States, see Kevin Werbach’s LOOKING IT UP: The Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries in Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation (1994).



An absolute, unqualified sentence (or proposition) needs no expositor {Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget; 2 Coke, Inst. 533}; From the words of the law there should be no departure {A verbis legis non est recendendum; Broom’s Max. 268; 5 Rep. 119; Wing. Max. 25}; Constructions should be liberal, on account of the ignorance of the laity, or non-professional persons, so that the subject-matter may avail rather than perish; and the words must be subject to the intention, and not the intention to the words {Benigne faciendæ sunt interpretationes propter simplicitatem liacorum, ut res magis valeat quam pereat; et verba intentione, non e contra, debent inservire}; Laws are to be more favorably interpreted, that their intent may be preserved {Benignius leges interpretandæ sunt quo voluntas earum conservetur}; The construction of law works not an injury {Construction legis non facit injuriam; Coke, Litt. 183; Broom’s Max. 259}; The voice of the legislators themselves is like the living voice; the language of a statute is to be understood and interpreted like ordinary spoken language {Est ipsorum legislatorum tanquam viva vox}; It concerns the commonwealth that things adjudged be not rescinded {Interest reipublicæ res judicatas non rescindi}; There should be no departure from common observance {Non est recedendum a communi observantia; 2 Co. 74}; The best mode of interpreting laws is to make them accord {Optimus interpretandi modus est sic legis interpretare ut leges legibus accordant; 8 Coke, 169}; The thing speaks for itself {Res ipsa loquitur}; A statute is to be so interpreted that the words may be taken with effect {Sic interpretandum est ut verba accipiantur cum effectu}; Statutes made for the public good ought to be liberally construed {Statuta pro publico commodo late interpretantur}; When anything is granted, that also is granted without which the thing granted cannot exist {Ubi aliquid conceditur, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest}; and that class of authority, infra:

It is the duty of the court to give a construction to all written instruments; 3 Binn. R. 337; 7 S. & R. 372; 15 S. & R. 100; 4 S. & R. 279; 8 S. & R. 381; 1 Watts. R. 425; 10 Mass. R. 384; 3 Cranch, R. 180 3 Rand. R. 586; to written evidence: 2 Watts, R. 347 and to foreign laws, 1 Penna. R. 388. For general rules respecting the construction of contracts, see 2 Bl. Com. 379; 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 658, 669; 2 Com. on Cont. 23 to 28; 3 Chit. Com. Law, 106 to 118 Poth. Oblig. P. 1, c. 1, art. 7; 2 Evans’ Poth. Ob. 35; Long on Sales, 106; 1 Fonb. Eq. 145, n. b Id. 440, n. 1; Whart. Dig. Contract, F; 1 Powell on Contr. 370 Shepp. Touchst. c. 5; Louis. Code, art. 1940 to 1957; Corn. Dig. Merchant, (E 2,) n. j.; 8 Com. Dig. tit. Contract, iv.; Lilly’s Reg. 794; 18 Vin. Abr. 272, tit. Reference to Words; 16 Vin. Abr. 199, tit. Parols; Hall’s Dig. 33, 339; 1 Ves. Jun. 210, n.; Vattel, B. 2, c. 17; Chit. Contr. 19 to 22; 4 Kent. Com. 419; Story’s Const. § 397-456; Ayl. Pa d. B. 1, t. 4; Rutherf. Inst. B. 2, c. 7, § 4-11; 20 Pick. 150; 1 Bell’s Com. 5th ed. 431; and the articles, Communings; Evidence; Interpretation; Parol; Pourparler;

28 U.S.C. § 1366 (Construction of references to laws of the United States or Acts of Congress) (For the purposes of this chapter, references to laws of the United States or Acts of Congress do not include laws applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia.);

ORS 42.230(Office of judge in construing instruments) (In the construction of an instrument, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is, in terms or in substance, contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted; and where there are several provisions or particulars, such construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.); Cf. Hunnel v, Roseburg Resources, 00 CV 0693 CC; A114411 (Or. 08/07/2002); Olson v. Van Horn,182 Or App 264, 48 P3d 860, rev den, 334 Or 631 (2002);

ORS 174.010 (General rule for construction of statutes) (In the construction of a statute, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is, in terms or in substance, contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted; and where there are several provisions or particulars such construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.);

ORS 174.020 [Amended by 2001 c.438 §1] (Legislative intent; general and particular provisions; consideration of legislative history) (1)(a) In the construction of a statute, a court shall pursue the intention of the legislature if possible. (b) To assist a court in its construction of a statute, a party may offer the legislative history of the statute. (2) When a general and particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former so that a particular intent controls a general intent that is inconsistent with the particular intent. (3) A court may limit its consideration of legislative history to the information that the parties provide to the court. A court shall give the weight to the legislative history that the court considers to be appropriate.);

ORS 174.030(Construction favoring natural right to prevail) (Where a statute is equally susceptible of two interpretations, one in favor of natural right and the other against it, the former is to prevail.);

Carcieri v. Salazar, No. 07-526 (USSC 02/24/2009) ((a) When a statute’s text is plain and unambiguous, United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 4, the statute must be applied according to its terms, see, e.g., Dodd v. United States , 545 U.S. 353, 359. … There is also no need to consider the parties’ competing views on whether Congress had a policy justification for limiting the Secretary’s trust authority to tribes under federal jurisdiction in 1934, since Congress’ use of “now” in §479 speaks for itself and “courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.” Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-254. Pp. 7-13.);

Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, No. 06-9130 (USSC 01/22/2008) (This Court must give effect to the text Congress enacted. Pp. 3-13.);

Clark v. Capital Credit Collection Services, No. 04-35563, 04-35795, 04-35842 (9th Cir. 08/24/2006) (Well-established canons of statutory construction provide that any inquiry into the scope and meaning of a statute must begin with the text of the statute itself. E.g., Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. BF Goodrich Aerospace Aerostructure Group, 387 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2004). They further caution that, “where the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms . . . for courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.” Id. (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) and Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Clark v. Capital Credit Collection Services, No. 04-35563, 04-35795, 04-35842 (9th Cir. 08/24/2006) (Because the statute affirmatively designates certain manners of operation, we are counseled that, under the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, these omissions are the equivalent of exclusions. See ARC Ecology v. U.S. Dept. of Air Force, 411 F.3d 1092, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 2005); In re Gerwer, 898 F.2d 730, 732 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The express enumeration [of an exception] indicates that other exceptions should not be implied.”). Nevertheless, we have long held that however helpful . . . rules of construction may be, the courts will . . . “construe the details of an act in conformity with its dominating general purpose, will read text in the light of context and will interpret the text so far as the meaning of the words fairly permits so as to carry out in particular cases the generally expressed legislative policy.” Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670, 674 (9th Cir. 1960) (quoting S.E.C. v. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943)); see also Longview Fibre Co. v. Rasmussen, 980 F.2d 1307, 1313 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that expressio unius “is a rule of interpretation, not a rule of law. The maxim is ‘a product of logic and common sense,’ properly applied only when it makes sense as a matter of legislative purpose.”) (citation omitted). Moreover, we are not bound by the plain meaning of a statute where its literal application will produce a result “demonstrably at odds with the intention of its drafters.” In re Been, 153 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989)); see also United States v. Combs, 379 F.3d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e are not required to interpret a statute in a formalistic manner when such an interpretation would produce a result contrary to the statute’s purpose or lead to unreasonable results.”) (citing Commissioner IRS v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571 (1965)). In the present context, strictly abiding by the plain language of § 1692c(c) would do just that. Cf. Lewis v. ACB Business Services, Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 398 (6th Cir. 1998) (“While Congress appears to have intended the [FDCPA] to eliminate abusive collection practices, the language of § 1692c(c) is broader. . . .”).

Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc.,No. 04-35563, 04-35795, 04-35842 (9th Cir. 08/24/2006) (However, “[i]n analyzing a statutory text, we do not look at its words in isolation. Textual exegesis necessarily is a holistic endeavor. . . . Thus, we look not only to the language itself, but also to . . . the broader context of the statute as a whole.” BF Goodrich, 387 F.3d at 1051 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Indeed, elsewhere we have explained that “[t]he words of a statute are, of course, dead weights unless animated by the purpose of the statute.” Favish v. Office of Indep. Counsel, 217 F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir. 2000). To that end, we are “obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used,” Baker, 677 F.2d at 778 (citing Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979)), and “[w]e have consistently . . . reject[ed] interpretations that would render a statutory provision surplusage or a nullity,” In re Cervantes, 219 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 2000). See also id. (noting that “statutes should not be construed in a manner which robs specific provisions of independent effect”) (citations omitted). This requirement demands that we pursue consistency not only within a particular provision but also among the provisions of the FDCPA. See Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Gould, 412 F.3d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Our goal in interpreting a statute is to understand the statute as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme and to fit, if possible, all parts into a harmonious whole”) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc.,No. 04-35563, 04-35795, 04-35842 (9th Cir. 08/24/2006) (See, e.g., Security Pac. Nat’l Bank v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 63 F.3d 900, 904 (9th Cir. 1995) (“We must avoid a construction which renders any language of the enactment superfluous.”); Hearn v. W. Conference of Teamsters Pension Tr. Fund, 68 F.3d 301, 304 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Only where a sensible result isn’t reachable may we resort to the drastic step of ignoring . . . statutory language. . . .”) (citation omitted). Instead, intent is only relevant to the determination of damages. Taylor, 103 F.3d at 1238, 1239 (“the fact that violations were innocuous and not abusive may be considered only in mitigating liability, and not as defenses”); Bentley v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, 6 F.3d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 1993) (“the degree of a [debt collector’s] culpability may only be considered in computing damages”). We are convinced that this reading of the FDCPA is more in harmony with the remedial nature of the statute, which requires us to interpret it liberally. Cf., e.g., Eby v. Reb Realty, Inc., 495 F.2d 646, 650 (9th Cir. 1974) (concluding the remedial purpose of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., required liberal construction); accord Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107, 1117 (10th Cir. 2002) (“Because the FDCPA . . . is a remedial statute, it should be construed liberally in favor of the consumer.”).

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense , No. 05-184 (U.S.S.C. 06/29/2006) (The Government’s argument that §§1005(e)(1) and (h) repeal this Court’s jurisdiction to review the decision below is rebutted by ordinary principles of statutory construction. A negative inference may be drawn from Congress’ failure to include §1005(e)(1) within the scope of §1005(h)(2). Cf., e.g., Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 330. “If … Congress was reasonably concerned to ensure that [§§1005(e)(2) and (3)] be applied to pending cases, it should have been just as concerned about [§1005(e)(1)], unless it had the different intent that the latter [section] not be applied to the general run of pending cases.” Id., at 329. If anything, the evidence of deliberate omission is stronger here than it was in Lindh.);

Scheidler v. National Organization for Women Inc., No. 04-1244 (U.S.S.C. 02/28/2006) (Respondents’ contrary claim rests primarily upon a canon of statutory construction that favors interpretations that give a function to each word in a statute, thereby avoiding linguistic superfluity. See United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-539 (1955) (“It is our duty ‘to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute’ ” (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883))). … The canons of interpretation cannot lead us to a contrary conclusion. Those canons are tools designed to help courts better determine what Congress intended, not to lead courts to interpret the law contrary to that intent. Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001) (noting that “canons are not mandatory rules” but guides “designed to help judges determine the Legislature’s intent,” and that “other circumstances evidencing congressional intent can overcome their force”).

Gathright v. City of Portland, No. 04-35402 (9th Cir. 02/24/2006) (Gathright challenged his evictions from the city park on First Amendment grounds. The City defended its ordinance as a legitimate “time, place, or manner” regulation of protected speech. The Ninth Circuit’s opinion rejects the City’s argument and invalidates the ordinance on its face, distinguishing the Supreme Court’s seminal case for such regulation in city parks ( Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 US 781) and the Supreme Court case most closely on point ( Hurley v. Irish-American Gay Group of Boston, 515 US 557), and then concluding without much more discussion that the City’s ordinance is not “narrowly tailored” enough to protect the permittees’ interest in exercising their right to gather peaceably in city parks.);

City of Nyssa v. Dufloth, 339 Or. 330 (2005) (Under the Priest paradigm the court searches for the intent of the people who drafted and adopted the original provision of the constitution. In so doing, the court examines the wording of the constitutional provision, the case law surrounding it, and the historical circumstances leading to its adoption. 314 Or at 415-16.)

Lambert v. Blodgett, No. 03-35081 (9th Cir. 12/28/2004) (Reinforcing our textual analysis is the usual presumption that when Congress employs a commonly used phrase like “adjudicated on the merits,” it intends that term to retain its ordinary meaning. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990) (“We assume that Congress is aware of existing law when it passes legislation.”); RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, 1 FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 1422 & n.4 (4th ed. 2001) (“[I]f a word is obviously transplanted from another legal source, whether the common law or other legislation, it brings the old soil with it.”) (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 537 (1947)).

United States v. Vagas Amaya, No. 03-50577 (9th Cir. 11/22/2004) (“In construing a statute as a matter of first impression, we first must look to the statutory language: ‘The starting point in interpreting a statute is its language, for if the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter.’ ” Morales-Alejo, 193 F.3d at 1105 (quoting Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 409 (1993)). It is a well-established canon of statutory construction that when Congress uses a term of art, such as “warrant,” unless Congress affirmatively indicates otherwise, we presume Congress intended to incorporate the common definition of that term: [W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed. In such case, absence of contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as a departure from them. Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 264 (2000) (quoting Morissettee v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952)).

Norfolk Southern Railway co. v. Kirby Engineeering, 543 U.S. 14, 125 S. Ct. 385 (2004) (“Read naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’ ” United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 97 (1976)). There is no reason to contravene the clause’s obvious meaning. See Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 89-90 (1823) (“[W]here the words of a law, treaty, or contract, have a plain and obvious meaning, all construction, in hostility with such meaning, is excluded”).

McMellon v. United States, No. 02-1494 (4th Cir. 10/14/2004) (The Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that the plain language of a statute is the best evidence of Congressional intent. See, e.g., Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 6 (1999). As noted above, the SIAA includes no list of exceptions to its waiver of sovereign immunity, but instead provides only that the government is entitled to the limitations of liability that are available in admiralty to private defendants. Thus, the plain language of the SIAA seems to reflect a Congressional intent that discretionary acts should not be excluded from the waiver of sovereign immunity. See Barnhart Comm. of Social Security v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (explaining that when construing a statute, “[t]he first step is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case. The inquiry ceases if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Miller v. C.C. Meisel Co. , 183 Or App 148, 51 P3d 650 (2002) (In Van v. Fox, 278 Or 439, 445-46, 564 P2d 695 (1977), the court explained: “‘The law does not favor, but leans against, the destruction of contracts because of uncertainty; and it will, if feasible, so construe agreements as to carry into effect the reasonable intentions of the parties if that can be ascertained.’ (Quoting 11 Williston on Contracts 813, § 1424 (3d ed 1968);

Hunnel v, Roseburg Resources, 00 CV 0693 CC; A114411 (Or. 08/07/2002) (We review the interpretation of an express easement for errors of law. State Highway Com’n v. Deal et al., 191 Or 661, 681, 233 P2d 242 (1951); Kell v. Oppenlander, 154 Or App 422, 426, 961 P2d 861 (1998). To interpret an easement, we follow the guidelines that the Supreme Court established in Tipperman v. Tsiatsos, 327 Or 539, 544-45, 964 P2d 1015 (1998). See also Olson v. Van Horn, 182 Or App 264, 270 n 4, 48 P3d 860 (2002) (adhering to Tipperman method). We begin with the text of the instrument itself and look beyond it if it is ambiguous, in which case we look to the intent of the original parties as revealed by the relevant surrounding circumstances such as the nature of the easement and how it was used. If ambiguity still remains, we look to rules of construction such as the one announcing that an easement is to be construed against the grantor who reserves it. Tipperman, 327 Or at 545. Applying those guidelines here, we conclude that the trial court erred. Thus, the actual words themselves are unambiguous, and neither the punctuation, the handwritten numeral, nor the context of the disputed phrase alters that fact. And if they did, the ambiguity would attach not to the meaning of the instrument but to whether that meaning reflected the intention of the parties. As the trial court recognized, these factors do not affect the language in such a way as to produce more than one meaning. Rather, they indicate (if anything) an inadvertent scrivener’s omission. Reinserting inadvertent omissions is not the office of the judge in interpreting instruments; that office is “to ascertain and declare what is, in terms or in substance, contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted[.]” ORS 42.230. An unambiguous contract that mistakenly fails to reflect the intent of the parties through inadvertent omission is remedied through a claim for reformation–a claim that defendant did not raise and that would have required defendant to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, an antecedent agreement to which the contract could be reformed, a mutual mistake (or unilateral mistake on the part of the defendant and inequitable conduct on the part of plaintiffs), and the absence of gross negligence by defendant. See Jensen v. Miller, 280 Or 225, 228-29, 570 P2d 375 (1977).

Olson v. Van Horn,182 Or App 264, 48 P3d 860, rev den, 334 Or 631 (2002) (ORS 42.230, which provides: “In the construction of an instrument, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is, in terms or in substance, contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted; and where there are several provisions or particulars, such construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.” (Emphasis added.);

AT&T Communications of the Pacific Northwest, Inc. v. City of Eugene,16-98-12672; A105861 (Or. 10/31/2001) (The only possible justification for reading subsections (b) and (c) as substantive prohibitions is the textual maxim expressio unius est exclusius alterius. That maxim, however, may operate only to explain a text, not to contradict it. Neuberger v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
311 US 83, 88, 61 S Ct 97, 85 L Ed 58 (1940) (“The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is an aid to construction, not a rule of law. It can never override clear and contrary evidence of Congressional intent.”).

United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 496 (2001) (As an initial matter, the Cooperative is correct that, when district courts are properly acting as courts of equity, they have discretion unless a statute clearly provides otherwise. For “several hundred years,” courts of equity have enjoyed “sound discretion” to consider the “necessities of the public interest” when fashioning injunctive relief. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-330 (1944). See also id., at 329 (“The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it”); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (“In exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction”). Such discretion is displaced only by a “clear and valid legislative command.” Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946). See also Romero-Barcelo, supra, at 313 (“Of course, Congress may intervene and guide or control the exercise of the courts’ discretion, but we do not lightly assume that Congress has intended to depart from established principles”).

United States v. One 1997 Toyota Land Cruiser, No 99-55661 (9th Cir. 04/26/2001) (In construing a statute, we first consider its text. “[W]hen the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts –at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd–is to enforce it according to its terms.” Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 120 S.Ct. 1942, 1947 (2000) (citations and quotation marks omitted). If the statute’s meaning is clear, we will not consider legislative history. “When the words of a statute are unambiguous, … the first canon is also the last: judicial inquiry is complete.” Connecticut Nat’l. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

State of Oregon v. Cach,9903-61470; CA A105887 (02/29/2001) (ORS 426.100 is like any other statute, in that its interpretation depends on ascertaining the legislature’s intent. We should interpret it as it is written and not add to, or delete language from, its text. ORS 174.010. There has been a tendency by this court to read this particular statute’s requirements as if the failure to comply with them constitutes “structural” error. See, e.g., State v. Montgomery, 147 Or App 69, 934 P2d 640 (1997); State v. May, 131 Or App 570, 888 P2d 14 (1994). Although that term has a somewhat ambiguous meaning in the law, I understand it to refer to situations where the denial of a fundamental right is so pervasive that it necessarily infects the entire proceeding. An example would be the denial of the assistance of counsel in a criminal proceeding where there has been no effective waiver of that right. See, e.g., State v. Barone, 329 Or 210, 986 P2d 5 (1998).(5) In those instances, the concept of “harmless error” can play no role because it is impossible to ascertain whether the proceeding was fundamentally fair. Nothing in the language of ORS 426.100 suggests that the legislature intended that a failure to comply with its requirements would constitute structural error. Consequently, this court has erred in the past to the extent that it has refused to consider arguments about waiver and harmless error, because those doctrines are applicable under this statute.)

Trus Joist Macmillan v. John Deere Insurance Co.,171 Or. App. 476, 15 P.3d 995 (12/20/2000) (The focus of statutory construction is the intentions of the legislature, not the intentions of the parties to a private insurance policy. There is a presumption that the legislature intended the ordinary meaning of terms to apply, as generally reflected in common dictionary definitions. See, e.g., Marcilionis, 318 Or at 644-45);

Trus Joist Macmillan v. John Deere Insurance Co.,171 Or. App. 476, 15 P.3d 995 (12/20/2000) (This is not a case in which the Oregon legislature enacted a uniform law. See, e.g., Security Bank v. Chiapuzio, 304 Or 438, 445 n 6, 747 P2d 335 (1987) (“the legislative intent to make the UCC a uniform code makes relevant the decisions of other courts”). Nor is it a case in which the Oregon statute is based on the wording of a statute from another jurisdiction, in which case pre-existing decisions from that jurisdiction may become relevant. See, e.g., Pamplin v. Victoria, 319 Or 429, 433, 877 P2d 1196 (1994) (pre-existing federal court decisions construing federal rule of civil procedure relevant to interpretation of identical Oregon rule based on the federal counterpart). In the absence of any such evidence that the Oregon legislature intended to follow decisions of other jurisdictions, the fact that some of those decisions construe similar language differently provides little, if any, assistance to us in determining what the Oregon legislature intended.);

State of Oregon v. Barnes, 329 OR 327, 986 P2D 1160 (1999) (“In the construction of a statute, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is, in terms or in substance, contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted * * *.”);

United States v. Harris, No. 97-10270 (9th Cir. 07/30/1999) (The presumption is that a statute is constitutional. United States v. National Dairy Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33 (1963). Statutes are construed to avoid defects which would render them unconstitutional. U.S. Civil Service Comm. v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 571 (1973)); Cf. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78, 106 S Ct 3101, 92 L Ed 2d 460 (1986);

Fales v. Multnomah Co. et al.,119 Or 127, 133, 248 P 151 (1926) aff’d. City of Eugene v. Nalven, 152 Or App 720, rev den, 327 Or 431 (1998) (When a power is given by statute everything necessary to make it effectual is given by implication.);  Ubi aliquid conceditur, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest.

Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997) (As we held in Albertini, supra, at 680: “Statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional questions, but this interpretative canon is not a license for the judiciary to rewrite language enacted by the legislature. Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 741-742 (1984). Any other conclusion, while purporting to be an exercise in judicial restraint, would trench upon the legislative powers vested in Congress by Art. I, §1, of the Constitution. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95-96 (1985).” These principles apply to the rules of statutory construction we have followed to give proper respect to the federal-state balance. As we observed in applying an analogous maxim in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), “[w]e cannot press statutory construction to the point of disingenuous evasion even to avoid a constitutional question.” Id., at 57, n. 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). Gregory itself held as much when it noted the principle it articulated did not apply when a statute was unambiguous. See Gregory, 501 U.S., at 467. A statute can be unambiguous without addressing every interpretive theory offered by a party. It need only be “plain to anyone reading the Act” that the statute encompasses the conduct at issue. Ibid.);

Jones v. General Motors Corp.,325 Or 404, 939 P.2d 608 (1997) (In the construction of a statute the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is, in terms or in substance, contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted; and where there are several provisions or particulars such construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.);

Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or 72, 78, 948 P2d 722 (1997) (We consider other statutes in pari materia, if not strictly speaking as “context” of the statute–because the other statutes were later enacted);

Holcomb v. Sunderland, 321 Or 99, 105, 894 P2d 457 (1995) aff’d. State of Oregon v. Lyons, 94-10-37308; CA A89277 (Or. 07/07/1999) (When the court interprets a statute, that interpretation becomes part of the statute as if it were written into the law at the time of its enactment.);

The Additional Legal Rights Otherwise Dormant


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(Blog Masters Note:   All Posts are now listed in a drop down below comments.  This was a wordpress idea, not mine, but at least all posts are still visible and retrievable)
(For Frank ‘Austin’ England III) 

Sovereign Immunity

[17 Alaska Bar Rag No. 3 (Sep/Oct 1993)]

Sovereign immunity springs from the English common law concepts that (1) the “King can do no wrong” (from the days it was believed that kings ruled by divine right and that all rights flowed from the sovereign) and (2) that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. Despite widespread criticism by legal scholars the doctrine retains a substantial degree of viability in American law based on the second “prong.”

Sovereign immunity at the Federal level is particularly indefensible since “We the People,” who ordained and established these United States and created the Federal “sovereign,” did not see fit to cloak “our sovereign” with immunity for its actions. However the doctrine has been judicially recognized these past 200 years, planted in dictum by Chief Justice Jay in Chisholm v. Georgia, [2 Dall. (2 US) 419 (1793)], fertilized in dictum by Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia, [6 Wheat. (19 US) 264 (1821)], and germinating in United States v. Clarke, [8 Pet. (19 US) 436 (1834)]. There is no constitutional basis for sovereign immunity, it is purely and simply a judge-made legal anachronism.

Despite its pernicious nature and logically indefensible character, the purpose of this article is not to argue for abolition of the doctrine but, rather, to discuss its operation, scope and effect in the bankruptcy forum. Recent cases in the U.S. Supreme Court have driven home the fact that the doctrine continues to thrive in the bankruptcy context, particularly with respect to damages for violations of the automatic stay.

In dealing with the immunity of government and government officials, it must be recognized that we deal with three levels of government: federal, state and local. Each has separate rules and varying degrees of “protection.”


As noted above, it is well settled in the law that, absent “consent,” the Federal government, its departments and agencies are immune from suit. Sovereign immunity extends to Indian nations United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 US 506 (1940), government officials acting in their official capacity United States v. Lee, 106 US 196 (1882) and, to the extent that Congress has cloaked them with immunity, Federal corporations Keifer & Keifer v. RFC, 306 US 381 (1939).

The critical issue is “consent.” “Consent to be sued” can be in a general sense, as with the Federal Torts Claim Act. Unfortunately, where violations of the automatic stay are concerned, the FTCA is of no help as the actions do not fit within even the broad scope of that statute. However, when a governmental unit formally invokes the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court by filing a proof of claim, government exposure to counterclaim liability exists under 11 USC 106(a) [ In Re Keith v. Pinkstaff,974 F2d 113 (CA9 1992); see United States v. Nordic Village, 503 US — [112 SCt 1011] (1991)]. Under Pinkstaff, the court applies a so-called “logical relationship” test. For purposes of 26 USC 106(a), a logical relationship exists when the counterclaim arises from the same set of operative facts as the initial claim in that the same operative facts serve as the basis for both claims or the aggregate core of facts upon which the claim rests activates additional legal rights otherwise dormant in the defendant. In the context of 362, when the activities of the governmental unit in question relate to collection of the claim and the collection activity violates the automatic stay, the necessary nexus exists for a waiver of governmental immunity.

Even where the governmental unit has not filed a formal claim, use of a self-help remedy to collect on the claim by the governmental unit may constitute an “informal proof of claim” sufficient to trigger the waiver provisions of 106(a) [ In Re Town & Country Home Nursing Services Inc., 963 F2d 1146 (CA9 1992)].


While a sovereign may reign supreme within its borders, sovereignty does not extend beyond its borders [ Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 411 (1979)]. Moreover, there being no constiutional basis for sovereign immunity, recognition of sovereign immunity is a forum other than the forum of the sovereign is based upon principles of comity [Id.] Accordingly, sovereign immunity does not per se bar actions against states in Federal courts except to the extent Federal law provides.

However, the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against states, state agencies and instrumentalities in Federal courts. Although the Eleventh Amendment specifically bars only suits against states by citizens of another state, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted it as barring suits by citizens of the same state. [ Hans v. Louisiana,134 US 1 (1890)]. Eleventh Amendment protection extends to State officials as well [ Tindal v. Westley, 167 US 204 (1897)], subject to an “excess of capacity” test [e.g. Pennoyer v. McConnaughy,140 US 1 (1891); Truax v. Raich, 239 US 33 (1915)]. However, immunity of state executive personnel is a qualified immunity limited by a “facts and circumstances” test of reasonableness and good faith [ Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 US 232 (1974)].

As with sovereign immunity, Eleventh Amendment protection may be waived by consent of the State to be sued, such as by voluntary submission to suit [ Clark v. Barnard, 108 US 436 (1883)] or by a general law specifically consenting to be sued in Federal courts [ Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line, 200 US 273 (1906)]. However, such consent must be clear and specific, and consent to be sued in its own courts does not imply a waiver of immunity in federal courts [ Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 US 151 (1909)].

Prior to 1992 it was clear that Alaska had not consented to suit in federal courts under the Murray holding because AS 09.50.250 expressly limited suits against the State on contract, quasi-contract or tort to the Superior Court. However, AS 09.50.250 was amended by 1, ch. 119 SLA 1992, deleting the words “in the Superior Court.” If the 1992 amendment is construed as authorizing actions against the State in any court of competent jurisdiction, then it may be held that Alaska has waived its Eleventh Amendment protection [cf. Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 US 636 (1911) (dicta); but cf. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 327 US 573 (1946)].

Absent a general waiver, there may be a specific waiver. To the extent that the actions of the State constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity [under Nordic VillagePinkstaffTown & Country], that same set of operative facts also constitutes a waiver of Eleventh Amendment protection [In re 995 Fifth Avenue Associates, LP, 963 F2d 503 (CA2 1992); see Hoffman v. Connecticut Dept. of Income Maintenance, 492 US 96 (1989)].

Political Subdivisions

Political subdivisions are creatures of the state, created by state law. As such, they are not truly “sovereigns.” Thus, the generally accepted rule is that political subdivisions of a state do not enjoy sovereign immunity and are only cloaked with immunity to the extent that the state sees fit to cloak them with immunity. Alaska follows this rule: political subdivisions in Alaska do not possess “blanket” immunity from suit [City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P2d 201 (Alaska 1962)].

Partial immunity from suit at the local government level is provided in AS 09.65.070(d). The main protection is the “discretionary function” provision of AS 09.65.070(d)(2). In this connection, a sharp distinction is drawn between “planning” and “operational” decisions in evaluating the exercise of discretion under AS 09.65.070(d)(2) [see e.g. Gates v. City of Tenakee Springs, 822 P2d 455 (Alaska 1991); Urethane Specialties v. City of Valdez, 620 P2d 683 (Alaska 1980)]. “discretionary acts are those which require `personal deliberation, decisions and judgment. . . .'” [Integrated Resources Equity Corp. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough, 799 P2d 295 (Alaska 1987)]. In addition, Alaska does not insulate even discretionary acts where the act itself violates established law. Thus, it must be concluded that political subdivisions of the State are not immune to damage claims under 362.

Moreover, immunity from suit in federal courts under the Eleventh Amendment does not extend to Municipalities, counties and other political subdivisions of a state [ Lincoln County v. Luning ,133 US 529 (1890); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 US 371 (1940)].

Accordingly, municipalities, boroughs, and other political subdivisions that are not the functional equivalent of a state agency are subject to liability for transgressions of the automatic stay in the same manner and to the same extent as a private party.

Update: BRA 94 amended § 106 ostensibly waiving sovereign immunity and the 11th amendment protection of states in bankruptcy cases. However, the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Seminole Tribes of Florida v. Florida,517 US 44, 116 SCt 1114, 134 LEd2d 252 (1995) raises a serious question regarding the power of Congress to override the 11th amendment proscription on suits against states in federal courts. [For an in-depth discussion of sovereign immunity and the 11th amendment, one should read this 71-page decision, particularly the dissent by Justice Stevens (not exactly recommended as a late evening exercise).


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